



ACCESS TO DURABLE SOLUTIONS AMONG IDPs IN IRAQ

PART ONE

SFS

Walsh School of Foreign Service
Institute for the Study of International Migration



International Organization for Migration (IOM)
The UN Migration Agency



Funded by the
US Government

APRIL 2017



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International Organization for Migration (IOM)
The UN Migration Agency

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COVER AND PAGE II PHOTOS BY *Hadi al-Najjar*



This research is funded by
the US State Department,
Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration

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FOREWORD

BY IOM IRAQ CHIEF OF MISSION, THOMAS LOTHAR WEISS

More than 3 million Iraqis live in displacement due to the current crisis; understanding the dynamics of this displacement and the adaptations of internally displaced people (IDPs) as they deal with the challenges of displacement is key to finding pertinent, targeted and durable solutions to support these IDPs, whether they choose to stay in their locations of displacement or return to their homes.

This timely longitudinal study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Georgetown University, “Access to Durable Solutions”, explores just that: How are IDPs coping with their new environment and challenges? What durable solutions have they found to enhance their resilience to such adverse circumstances? This report of the first round of the study sets the baseline for the forthcoming second and third rounds of data collection and reporting.

The study relies on surveys administered to approximately 4,000 Iraqi families displaced since January 2014 and living outside camp settings, and qualitative interviews with host community members and IDPs. Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah governorates, which collectively hosted around 33% of IDPs, were included in the study.

The study offers strong evidence that displacement is an effective protection strategy, and reveals that most IDPs feel safer in their location of displacement than back home –this is also attributed, however, to the positive attitude of host communities all over Iraq. Feeling accepted and part of the community, has a positive impact on people’s perception of safety and security; this is a notable factor in displacements within the ‘home’ governorate, where social and family connections are often available to offer a network of support.

Even though most IDPs reported feeling safer in their new locations, almost all have experienced a sharp decline in their standard of living: housing is a challenge and is often in poor condition, income has dwindled if not ceased, and most personal possessions have been left behind. IDPs have found solutions in relying on family and friends, sharing houses, borrowing money and relying on charity.

The greater availability of these support networks and other resources has contributed to displacement being a mostly urban phenomenon (87%). For IDPs from rural areas, attention should be provided to develop their skills, to ease the burden of displacement on urban areas. When returning to their homes, IDPs from rural areas should be assisted to restart their agricultural activities, in order to support agricultural production.

Accessing employment to provide for families was identified as a major challenge facing IDPs. Before experiencing displacement, many IDPs were fully employed and supporting their households, and must now rely on irregularly available daily work. Despite all these challenges, many IDPs have rebuilt their lives in displacement, found livelihoods and wish to stay and integrate in their new communities. For others, the limited availability of livelihood opportunities has pushed displaced families to return home even when conditions do not support safe and dignified return.

Decisions to return are strongly affected by factors in the location of origin: security conditions, the availability of jobs (securing livelihoods) and the availability of housing. Security is, and will remain,

the most important consideration, as it determines whether returnees can rebuild their livelihoods, and whether those who choose to remain can do so in a stable environment that ensures their basic rights are upheld. The study also reveals that neither loss of documentation nor family separation are reported as a significant problem among surveyed IDPs.

It is essential that the Government of Iraq and development partners focus on and consistently promote durable solutions to improve the conditions of IDPs, to meet their needs and to support recovery. Ensuring security will be key in allowing IDPs to rebuild their lives, whether in displacement or upon return.

We hope that the study's findings and conclusions will inform decision makers and the humanitarian community about challenges faced by IDPs, and will promote development of effective and durable solutions in support of stabilization and recovery for IDPs and for the country of Iraq.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

More than four million Iraqis live as internally displaced persons (IDPs), comprising over 10% percent of the country's population of 36 million. Repeated rounds of internal displacement have plagued Iraq for decades, most recently with the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the subsequent fighting. This longitudinal study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Georgetown University identifies the ways in which Iraqi IDPs experience displacement, adapt to their circumstances, and create durable solutions. Through surveys of about 4,000 Iraqi families displaced since January 2014, and qualitative interviews with host communities and IDPs, the study aims to help researchers and policymakers build more accurate and nuanced understandings of IDPs' realities in order to foster more effective durable solutions. As spelled out in the Framework on Durable Solutions by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), achieving a durable solution means that IDPs no longer face particular vulnerabilities resulting from their displacement and that they enjoy their full human, legal, and communal rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. This report represents the findings and analysis of the first round of data collection, completed in March-April 2016; additional rounds of data collection will allow longitudinal comparisons as IDPs return, integrate, and resettle. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the IASC durable solutions framework and background on Iraqi displacement.

The four governorates of study (Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah) hosted roughly 33% of IDP families displaced by ISIL in Iraq – approximately 180,000 families out of a total of 522,000 displaced families throughout the country in December 2015. The rationale for the selection of these governorates, covered in Chapter 2, includes the heterogeneity of the displaced population with respect to governorate of origin and religious background and the variation in the numbers of IDPs hosted by each governorate, along with the fact that they could be accessed with reasonable safety. The study included only those IDPs living outside of camps (camp residents made up 10% of the IDP population at the time of the first round of study).

A variety of central government policies enacted by the General Council of Ministers after January 2014 (in Appendix 4) specifically address IDPs' needs, such as the ability to move their place of public employment, new housing loans for the poor, a one-time payment for IDPs of 1 million Iraqi Dinars (approximately US \$840), and compensation for those who lost homes in the fighting. The implementation of these policies has met with varying degrees of success: 94% of all IDPs are registered with the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD), many received the 1 million dinar payment, and people reported retaining their government-sector jobs. However, none had received compensation for lost homes (and most did not even know that such compensation was possible).

Chapter 3 provides the overall conclusions of the first round of the study, showing that displacement is indeed an effective protection strategy, with the vast majority of IDPs feeling much safer in their current place of residence than in the place from which they moved. In general, this is not always the case for IDPs, but due to the welcoming attitudes of society in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, only a tiny

minority reported discrimination or violence toward them because they were IDPs. As the retaking of ISIL-controlled areas continues, a meaningful comparison can be made between those who fled and those who remained and returnees, in terms of safety and other indicators of durable solutions.

Prior ties and histories matter and seem to be directly linked to perceptions of personal security. Baghdad – the governorate where IDPs reported feeling least secure – is also the governorate where IDPs reported feeling accepted the least by the community (64%), with greater feelings of acceptance in Kirkuk (77%), Basrah (89%), and Sulaymaniyah (96%). Over a quarter of IDPs in Kirkuk came from another area of Kirkuk, and thus tend to feel safer because they count themselves “as among the people of Kirkuk,” as expressed by one respondent. This is similar to the situation for many IDPs in Basrah who were originally from Basrah or chose to come to Basrah because they had family or friends there. This sense of belonging, whether based on family ties, familiarity with the area, former employment, or other links, has a direct positive impact on people’s sense of safety and security in the governorate of displacement. Interestingly, 96% of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah, part of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and with an overwhelmingly Kurdish population, report feeling accepted. This is despite the fact that 90% of the IDPs report themselves as Arab. This fact speaks to the limitations of a ethnicity-based analysis of IDP movement that suggests that people move to be with their own communities.

Although people report feeling safe and secure in their new places of residence, they experience stark declines in their standards of living and in particular the quality of their housing. Increasing demand on the rental housing market pushed prices up and pushed many into slum-like conditions as well as negatively impacting the poor among the host community. IDPs found solutions in relying first and foremost on family and friends – through sharing housing (around 25%) and borrowing money (nearly 50%) – and additionally on aid and charity. These networks pulled 87% of IDPs into urban areas where they had family and labor connections. This percentage of IDPs living in urban areas is higher than the percentage of urban residents for the country as a whole (70%). This finding indicates that policies should be adjusted accordingly to ease the burden on urban communities by increasing services for all. Policies are also needed to assist IDPs from rural areas to stay in areas where they have the skills to work and thus also encouraging the redevelopment of Iraq’s rural areas with new governmental agricultural projects or incentives for land-owners to expand agricultural projects.

Accessing employment that can sustain a family’s needs remains a challenge. While certain sectors (government civil service, military, the oil industry, etc.) allow IDPs to transfer jobs to their new places of residence, and some found employment in the private sector, for others, their skills (such as farming) were no longer suitable for the labor markets where they currently live. As a result, family members, including young adults, women, and formerly self-employed men work intermittent jobs or menial labor. The study reveals how the lack of regular employment impacts their sense of self-esteem and their ability to care for their children and send them to school. Such experiences also push these families, already the most disadvantaged, to be among the first to return to their places of origin. The increased competition for informal sector labor also impacts the local population who face increased competition with IDPs for ever-lower wages, thus disproportionately affecting the most needy among the host community.

While return to community of origin is usually seen as the most desirable durable solution from a policy perspective, it is not the most desired from the perspective of many IDPs. Those who have found suitable housing and have re-created some semblance of their livelihoods, or those who feel considerably more secure, express a desire to stay where they are rather than return. In addition, the study finds that IDPs decide to return primarily based on the security situation in the community from which they were displaced. Other factors – employment and finances as well as the presence of housing – are the next most important in their decision about return. Thus, with the liberation of areas from ISIL, if IDPs

are to return, it is essential that security and safety be restored to those areas and that there be ways for returnees to re-create their livelihoods.

What this study ultimately indicates is the need for a more contextual and nuanced approach to durable solutions for IDPs than is usually the case, as summarized in Chapter 4. While over the last three years Iraqi central government has enacted legislation to assist IDPs, there has been no progress in implementing the promised compensation and reparations for what they have lost. International aid has played an important role in meeting the needs of displaced Iraqis. And some Iraqis have found durable solutions with assistance from their family, friends, and host community members. But ultimately, it is only in ensuring security for all Iraqis that IDPs will find durable solutions. Policies enacted that support Iraqi IDPs will assist them to reestablish their lives, livelihoods, and meaningful social integration whether through return, integration or resettlement.



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1. INTRODUCTION

This study, jointly carried out by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM), sets out to understand the experiences of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq in accessing quasi-durable and durable solutions to their displacement. Internal displacement has a long and painful history in Iraq and at the time of this writing, the estimates of the number of IDPs stand at over 4.4 million¹— out of a total Iraqi population of 36 million people. Even as new displacement is occurring, those displaced earlier for years – and in some cases, decades – have not found solutions. The question of durable solutions is thus an urgent issue. For millions of Iraqi IDPs, finding solutions means an end to living in limbo. For local and national authorities and host communities, it means being able to move beyond short-term planning and to incorporate IDPs into development plans. For the international community, finding solutions means an eventual end to repeated cycles of appeals for humanitarian funding. For all actors, it means opportunities for increased stability, security, and economic well-being.

While the study is of immediate interest to Iraqi IDPs and those serving them, it also has implications for those working with internally displaced populations more generally. Although the need for durable solutions has long featured in the discourse around IDPs and refugees, we know remarkably little about how these solutions are perceived and implemented. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions and IOM's Framework on the Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations (both discussed in more detail below) offer essential guidance on both the criteria and the process of finding solutions, but have limitations. What sets this study apart from others is that it is a longitudinal analysis; that is, it is based on interviews with Iraqi IDPs over time as well as with representatives of host communities and other stakeholders. The study is based on three research questions:

- How does the experience of displacement and access to durable solutions among IDPs in Iraq change over time?
- What are the needs, coping strategies, and aspirations of IDPs, and which events or factors are perceived to impact these needs, coping strategies, and aspirations over time?
- How does the experience of IDPs in Iraq inform our conceptualization and operationalization of quasi-durable and durable solutions?

This report is the first in what is expected to be a series of reports from this multi-year study. Based on the first tranche of quantitative interviews, carried out in March - April 2016, the study provides baseline data on the needs, coping strategies and aspirations of IDPs at one particular point in time. This report utilizes that baseline data and qualitative interviews with IDPs and host community members to offer preliminary reflections on the impact of these findings on our conceptualization of durable solutions. Subsequent reports will analyze changes in these findings using different variables and over time.

¹ Adrian Edwards “[Global Forced Displacement Hits Record High](#),” *UNHCR News*, N.p., 20 June 2016. Also confirmed by [IDMC](#)

Longitudinal studies can enhance understanding of migration and population displacement for the following reasons: 1) they allow us to understand more precisely the processes through which various factors influence decisions to move; and 2) they enable understanding of the longer-term effects of displacement.² The longitudinal research design of this study is thus particularly well-suited to understand the circumstances in which individuals were displaced, and how individuals' needs, strategies, and access to durable solutions change over time. Findings from the study thus allow us to build an evidence base that helps researchers and policymakers to move beyond conceptions of displacement as either a 'crisis' or a problem that has been solved, and instead bring into focus the ways in which the process of seeking out durable solutions to displacement coexists alongside patterns of mobility and risk management.

In recent years, researchers at IOM Iraq and Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration have conducted extensive quantitative and qualitative research around internal and cross-border movements in Iraq, among other situations of conflict- and disaster-induced displacement elsewhere in the world.³ IOM Iraq has been heavily involved in conducting in-depth assessments and operations around internal displacement in Iraq since 2003, and has an extensive network of trained field staff that is embedded within communities to monitor and track displacement and deliver humanitarian assistance. IOM currently has almost 900 staff working in all 18 governorates.⁴ At present, IOM Iraq's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) that IOM has developed to enable the organization to regularly capture, process, and disseminate information on numbers and locations, vulnerabilities, and needs of displaced populations throughout the course of a crisis is the most trusted source of country-wide data on the number and location of IDPs in Iraq. IOM Iraq also publishes regular reports and governorate profiles on IDP needs and displacement.⁵ Georgetown's ISIM has an 18-year track record of research into displacement and migration, and Georgetown faculty⁶ have also undertaken research with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Egypt, using qualitative methods similar to those used in this longitudinal study.⁷

1.1. Iraqi Displacement

Iraq has experienced multiple waves of internal displacement. Displacement was used as a political tool during the Saddam Hussein regime to systematically marginalize ethnic minorities and to consolidate political control. During the 1970s and 1980s, displacement campaigns against the Kurds

² World Bank. *Eastern Africa - HOA Displacement Study: Forced displacement and mixed migration in the Horn of Africa*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2015.

³ Angela Sherwood, Megan Bradley, Lorenza Rossi, Rosalia Gitau and Bradley Mellicker, *Supporting Durable Solutions to Urban, Post-Disaster Displacement: Challenges and Opportunities in Haiti*, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and International Organization for Migration 2014, p. 2; Angela Sherwood, Megan Bradley, Lorenza Rossi, Rufu Guiam, and Bradley Mellicker, *Resolving Post-Disaster Displacement: Insights from the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)*, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and IOM, 2015 p. 1; Elizabeth Ferris, *The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq*, The Brookings Institution, August, 2008; Phil Marfleet, *Iraq's Refugees - beyond 'tolerance'*, Refugee Studies Centre, December, 2009.

⁴ IOM, *Revised Iraq Appeal: July-December 2015*.

⁵ IOM, [Iraq website](#)

⁶ ISIM Georgetown [Website](#)

⁷ Rochelle Davis, *Urban Refugees in Amman, Jordan*. Institute for the Study of International Migration, and Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, November 2012. Elzbieta M. Gozdziaik and Alissa Walter, *Urban Refugees in Cairo*. Institute for the Study of International Migration, and Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, November 2012.



and Shi'as led to the internal displacement of over one million people.⁸ While the US invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Hussein regime did not immediately trigger massive waves of displacement, the resulting instability led to sectarian violence that started in 2006 and has led to repeated waves of internal displacement.⁹ By 2008, 2.78 million Iraqis were internally displaced with a similar number living as refugees outside the country.¹⁰ Growing militancy by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) led to yet another displacement crisis, which began in December 2013 and led to a third wave of 3.2 million newly displaced IDPs by October 2015.¹¹ By October 2016, the number of IDPs stood at 3.2 million¹² and military operations to retake Mosul from ISIL are triggering further displacement. Humanitarian resources are currently stretched and governmental and international support has not been sufficient to respond to the immediate humanitarian needs of Iraqi IDPs, much less to support the longer-term developmental efforts necessary to support their return or integration into local communities. Our study shows that displaced families are living with much less, and that much of the burden

⁸ Joseph Sassoon, *The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis in the Middle East*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2009, p. 9; see also Chatelard, Geraldine, "What Visibility Conceals: Re-embedding Refugee Migration from Iraq" and al-Takriti, Nabil, "There Go the Neighbourhoods: Policy Effects vis-à-vis Iraqi Forced Migration" both chapters in Dawn Chatty and Bill Finlayson (eds.), *Dispossession and Displacement: Forced Migration in the Middle East and North Africa* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁹ Chatty, Dawn and Mansour, Nisrine, "Unlocking Protracted Displacement: An Iraq Case Study" *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 30, (2011): p. 52; Chatelard, Geraldine, "Iraqi refugee and IDPs: From humanitarian intervention to durable solutions." *Middle East Institute and Fondation Pour La Recherche Strategique* (June 9, 2011).

¹⁰ Sassoon, *op cit.* p.13. See also Chatelard, Geraldine, *Jordan as a transit country: Semi-protectionist immigration policies and their effects on Iraqi forced migrants*. New issues in refugee research, 61. Geneva: UNHCR, 2002; Washington, Kate, *Iraqis in Jordan: Urban Refugees*, Data and the Implications for Emergency Education Programs. (2010); IOM "Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq, February 2011."

¹¹ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix-Iraq Mission. Round 30, October 2015*, pp. 4-7.

¹² IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix-Iraq Mission. Round 57 October 2016* p. 1.



of support has been borne by extended family members sharing living spaces and loaning money, and through charitable giving by host communities.

In addition to the massive number of IDPs, an estimated 11 million people in Iraq will be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2017, including 3 million vulnerable host community members and 1.4 million highly vulnerable people living in ISIL or other conflict areas.¹³ The majority of IDPs and affected populations remain in dire need of protection assistance, shelter, health services, food security, water, and education.¹⁴ Humanitarian actors have been limited in their capacity to provide assistance and are unable to meet the minimum international standards of assistance due to inadequate funding, limited humanitarian access, and weak coordination with national and local actors.¹⁵ In addition to the IDPs, northern Iraq has also experienced an influx of approximately 250,000 Syrian refugees, leading not only to increased pressure on local governments and humanitarian actors but also to problems in coordination of assistance efforts.¹⁶

Since its inception in August 2003, the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoMD), the Iraqi government entity responsible for assisting IDPs, refugees, and returnees, has only helped a small percentage of those in need. In order to receive assistance, IDPs must register with the MoMD in the local governorate office. However, the registration system itself has been flawed due to a disparity between the criteria set by the MoMD offices in defining the displaced and internationally recognized

¹³ OCHA, 2016 *Humanitarian Response Plan: Iraq: Advance Executive Summary*. 16 December 2016. p. 8.

¹⁴ OCHA, *Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2015*, June 2015, p. 3.

¹⁵ OCHA, *Iraq: Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2015*, June 2015, p. 8.

¹⁶ Louise Redvers, “Refugee or IDP – does it really matter?” *IRIN News*, 13 November 2014.

criteria.¹⁷ With the displacement due to ISIL, there has been a much more consistent response to registering IDPs: our study shows 94% of the families surveyed are registered with MoMD. Among IDPs in Kirkuk and among IDPs originally from Kirkuk the percentage is 88%; similarly, 89% of those from Salah al-Din are also registered. We know that some IDPs experience difficulties registering due to a lack of documentation or the fact that their displacement occurred at times other than those specified in the timeframe accepted for registration.¹⁸

1.2 Previous Studies of Iraqi Displacement

While a number of valuable studies have addressed Iraqi internal displacement,¹⁹ the fact that protracted displacement continues and the huge spike in the number of IDPs after 2014 are indications that there is much that remains to be known. Additionally, more academic and comprehensive studies that are based on large-scale data collection are needed. IOM's thematic reports on Iraqi displacement have served as an important resource for both policy-makers and practitioners and UN and NGO reports have provided updates on current needs and issues.²⁰ However, there have been no academic studies focused on the extent to which Iraqi IDPs have found solutions to their displacement, the strategies that they have used, or how these strategies change over time. The present study was developed in order to fill this gap. Based on both quantitative and qualitative data collection, the study is based on a representative sample of the IDP population in order to analyze the extent to which durable solutions have been – or can be – found.

The limited published research centered on Iraqi IDP and host community perceptions reveals a critical evolution in IDP intentions, obstacles and coping strategies as displacement becomes protracted and conditions at home and in areas of displacement change. In the summer of 2013, IOM conducted interviews with 57 Iraqi government officials, 35 host community representatives, and 45 IDPs to “give a fresh look into the issues pertinent to the integration of IDPs in Iraq.”²¹ The study captured the evolved intentions of IDPs regarding durable solutions, the primary factors IDPs consider when deciding to flee and integrate elsewhere, and the host communities' perceptions of IDPs. In particular, the study demonstrated that perceptions of durable solutions evolve over time. Between 2006 and 2008, 45% of IDPs intended to return, while only 25% favored local integration. By 2012, only 6% of IDPs interviewed intended to return, while 85% expressed an intention to integrate locally. IDPs overwhelmingly chose to flee to areas where they would be part of the dominant ethno-sectarian group; security, employment, housing, and public services were the most important factors cited by both host community and IDP participants regarding IDPs' intentions to integrate.²² Another recent IOM study published in September 2016 drew on qualitative material with IDPs, host community members, and other stakeholders to demonstrate the role of integration and social cohesion in Iraqi communities'

¹⁷ IOM Iraq, *Internal Displacement in Iraq: Barriers to Integration*, December 2013, p. 14.

¹⁸ IDC, *Iraq: IDPs caught between a rock and a hard place as displacement crisis deepens*, June 30, 2015, p. 11.

¹⁹ Roberta Cohen. “Rethinking the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq: Iraq’s Displaced: Where to Turn?”. *Am. U. Int’l L. Rev.* 24 (2009); Peter Van Der Auweraert, “Displacement and National Institutions: Reflections on the Iraqi Experience,” Middle East Institute. Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, 2011; Madarik Foundation (In partnership with NRC and UNHCR), “[Conditions and rights of IDPs and Returnees in Four Governorates of Iraq](#),” 2013.

²⁰ IOM, *Thematic Report on IDPs Intentions*, July 10, 2015, (Draft); IOM, *The Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations*, September 29, 2015, (Draft); IOM, Council 106th Session, *IOM’s Humanitarian Policy- Principles for Humanitarian Action*, C/106/CRP/20, October 12, 2015; IOM, *Community Revitalization Program: Phase IV*, August, 2015.

²¹ IOM, *Iraq, Internal Displacement in Iraq: Barriers to Integration*, p. 7.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 18-26. Also see: IOM, “[Iraq Displacement 2006 Year Review](#).”; IOM, “[Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq, February 2011](#).”; IOM, “[Iraq Final Report 2012 – Displacement Monitoring and Needs Assessments](#).” IOM Iraq, *Internal Displacement in Iraq: Barriers to Integration*, December 2013, p. 14; UN HABITAT, *Iraq Country Programme Document 2009-2011*.

ability to withstand shocks, such as additional displacement to their area.²³

A survey of the literature on Iraqi refugees provides some windows into the strategies of forced migrants, the responses of local communities, and the policies of host governments that are useful starting points.²⁴ Chatty and Mansour argue that Iraqi refugees do not fit the Western understanding of the refugee regime because their migration is circular. While they are living outside the country, Iraqi refugees return to Iraq to check on family members, pick up pension checks, and conduct routine business. Chatty and Mansour characterize this mobility as the “result of a strategy to manage life risks by dispersal of family members along pre-established social networks whenever possible.”²⁵ They note that while local integration of Iraqi refugees is rejected by all the host governments, local ‘accommodation’ is taking place in that Iraqis are settling down and blending in with their host communities (including through intermarriage with locals) and few are deported.²⁶ In conducting this study on IDPs, we sought to determine if these findings, developed in a refugee context, would be useful in understanding IDPs’ search for self-crafted solutions.

This research project, *Access to Durable Solutions among IDPs in Iraq*, sought to build on these studies in examining the ways in which Iraqis themselves access durable solutions, either through accessing known solutions or creating new solutions to their displacement and thus, the extent to which existing frameworks for durable solutions are applicable in Iraq.

1.3 Durable Solutions and Ending Displacement

The foundational international document for addressing internal displacement is the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, adopted in 1998, which identifies the needs, rights, and guarantees relevant to the protection and assistance of IDPs during and after displacement. The Guiding Principles define IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”²⁷

Based on international human rights law, international humanitarian law and (by analogy) refugee law, the Guiding Principles identify three durable solutions to internal displacement: return, local integration, and settlement elsewhere in the country.²⁸ In 2010, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee adopted the *Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons*, which provides a better understanding of each durable solution, further details the process and conditions necessary for achieving a durable solution, and sets the criteria to determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved.²⁹ While there are other relevant documents which offer in-

²³ Siddiqui, Nadia and Guiu, Roger, et. al. “Assessment of Community Perceptions of Social Cohesion in Areas of Protracted Displacement and Stabilization in Iraq.” International Organization for Migration. Sept. 2016.

²⁴ Chatty and Mansour, *op cit.* p. 52; Davis, Rochelle and Taylor, Abbie, *Urban Refugees in Amman, Jordan*, Institute for the Study of International Migration, December, 2012; Ferris, Elizabeth, *The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq*, The Brookings Institution, August, 2008; Marfleet, Phil, *Iraq’s Refugees- beyond ‘tolerance,’* Refugee Studies Centre, December, 2009; Sassoon, *op cit.*; Zetter, Roger, *Protection in Crisis: Forced Migration and Protection in a Global Era*, Migration Policy Institute, March, 2015.

²⁵ Chatty and Mansour, *op cit.* p. 4.

²⁶ Chatty and Mansour, *op cit.* p. 7.

²⁷ OCHA, *Iraq: Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2015*; See footnote 18.

²⁸ United Nations, OCHA, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, 1998, p. 8.

²⁹ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Person*, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement. April 2010, pp. 12

sights into durable solutions for displacement, such as those on the relationship between displacement and peace processes and transitional justice,³⁰ on humanitarian principles³¹ and operations³² and various publications of the Global Protection³³ and Early Recovery Clusters, the *Framework for Durable Solutions* remains the principal point of reference for understanding the process of achieving durable solutions.

1.4 The IASC Framework for Durable Solutions

In 2005, the then-Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs, Walter Kälin, was asked by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, to develop guidance on ‘when displacement ends.’ This led to a multi-year process of research and consultations, carried out with the support of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement and Georgetown’s ISIM. Three approaches were considered – a ‘cause-based approach’ (e.g. displacement ends when the conflict or disaster which caused the displacement is over); a ‘location-based approach’ (e.g. when IDPs return to their homes), and a ‘needs-based approach’ (e.g. when displaced persons no longer have particular needs directly linked to their having been displaced.) The third approach was ultimately used. The Framework understands durable solutions as a gradual process rather than a specific endpoint. It identifies the parameters of such process based on human rights and identifies criteria for determining the degree to which durable solutions have been achieved.



³⁰ See Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, *Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace-building*, Brookings Institution, 2007. Roger Duthie, ed., *Transitional Justice and Displacement*. New York: Social Science Research Council, 2012.

³¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Humanitarian Policy: Principles for Humanitarian Action*, October 2015.

³² International Organization for Migration (IOM), *IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework*, 2013.

³³ Global Protection Cluster, *Digest: securing durable solutions for IDPs*, 01/2014.

A durable solution is achieved if internally displaced persons:

- No longer have specific assistance and protection needs and vulnerabilities that are directly linked to their having been displaced; and
- Enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.

As spelled out in the *Guiding Principles*, three durable solutions are considered: sustainable reintegration at the place of origin, sustainable local integration in areas where IDPs take refuge; and sustainable integration in another part of the country. The *Framework*, again like the *Guiding Principles*, recognizes the primary responsibility of the government to support durable solutions and calls for the rapid and unimpeded access to humanitarian and development actors. The *Framework* underlines the centrality of the needs, rights and legitimate interests of IDPs as the primary consideration in determining durable solutions. In particular, the Framework highlights the importance of the informed and voluntary decisions of IDPs on solutions, consultation and participation of IDPs in decisions affecting them and their implementation, and the access of IDPs to all actors supporting durable solutions and to effective monitoring mechanisms. Finally, the Framework spells out criteria to determine the extent to which a durable solution has been achieved:

Enjoyment without discrimination of:

- Safety and security
- Adequate standard of living, including access to adequate food, housing, healthcare and education
- Access to employment and livelihoods
- Access to mechanisms for restitution of housing, land and property or compensation if restitution is not possible.

Depending on the situation the following may also be necessary for achieving a durable solution:

- Access to and replacement of personal and other documentation (e.g. identification cards, property titles)
- Voluntary reunification with family members separated during displacement
- Participation in public affairs (e.g. in elections)
- Effective remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice reparations and information about the causes of violation.

There have been several attempts to apply the *Framework for Durable Solutions* to specific situations. Bigio and Scott sought to operationalize the framework for application to Iraqi displacement, formulating and assessing a number of indicators that would be useful to understanding the extent to which IDPs in Iraq can find durable solutions.³⁴ Studies on applying the framework to two situations of disaster-induced displacement in Haiti and the Philippines were conducted by IOM and the Brookings-LSE Project in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The 2010 Haiti earthquake displaced over 1.5 million people and four years later, almost 150,000 people remained displaced. The study was based on interviews with stakeholders and 2500 interviews with Haitians living outside of camps in 2014 and found that about half of those

³⁴ Jamille Bigio, and Jen Scott, *Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Process of Working Toward Durable Solutions*, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, June 2009.



interviewed had been displaced by the earthquake. Of those who reported being displaced in 2010, 75 percent indicated that they were displaced even though no longer living in an IDP camp. The study found that “many of the socio-economic factors underlying exposure to displacement in the first place are, not surprisingly, factors that also inhibit the durable resolution of displacement” and called for development and reconstruction efforts to address solutions to displacement from the very beginning.³⁵ The study also found cases where IDPs decided to use resources made available to support their durable solutions, e.g. rental subsidies, in ways different from those intended. While these were reported as adverse outcomes, they indicate the ways in which IDPs can be agents of their own solutions.

Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in October 2013 displaced 4 million people and the IOM-Brookings study sought to understand the particular needs of those who remained displaced 15 months after the typhoon. The study, based on interviews with stakeholders and 4500 Haiyan-affected households, found that those who reported that they had been displaced were more likely to feel insecure and to have lost livelihoods and less likely to have access to adequate shelter than those who had not been displaced.³⁶ This situation of insecure status and inadequate access to shelter continued despite the fact that more than 90 percent of those displaced had returned to their home area and land within a month of the typhoon, thus evidencing the reason why a location-based approach to accessing durable solutions for IDPs is not adequate.

IOM’s *Framework on the Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations*³⁷ builds on the IASC

³⁵ Angela Sherwood, Megan Bradley, Lorenza Rossi, Rosalia Gitau and Bradley Mellicker, *Supporting Durable Solutions to Urban, Post-Disaster Displacement: Challenges and Opportunities in Haiti*; See footnote 3.

³⁶ Sherwood et al., *Resolving Post-Disaster Displacement: Insights from the Philippines*; See footnote 4.

³⁷ IOM, *Framework on the Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations*, Geneva: IOM, 2016.

Framework for Durable Solutions, but notes that the three traditional solutions for displacement are predicated on ending mobility and they assume that a finite event ushers in a comprehensive end to displacement. The IOM Framework integrates a mobility perspective to solutions and is based on a recognition that individuals are agents of their own recovery. The Framework sets out a six-step process to develop a comprehensive approach which recognizes the need for a conducive environment, and emphasizes self-reliance and coping capacities by affected populations, including IDPs, but also migrants and communities affected by the crisis. This Framework boils down the 8 criteria in the *IASC Framework on Durable Solutions* into four pillars, applying a mobility approach to each pillar:

- Protection, safety and security
- Adequate standard of living
- Sustainable livelihoods and employment
- Inclusive governance

By incorporating mobility and self-reliance into support for solutions for IDPs and by focusing on the broader affected community, the IOM Framework offers useful insights into the way in which Iraqi IDPs find solutions. Other studies focusing on solutions to internal displacement have also been carried out albeit with qualitative methods.³⁸ Organizations such as the Solutions Alliance, established in 2014³⁹ and the Joint Internal Profiling Service (JIPS)⁴⁰ are both working to support solutions to internal displacement, but as yet have not produced studies looking at the way intentions and strategies for ending displacement change over time – the subject of this research project.



³⁸ See for example the studies and resources available on the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement’s webpage on ‘[Durable Solutions](#)’. Also see publications by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, including [Home Sweet Home: Housing Practices and Tools that Support Durable Solutions for IDPs](#), March 2015; [Durable Solutions for IDPs: Challenges and Way Forward](#), October 2015.

³⁹ [Solutions Alliance](#)

⁴⁰ [JIPS, Joint IDP Profiling Service](#); for an example of how JIPS has used its profiling services to identify prospects and obstacles to durable solutions, see: [Link](#).


2. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS

As mentioned above, this is the first report from a multi-year research project that will collect information from a sample of displaced families over time. The duration of the project will depend on the availability of funding; although, in order to capitalize on the initial investment in setting up the study, it is hoped that the research will continue for a minimum of three years. The present report is based on the first round of interviews, conducted in March - June 2016, and hence is intended to provide a descriptive overview of Iraqi IDPs at one particular moment in time and to draw out relevant observations. Subsequent reports will be more analytical in nature and will incorporate longitudinal analysis.

The study excludes IDPs living in camps (10% of the Iraqi IDP population as of January 2016⁴¹), as they are expected to have different behaviors and to adopt strategies to attain durable solutions that differ from those of the vast majority of IDPs who live dispersed in communities. However, it is important to note that the delineation between IDPs living in camps and those residing in non-campus settings is not always a stark one. Many IDPs live in communities or enclaves that are similar to camps in that they are isolated from host communities and in some non-campus settings, IDPs receive distribution of relief items just as they do in camps. Although this is a longitudinal study which will focus on how the experience of internal displacement and access to durable solutions changes over time, this first report is intended as a baseline report on IDPs who were displaced since 1 January 2014, beginning with a survey of their demographic characteristics and then reporting on each of the eight indicators highlighted in the *Framework for Durable Solutions*. The methodology of the study is detailed in Appendix 1.

The four governorates of study (Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah) hosted in January 2016 roughly 33% of IDP families in the country – approximately 180,000 families out of a total of 522,000 displaced families in Iraq. For more information about the economic, social, and operational context of each governorate, see Appendix 2. These families are relatively young on average, as can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the age pyramid of IDP families in their governorate of residence in April 2016.

Figure 1: Age Distribution of Iraqi IDPs: Survey of April 2016



⁴¹ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix*, January 2016.

Just under half (48.1%) of the population is 19 years old or younger, and nearly two-thirds (66.3%) are 29 years of age or younger. There is a noticeable dearth of men aged 55-59 compared to women of the same age group. This likely reflects high casualty rates among military-aged men during the Iran-Iraq War, which spanned 1980 - 1988, as well as the first Gulf War from 1990 - 1991 (this age cohort would have been of military-age during these two conflicts).⁴² At the same time, there appears to be a deficit of children. A typical age pyramid would show at least as many children under the age of 5 as those aged 5-9. It is most likely that the deficit is due to a reduction in fertility among these IDPs, but we cannot say whether or not that is a byproduct of migration or delayed childbearing.⁴³

2.1 Religious Identification by Governorate

Across the four governorates, over 97% of IDPs self-identified as either “Muslim,” “Muslim Sunni,” or “Muslim Shi’a.” Given the sensitivity of sect in some parts of Iraq, the questionnaire included an opportunity to self-identify as Muslim rather than indicating the specific sect. Just under 60% of IDPs currently in Baghdad identify as “Muslim,” which may be evidence of the sensitivity of sect in Baghdad as opposed to the other governorates or may be an anti-sectarian comment. Almost 40% of IDPs in Basrah identify as “Muslim Shi’a,” which is consistent with the broader religious demography of the southernmost governorate, with 19.9% consider themselves to be “Muslim Sunni” and 38.7% as “Muslim.” Approximately 84% of IDPs in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah identified as “Muslim Sunni,” reflecting the largely Sunni Muslim demographics of these northern governorates and people’s identification as such. In Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah, 2-3% of the IDPs identified as Christian (various sects) and Yazidi.

2.2 Ethnic Composition by Governorate

As expected, the vast majority of IDPs identified themselves as Arab in the four governorates. Baghdad hosted the least ethnically diverse IDP population of the four governorates, with nearly 97% of IDPs identifying as Arab while Basrah has the lowest percentage of IDPs identifying as Arab (81.2%), with the remainder largely comprised of Turkmen (13.7%). IDPs in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah are 92.9% and 89.7% Arab respectively, and the non-Arab ethnic groups represent a diverse array of minorities, including a greater number of Kurds in Sulaymaniyah and small numbers of Assyrian and Chaldean Iraqis in Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah.

Table 1: Ethnic composition of IDPs by governorate

GOVERNORATE	PERCENT ARAB	PERCENT KURD	PERCENT TURKMEN	OTHER
BAGHDAD	96.8	1.2	1.9	0.1
BASRAH	81.2	1.5	13.7	3.6
KIRKUK	92.9	1.9	3.7	1.5
SULAYMANIYAH	89.7	7.1	1.6	1.6

⁴² Some estimates place the number of casualties on both sides of the Iran-Iraq War as high as half a million people. See Kurzman, Charles. “[Death Tolls of the Iran-Iraq War](#).” 31 October 2013.

⁴³ Iraqi fertility on average was stable through at least 2012 with the exception of a surge among young brides. Migration is known to depress fertility, but fertility might also have been delayed due to the stress of pre-migration conflict (Cetorelli, Valeria, 2014. “The Effect on Fertility of the 2003–2011 War in Iraq,” *Population and Development Review*, Volume 40, Issue 4, pp. 581–604).

2.3 Urban-rural location of IDPs

The percentage of IDPs living in urban areas is higher (87%) than the percentage of urban residents for the country as a whole (69.5%),⁴⁴ indicating that those who are displaced tend to go to urban areas, even if they came from less urban areas. In Sulaymaniyah, 99% of IDPs live in urban areas, while 85% of IDPs in both Baghdad and Kirkuk live in urban areas, and 71% in Basrah. Considerable variation of host community rural-urban residency occurs within the governorates, by district. Kadhimia district in Baghdad has the highest percentage of IDP rural residents (93%) followed by Adhamia (24%). In three districts in Basrah – Abu Al-Khaseeb Shatt Al-Arab, and Al-Qurna – 78% or more of the IDPs live in rural areas, whereas in Al-Midaina there are no IDPs living in urban areas. Sulaymaniyah only has one district, Sharbazher, which has 11% of the IDP population living in rural areas.

2.4 Governorate of origin for IDPs by governorate of displacement

This analysis is based only on those who were displaced after January 1, 2014 – largely as a result of ISIL's extensive territorial gains. Since then ISIL's control of territory has varied, reflecting the dynamic nature of the military conflict.⁴⁵

2.4.1 Baghdad

Almost three quarters of IDPs now in Baghdad were living in Anbar before their displacement. The remainder came from Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Diyala to the north, with some from other districts within Baghdad and others from Babylon to the south. In Baghdad, 44% of IDPs indicated that they came to Baghdad because of the presence of family and relatives and 4% indicated that they had no other choice (possibly




Figure 2: Governorates of origin for IDPs in Baghdad

⁴⁴ Iraq Demographics Profile 2016.

⁴⁵ For a map of ISIL's control of territory in mid-December 2016, see: [Link](#).

due to road blocks or closure of other routes). A lower percentage of IDPs (38%) indicated that security was a reason for their decision to move to Baghdad than in other governorates.

2.4.2 Basrah

Over half of the IDPs in Basrah come from areas north of Baghdad, with 37% hailing from Ninewa and another 22% from Salah al-Din, raising the question of why IDPs chose to move so far from their areas of origin. The qualitative interviews as well as enumerator knowledge indicate several reasons for displacement to Basrah. In some cases, the IDPs were originally from Basrah, had taken jobs in the north to work in various fields, including the petroleum industry, and who then returned to Basrah due to the violence in the north. Others fled the sectarian violence of 2006 in Basrah by going to the north and have now returned as a consequence of the violence in the northern areas. Some from the northern governorates were stationed in the military in Basrah prior to 2003 and had married people from the area, so Basrah was now perceived as a safe option for refuge. Among IDPs now living in Basrah, 33% of them had been not been living in their original places of residence when they were displaced after January 1, 2014 (90% of whom were originally from Basrah). This high percentage of those IDPs living in Basrah who had either been previously displaced or had moved compares to about 3-4% of those not living in their original places of residence in the other governorates. Looking at reasons why IDPs chose their place of refuge,

Basrah has the highest percentage of IDPs who chose the place due to the presence of family and friends (57%). The response of “other reasons” (17%) – including jobs (9%) – evidence a pull factor and is the highest among the four governorates. Our enumerators suggested this was because some workers were able to move jobs within the petroleum industry (particularly between Kirkuk/Ninewah and Basrah).





Figure 3: Governorates of origin for IDPs in Basrah



2.4.3 Kirkuk

Among IDPs in Kirkuk, the largest groups came from the nearby governorates of Salah al-Din and Anbar, and from within Kirkuk. IDPs chose Kirkuk mainly for security reasons, with 58% explaining that they decided to move to Kirkuk because of security. IDPs now living in Kirkuk also had the lowest percentage of respondents citing that they came to join family and relatives (19%). In comparison with other governorates of destination, a relatively greater share of IDPs in Kirkuk claimed that they had no other choice (9%), or cited the availability of housing (11%).






Figure 4: Governorates of origin for IDPs in Kirkuk



2.4.4 Sulaymaniyah

The largest group of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah come from Anbar, which is surprising given the distance. Additionally, Sulaymaniyah is in the Kurdish area where Kurdish is the predominant language spoken, which presents a linguistic challenge for many of the Arabic-speaking IDPs from Anbar, and indeed, other governorates where Arabic is the only or main language spoken. The majority of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah (74%) cite security as a reason for their displacement to Sulaymaniyah and it may be that blocked transportation routes prevented them from moving to other, closer, areas. Other reasons, including the presence of family and relatives, do act as a major pull factor for choosing the governorate.

Figure 5: Governorates of origin for IDPs in Sulaymaniyah



3. DURABLE SOLUTIONS INDICATORS

The following sections look at the results from both the qualitative and quantitative data on each of the eight factors identified as crucial for attainment of solutions in the *Framework for Durable Solutions*.

3.1 Safety and Security

Respondents in the qualitative interviews indicated that IDPs do not feel a general sense of safety or security due both to the fact of their displacement as well as the overall situation in Iraq. One female head-of-household from Mosul living in Baghdad explained that “IDPs don’t feel safe in Iraq because of the bad and unstable security situation.” However, in the quantitative survey, over 90% of the IDPs reported that they feel either “completely safe” or “moderately safe” in their current place of residence.⁴⁶ As might be expected, IDPs feel safer than they felt in their place of residence before January 1, 2014, in all likelihood because of ISIL and other fighting in the area. Respondents also indicated that feelings of safety and security depend on a number of factors, including, among others, the area where they live, their sect, and their own individual status.

Figure 6: Perceptions of safety by IDPs in their former places of residence, by governorate





Figure 7. Perceptions of safety by IDPs in their current places of residence, by governorate



One of the major findings of this study is that IDPs feel safer in their current place of residence than in the areas where they were living on January 1, 2014. This suggests that displacement is an effective strategy for increasing personal security. The following sections describe variations in perceptions of security by governorate.

3.1.1. Sulaymaniyah

IDPs in Sulaymaniyah felt the safest, with 94.5% reporting that they now feel “completely safe.” These feelings of safety and

⁴⁶ The Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) researchers are in the process of comparing results from several Durable Solutions surveys that use these same “safety and security” questions. In Somalia and Ukraine they find the same high percentage of people reporting feelings of safety. There are concerns that these questions on safety and security are not being answered in the quantitative questionnaires.

security seem primarily to be the result of living in the Kurdistan region. IDPs reported having a greater trust in and reliance on law enforcement in Sulaymaniyah: they indicate that while they would have solved problems amongst themselves in their places of origin, they now rely on and approach the police in the event that problems arise. As one laborer from Diyala put it: “the law has power here.” Others specifically refer to the Asayish, the Kurdish security apparatus, as responsible for this increased law and order: “[They] are the watchful eye over this area [and] take care of all illegal issues,” noted a driver from Fallujah. Another laborer from Diyala summed it up, “I have never been as safe as I am now.” The overall sense, as articulated by a government employee from Salah al-Din residing in Sulaymaniyah is that, “it’s only in Iraqi Kurdistan that IDPs feel secure and safe; in other places, like Baghdad for instance, the IDPs don’t feel safe due to the existing sectarian divide in the area.” At the same time, Sulaymaniyah is the governorate where IDPs experience the most restriction of movement (32%), especially for those living in the districts of Rania, Chamchamal, and Sharbazher (52%, 36%, and 33% respectively).

3.1.2 Baghdad

IDPs living in Baghdad reported feeling less safe than the IDPs living in the three other governorates of displacement with a much lower percentage of IDPs report feeling “completely safe” in Baghdad (24.8%). As in Sulaymaniyah, they credited local authorities in Baghdad, identified either as tribal authorities or city councils, as effectively ensuring that security is provided for the residents, IDPs, and host community alike. For those who cited insecurity in Baghdad as a problem, specific mention was made of the harassment of IDPs by security forces while others said that the host community makes them feel unsafe. “We do not feel safe because we are IDPs, and if a problem arises, fingers will be pointed at us immediately,” a farmer from Salah al-Din expressed. One mother from Anbar said, “[IDPs] from Anbar face harmful words from the host community...they blame people from Anbar, saying that we helped ISIL enter the region.” In Figure 8, just over 5% cited fears of targeted violence as the reason they felt unsafe while almost 20% cited “other” as causing those feelings of insecurity. A larger percentage of IDPs in Baghdad, 30.4%, reported “petty crime/theft” as their primary source of insecurity and a much smaller percentage (less than 10%) said that violence and kidnapping were their primary threat. This percentage is still higher than any of the other governorates. In Baghdad, 14% of IDPs reported experiencing restriction of movement; this was especially high in the district of Adhambia (28%).

3.1.3 Basrah

The feelings of safety in Basrah were mixed; 66.6% of IDPs reported feeling “completely safe,” and qualitative interview data varied considerably. “I don’t feel safe here because problems result [with the host community] from even the smallest misunderstanding,” according to a driver from Mosul. “I do not feel there is tolerance here, and this society is tense most of the other time.” Others in Basrah, on the contrary, cite the warm welcome and help from the host community as a main reason for their feelings of safety: “I feel safe in Basrah because...there isn’t discrimination between sects and the people of the city are tolerant and understanding,” said the mother of a family from Salah al-Din. Fourteen of the 20 families in the qualitative study are originally from Basrah, had lived in Basrah previously, or have relatives living in the area – all of which seem to have a powerful effect on respondents’ feelings of safety and security. 57.4% of IDPs in the quantitative study in Basrah identified “presence of relatives/extended family” as the primary reason drawing them to that governorate, more than IDPs living in any of the other three governorates of study. As with some IDPs living in Sulaymaniyah, many IDPs in Basrah felt safe but observed that IDPs living in other areas did not feel safe: for example, a driver from Ninewa suggested, “security is better for IDPs in the Basrah community than anywhere else,” and

a family from Salah al-Din similarly noted, “My sons live in Kirkuk and they say that it is not safe there because there are always explosions late at night; as for Basrah, the situation here is very safe.” Feelings of safety and security had gendered dimensions as well. A female head-of-household from Salah al-Din living in Basrah said, “The security situation is perfect, but I don’t feel safe because I live alone and I don’t have a man with me.” Thus, the sense of safety and security seems to reflect the overall environment as well as their own particular circumstances. There is almost no restriction of movement for IDPs in Basrah, with the highest percentage (5%) of restrictions reported in Al-Zubair.

3.1.4 Kirkuk


While over half of all IDPs in Kirkuk (59%) reported feeling “completely safe,” many of the qualitative interviews revealed anxieties about the future of their security situation. “Even the host community is very anxious,” noted the mother of a family from Qaraqosh, Ninewa. “Kirkuk is like a time-bomb. It has great oil wealth and everyone has their eyes on it,” referring to the competition between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdish regional government to control Kirkuk. IDPs cite a range of sources of insecurity in Kirkuk, the most prominent of which is “petty crime/theft,” which 32.9% of IDPs in Kirkuk cite as the primary source of insecurity. However, that is not the only source, as IDPs also mentioned harassment by security forces, a lack of freedom of movement, and the sponsorship system requiring IDPs to have a local sponsor (*kafeel* الكفيل or *pishgirey* بيشكيري). Many IDPs in Kirkuk make a distinction between physical security and psychological security; while they enjoy physical security in Kirkuk, feelings of psychological insecurities are brought on by uncertainty about their future. They also referred to the absence of law and order in Kirkuk as a main reason for insecurity (which stands in contrast to the IDPs in Sulaymaniyah, who marvel at the levels of law and order in Kurdistan). Comparatively, 2% of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah reported “petty crime/theft” to be a source of insecurity in comparison with the almost 33% of IDPs in Kirkuk. (See Figure 8.) A female head-of-household from Salah al-Din reported that, “we don’t feel safe and we stay home most of the time...To feel safe, we are



in need of police checkpoints and patrols to secure areas and provide order.”

Over a quarter (27.1%) of IDPs in Kirkuk came from another area of Kirkuk, and thus tended to feel safer because they count themselves “as among the people of Kirkuk,” as expressed by a government employee from Al-Hawiga, Kirkuk, now living in Kirkuk City. This is similar to the situation for many IDPs in Basrah who were originally from Basrah or chose to come to Basrah because they had family or friends there. This sense of belonging, whether based on family ties or familiarity with the area or another factor, had a direct positive impact on people’s sense of safety and security in the governorate of displacement.

Figure 8: Sources of insecurity in place of residence on January 1, 2014, by governorate




Feelings of insecurity are slightly higher in urban than rural areas in all the governorates except Basrah. As for the main sources of insecurity, there are slight variations between rural and urban areas and between governorates. Theft is the main crime in urban Sulaymaniyah (and absent in the rural areas of Sulaymaniyah), whereas very similar levels of petty crimes were reported in both urban and rural Basrah and Kirkuk. Rural Kirkuk stands out for the prevalence of kidnapping and reported discrimination. Petty crime seems to be more common in rural Baghdad than urban Baghdad

whereas urban Baghdad seems to be more at risk of discrimination, targeted violence, and kidnappings.

However, the percentage of those who claim to feel very safe is higher in urban areas in all governorates except Kirkuk. In rural areas, it seems that the few security incidents were resolved through families while in urban areas there was more mention of police and government forces. Tellingly, not even in Basrah, was recourse to militia or tribal leaders mentioned.

In all these cases, incidents of insecurity in their current place of residence were reported by a small minority of the population (1% overall). Overall, only 39 families said they faced security incidents, of those, 9 were dealt with by themselves, and 9 went to the government forces, the army, or the *asayish* to resolve. However, some districts have much higher rates, as in Al-Zubair in Basrah with 4%. Basrah is also the governorate with the highest overall incidence of reporting security incidents at 2%.

Figure 9. Sources of insecurity in present area of residence, by governorate



3.1.5 Safety and Security and Social Integration

Qualitative interviews with IDP families revealed that cultivating good relationships with the host community functioned, for some, as a strategy to ensure safety and security. “In the beginning, IDPs didn’t feel safe because the security forces harassed them, but it got better as time passed and the IDPs adapted,” a farmer from Anbar living in Baghdad recounts. “As for myself, I feel secure due to my good relations and communication with everyone.” Similarly, a worker from Salah al-Din living in Basrah observed: “I feel safe with my family due to God’s favor because we didn’t feel that we were strangers to the area. We found kindness in all of its meaning.” For others, however, the welcome of the host community cannot diminish the sense of insecurity they feel; a housewife from Anbar living in Kirkuk summed up these sentiments, saying: “We don’t feel very safe, and we don’t leave our house, spending most of our time at home. However, we cannot deny how kind the people are in our area. They don’t cause us to feel afraid; however, I consider this fear to be a normal thing for a person to feel after displacement. We cannot feel safe unless the government finds a solution to bring families back to their place of origin.”

Baghdad is the governorate where IDPs reported feeling accepted the least by the community (64%), with greater feelings of acceptance in Kirkuk (77%), Basrah (89%), and Sulaymaniyah (96%). However, the districts of Kadhimia and Mada’in in Baghdad show values as high as 88% and 85% respectively. Despite the high acceptance in Basrah, again the Al-Zubair district shows the lowest percentage (77%). Overall IDPs living in rural communities feel more accepted than those in urban ones (81% versus 72%) and this holds true in all governorates except Sulaymaniyah.

3.1.6 Security and Durable Solutions

The connection between security and access to durable solutions is clear: IDPs’ preferences for return, integration, or relocation to a third place are directly tied to security. When asked to identify the most important precondition for returning to their governorate of origin, the majority of IDPs in all governorates of study cited security as the most important factor (66.1% in Baghdad, 69.8% in Basrah, 75.1% in Kirkuk, and 52.7% in Sulaymaniyah). A worker from Diyala living in Sulaymaniyah expressed this conditional desire for return as it relates to security: “Many of us want to go back to our places of origin but on the condition that we have good security in those areas. For us, the place of origin is the best place. We [will] need everything, the most important of which is good security.” A farmer living in Baghdad underscored this notion that security is the bottom line for returning to his home governorate of Anbar: “I wish to return to my land and my home, as that is where my dignity and my pride are. To begin with, I need security, and beyond that, I don’t want anything else but to return to my land.” “We do not ask for anything in order to return, just for the security situation to improve,” echoed a worker from Babylon living in Sulaymaniyah. A housewife from Salah al-Din, heading her household and now living in Kirkuk, added: “The most important thing that I need [to return] is safety, freedom of movement, and assurance that there are no militants in the area.”

There were also cases that illustrated that IDPs wished to return to their places of origin, in spite of the unstable security situation. As a medical worker from Diyala now living in Basrah eloquently put it: “Everybody knows that Diyala is an unstable area because there were continuous targeted explosions and my work in emergency medical services meant that I was constantly surrounded by danger. [Despite all that], of course I miss my life there. I am reminded of the poetry verse: ‘love is only given to the first love.’ This is what I can tell you about how much I miss my place [of origin]. It is the love that I always long for and would want to go back to at all times.”

Conversely, feeling safe and secure in the host governorate was often cited as a reason to stay, although that choice is not always clear-cut: as a man from Diyala living in Sulaymaniyah artic-


ulated, “I feel satisfied and comfortable because we are safe and happy here. I wouldn’t have a problem staying here permanently, as I like this city and its people. But, if life improves in the future in our place of origin, I will probably return.” For others, the choice to stay and integrate is less ambiguous; another worker from Diyala living in Sulaymaniyah cites security as a reason to stay: “For now, I don’t think about returning. I want to stay and integrate with the Kurds, as we are safe here.”

Preferences for return or integration based on the security situation vary within families as well. The wife of a family from Salah al-Din living in Sulaymaniyah said, “Even if the situation gets better, I personally do not want to go back home...I feel relieved and comfortable here.” Her husband, by contrast, invoked his family’s ties to the land, saying: “It’s the land of our fathers, I cannot easily give it up. The only thing stopping me from going back is the current security situation; we can deal with the lack of services and facilities, but the security situation is something we cannot control.” Regardless of the particular preference, the connection between feelings of safety and the ability to integrate (or not) and thus having achieved a durable solution is clear: “One of the conditions of belonging is feeling safe,” explains the mother of a family from Mosul living in Kirkuk.

3.2 Adequate Standard of Living

In assessing the difference between their ability to access an adequate standard of living before displacement compared to their current situation of displacement, an overwhelming majority of IDPs (92.6%) reported that their present standard of living represented a marked decline from pre-displacement conditions.” Figure 10 shows that the vast majority of IDP families (well over 90%) were able to provide an adequate standard of living before January 1, 2014. However when asked to describe their ability to provide an adequate standard of living over the last three months (for their current location), the positive responses are much lower.

Figure 10: Perceptions of adequate standard of living by current governorate




The ability of IDPs to provide an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families varied greatly among the four governorates. In Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, 40.6% and 45.1% of IDPs reported that they were able to do so. IDPs in Basrah reported the lowest rate, with only 29.6% able to provide an adequate standard of living. Overall, 16.1% of the population in Basrah lives below the poverty line, higher than the national average of 11.5%,⁴⁷ and thus, IDPs are unable to compete with locals for daily wage labor and the lowest paying jobs. Clearly employment is an issue in Basrah. The study’s enumerators offered another explanation for the low percentage in Basrah due to the limited activities of aid organizations. Because Basrah has a comparatively small IDP population, fewer aid organizations are present than in the other governorates.⁴⁸ In all the governorates, local charities seem to provide a good deal of assistance to IDPs, which may account for differences in ability to access adequate living stan-

⁴⁷ NGO Coordinating Committee for Iraq

⁴⁸ Ibid

dards. For example, the highest percentage of IDPs reporting that they were able to provide an adequate standard of living was in Baghdad (73.7%). The enumerators suggested that the many aid organizations that are located in Baghdad facilitated the provision of assistance; also a good deal of donations and aid are provided by the local communities. Baghdad has also been a location of major in-migration historically, and thus a significant portion of the IDPs had relatives in the city, which provided them with a place to live as well as access to other ways to meet their needs.


Figure 11: Spending priorities by IDP families, by current governorate



IDPs' commentaries on their lives illustrate these hardships. "My life has changed 180 degrees," said a government employee from Mosul, now living in Basrah. "I had a residence, employment, and a car, and I lived an organized and calm life...now I am unable to provide for my family's needs." Similarly, the father of a family from Diyala living in Sulaymaniyah recalls their situation before displacement and laments their current conditions: "We were not from a family with a good financial status. We were a very simple family with a very simple and ordinary life, but at least I could provide for most of my family's needs there. But here, it's difficult. My family wanted me to buy them some new clothes, but I knew that if I did, we wouldn't be able to pay the next month's rent." Some IDPs recalled their previous role as providers of aid before they were displaced: "In previous years, we ourselves gave aid to Syrian

refugees. Unfortunately, our situation is now worse than theirs," recounts the son in a family from Salah al-Din now living in Baghdad.

Figure 12: IDP strategies for providing basic living needs, by governorate.



IDP families were asked to describe their anticipated spending if they received a large sum of money; their answers reveal the current shortfalls in their living situations and their top spending priorities. The top hypothetical spending priority among IDPs in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk was "food and clothing," while IDPs in Baghdad were almost evenly divided between spending it on "food and clothing" and "shelter". Nearly half of all IDPs in Basrah cited that spending on "shelter" would be their foremost consideration. Interestingly, while the qualitative interviews contained accounts of difficulty paying for medical needs (such

as cancer, kidney problems needing dialysis, and others), fewer than 12% of the IDP households indicated that they would spend an unexpected cash windfall on medical needs.

3.2.1 Strategies for Covering Basic Needs

IDPs indicated the ways that displacement reordered their spending and consumption patterns (see Figure 12). A farmer from Salah al-Din now living in Baghdad explains his family’s change in spending patterns: “I used to spend money on food, clothing, investing in land, and expanding my business, but now I only spend money on food. The majority of IDPs borrowed money and/or consumed savings as their primary strategy, while others reduced consumption of food, restricted their recourse to medical care, or shared a house. Between 9% and 14.4% of IDPs reported reducing consumption of food as their primary strategy to ensure a standard of living. They described going without food and basic furnishings for their homes and depending on the charity of the host community in order to make ends meet. “We have gone without a lot of things...to the point that we have reached the stage of waiting for scraps of animal bones. My son works in a meat shop, and the owner of the shop helps him by giving him the remains from the bones in a bag. This makes me very happy because I cook it for my children, and this helps a lot,” said the mother of a family from Anbar now living in Baghdad.

While public education is free in Iraq, children must provide their own school uniforms and supplies, and in some cases, pay for transportation. When money is tight, for IDPs and others, parents often cannot afford to send their children to school. Increasingly, given the central government’s economic crises and the allocation of resources to fighting ISIL, public education is suffering. The schools in some areas have implemented three daily shifts, others lack desks and chairs; most lack books and other necessities. In this scenario, IDP families also report having to take their children out of school due to lack of money; the father of a family from Anbar living in Basrah recounted: “I had throat surgery in Turkey on a medical trip sponsored by the Iraqi Ministry of Health, and [now] I don’t work because of my health situation. My children left school because there is not enough income to cover their educational needs.” Similarly, a female head of household from Salah al-Din living in Kirkuk, who has to cover monthly medical expenses for a chronically ill daughter, said, “It has reached the point where I had to take my children out of school and make them work just to provide some money for us to live on.” There are few accounts of child labor within the qualitative material, and a small number of families (less than 3%) employed children under the age of 16 as a way of increasing income. This corresponds with statistics for Iraq more generally, with earlier surveys finding child labor rates at less than 5% (Table 2 below).

Table 2. Child labor rates, 2002-12, for Iraq for children aged 5-15

CHILD POPULATION INVOLVED IN LABOR (AGED 5-15) <i>(Source: Iraq Statistics, UNICEF)</i>	TOTAL	4.7%
	MALE	5.4%
	FEMALE	4.0%

Borrowing money to make ends meet is a temporary solution for over 45% of IDP in all four governorates. In the absence of secure livelihoods, many express concern that this is merely a short-term solution and that they will not be able to cover their debts later: “I had to borrow an amount of money to meet some needs and I cannot currently pay back the money that I borrowed,” said a military officer from Daquq, Kirkuk, now living in Kirkuk City.

3.2.2 Aid and Assistance from Governments, International Organizations, and Other Actors


It is clear that the assistance of others in offering cash, shelter, food, and non-food items plays a signif-

icant role for many IDPs in covering their basic needs. They cited the host community, relatives, and friends as their central source of aid. “For almost an entire month, families brought many aid items and some families even invited us to eat food in their homes or brought food to us,” recounted a family from Salah al-Din living in Basrah.

Many said that they received assistance from the government or from charitable organizations immediately after they were displaced. This aid often allowed them to purchase some basic necessities, pay (at least part of) their rent, and begin to get settled within the host community. Some IDPs received this aid even before they had officially registered with the MoMD. Even among those who received government aid promptly, there were still complaints that it was inadequate and that there were substantial delays between payments/distributions. A major factor in the limited governmental assistance may be the deepening economic crisis, which has weakened the Iraqi economy since 2014. Iraq’s economy has become increasingly dependent on the oil sector (which made up 43.5% of the GDP in 2014), itself also a site of extensive corruption.⁴⁹ The decline in oil prices in 2014, along with political and economic instability as a result of ISIL taking over major parts of the country, meant that Iraq and the Kurdistan region experienced a major economic downturn that they have yet to recover from.⁵⁰ The Kurdistan region’s economic difficulties are also a result of decreased funding from the Baghdad government and inadequate taxation systems, along with declining oil prices and the spread of ISIL.⁵¹

Cash is the most common type of aid given to families, with approximately 44% of IDPs listing it as the primary type of aid received (see Figure 13). However there is some variation across governorates, with IDPs in Sulaymaniyah reporting that they received more aid in the form of (heating) fuel than the others. This is because the weather is colder there and hence, the need for heating fuel is greater, as well as the actions of the Kurdistan Regional Government. An Iraqi Council of Ministers’ Decision (Approved 29 Dec, 2015) in collaboration with the Ministry of Oil agreed to facilitate the free distribution of heating fuel to IDPs. However the extent of the implementation is unclear. As the survey data shows, and enumerators verified, it was the KRG that distributed significant amounts of fuel to IDPs in Sulaymaniyah.

Figure 13. Types of assistance provided to IDP families, by current governorate



Non-food items is a broad category, including clothing, shelter materials, and hygiene kits, and also varies significantly by governorate.

⁴⁹ Sassoon, Joseph. “Iraq’s political economy post 2003: From transition to corruption.” *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies*, Vol. 10, Numbers 1-2, 1 March 2016, pp. 17-33. See also [Central Bank of Iraq Annual Report 2014](#).

⁵⁰ Musa, Abdul Sattar and al-Jaberi, Qusay. “[The Relationship between Economic Development and Political Stability: Iraq as a Case Study for the Period 1970-2014](#)” December 3, 2016

⁵¹ DeWeaver, Mark. “[Kurdistan’s Great Recession: From Boom to Bust in the Rentier Economy](#).” Institute of International and Regional Studies (IRIS). American University of Iraq, Sulaimani. October 2016. pp. 1-3. “Displacement as challenge and opportunity Urban profile: Refugees, internally displaced persons and host community Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq.” UNHCR et al, April 2016. p. 4.

As indicated in Table 3 below, both national non-governmental organizations (NNGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are active in working with Iraqi IDPs, although their presence varies significantly by governorate.⁵²

Table 3: NGO presence by governorate

GOVERNORATE	INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (INGOS)	IRAQI NATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NNGOS)
BAGHDAD	13	38
BASRAH	4	23
KIRKUK	14	36
SULAYMANIYAH	21	19
ERBIL	24	29


(Although Erbil is not included in this study, it is nevertheless, an important center of INGOs operating in the Kurdistan region and Kirkuk).

More general complaints of uneven access to aid stem in part from a lack of coordination among aid providers. As a female head-of-household from Salah al-Din living in Kirkuk said, “There are many organizations who visit us, register our names, take our signatures, and then disappear and never return.” In some areas, IDPs felt that aid was only given on the basis of connections: “Currently, the aid provided by the local councils depends on personal relations and favoritism,” complained the son of a family from Salah al-Din living currently in Baghdad. While some IDPs had received multiple rounds/forms of aid, others had still not received anything. Therefore, some suggested that information about aid distribution to IDPs should be shared among all of the major aid providers to allow for more equitable distribution of assistance and coordination of efforts.

In the qualitative interviews, some IDPs reported receiving less aid because they lacked official documentation and others because they did not register with the MoMD. While 94% of all IDPs are registered with MoMD, this rate varies slightly by governorate. IDPs residing in Kirkuk report an 87.7% rate of registration, while more than 97% of those in Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah are registered. Due to the difficulty of reissuing lost documents, some IDPs/enumerators have expressed hopes for a simpler, less time-consuming registration process. Others were not eligible because they fled from an area that was not under threat from ISIL or was quickly recaptured by government forces. For example, a female head-of-household from Baghdad living in Sulaymaniyah did not receive the MoMD grant; she stated, “they told me that I am from the governorate of Baghdad and because of that the grant does not include me.” For the 6% of IDPs who were unable to register with MoMD, about 14% of IDPs in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah cite the inability to transfer prior registration in another governorate as their obstacle to MoMD registration. And 25.3% of IDPs in Basrah cited this same reason, inability to transfer prior registration, as the primary obstacle to registration. Another central determinant of aid provision was location. The enumerators reported that some governorates were easily accessible through well-secured areas while others were much less so.

⁵² More details about which NGO’s are responsible for certain activities can be found by using [the interactive map provided](#) by the NGO Coordinating Committee for Iraq, accessed 6 Nov 2016.

Figure 14: Reasons for inability of IDPs to register with MoMD, by current governorate




For some, financial aid is enough to ensure their access to an adequate standard of living, but for most others, such aid is not sufficient. Borrowing is another important strategy to maintain an adequate standard of living. Across all governorates, 60% of IDPs reported that they were able to borrow money following displacement, and 95.8% of IDPs who borrowed money preferred doing so informally and from relatives or extended family. After relatives and extended family, borrowing from friends and acquaintances provided the second-most common source of borrowing. All other sources, including shopkeepers, financial institutions, and religious charities amounted to a negligible percentage (less than 5%). However, as IDPs' time in displacement extends, borrowing from family and friends puts a strain on others who are not displaced and is not a sustainable solution.

3.2.3 Adequate Standard of Living and Durable Solutions

In the quantitative section of the study, access to basic services was not cited as the first condition for return; rather IDPs in all four governorates of study listed security as the first requirement for returning to their governorates of origin, followed by financial security, and then the provision of physical shelter. Fewer than 2% of IDPs in all four governorates cited the availability of basic services (education or medical services) as a condition for return. However, in the qualitative section of the study, respondents often cited the availability of basic services such as infrastructure, education, and medical services, almost always along with improved security, as a condition for their return to their governorates of origin. "Most of us want to go back to our places of origin but on the condition that we have good security... the most important is the availability of good security conditions, and then we need a house, services, hospitals, financial support, job opportunities, and...etc," stated a father of a family from Diyala now living in Sulaymaniyah. So while security remains the primary obstacle for return, IDPs face a daily struggle to maintain an adequate standard of living.

Figure 15. Source of borrowed funds, by current governorate




3.3 Employment and Livelihoods

Finding employment and maintaining a livelihood is a particularly challenging dimension of life for IDPs, many of whom fled their homes with little advance notice and were unable to plan for the move. The circumstances of their departure had a significant impact on the capital or assets they could bring with them.

When asked about their current source of income, over 98% of IDPs responded that they had none, however this question was interpreted to refer to a formal, salaried job. The fact is that 20 to 30% of IDPs reported some kind of employment, largely informal. Almost a quarter of IDPs (22.1%) reported that their primary income before January 1, 2014 was from a public sector job and 21.4% of all IDPs reported that they still receive a regular salary from the government, with an additional 9.6% responding that they receive their government salary with delays or irregularity. Only 2.7% of IDPs who worked for the government before January 1, 2014 reported that they had not received their salary for several months. This overall situation of continued government employment may reflect a number of decisions post January 1, 2014 by the Iraqi government’s Council of Ministers that allow for government workers in conflict areas to still receive their salaries (Approved January 7, 2015) and to modify the contracts of displaced government employees to allow them to work in the areas to which they fled (Approved March 31, 2015).

As for pensions, only a tiny number of IDPs (.6% across all IDPs) are able to draw some kind of government pension, albeit irregularly. This is compared to 6.9% who cited a pension as the primary source of income for their household prior to January 1, 2014. However, it must be kept in mind that not all of their income may be reported because of the hope for more aid or the fear of jeopardizing their status.

Figure 16: Primary source of income for IDP households in 2014, by current governorate




Employment of IDPs is a particular challenge for those who previously worked in the agricultural sector, because the lands they once owned or farmed for others are largely inaccessible. They may also now live in an area where there are limited prospects of employment for agricultural skills. Over 25% of IDPs currently in Baghdad and Kirkuk and almost 20% of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah reported agriculture as their primary source of income where they were living as of January 2014.

Of all IDPs over the age of 16, approximately 25% of IDPs in Baghdad, Basrah, and Kirkuk report that they are currently working, working and studying, or working for the government and still receiving a salary, albeit irregularly. The corresponding figure for Sulaymaniyah is slightly lower at 18%. However, it is important to underscore that among the total population, roughly 65-70% are not part of the labor force – the retired, the medically disabled, and those who are unemployed but not seeking work (sometimes referred to as “discouraged workers”).

In all four governorates, employment opportunities are limited for IDPs, although the job markets vary from place to place. “I can only work as a wage laborer. I have no other choice unless I want to work in

Figure 17: Employment situation, by current governorate



restaurants or hotels, but most of those jobs are already held by Syrian refugees,” explains a father of a family from Diyala living in Sulaymaniyah, highlighting the fact that IDPs in Kurdistan also share the labor market with Syrian refugees. Additionally, Arabic-speaking IDPs are often at a disadvantage in Kurdish areas because of the differences in language and/or differences/perceived differences of culture and tradition. Elderly IDPs or those

with health issues often cannot work at all, because the hard physical work of day labor is a limiting factor. Discrimination in the workplace also serves as a deterrent to accessing employment in situations of displacement. “[In] the workplace, they make us feel as if we are not Iraqis. They sometimes ask us ‘Where are you from?’ and use sectarian language. For that reason, we only work if necessary,” recounts the son in a family from Salah al-Din living in Baghdad. Unsurprisingly, being able to work and make enough money is tied closely to IDPs’ ability to provide for their families: “I wish to get a job with a salary that covers my family’s expenses, and nothing more. It doesn’t matter if it’s governmental, private, a project, or anything else. What really matters is that I provide a dignified life for my family,” asserts a government employee from Mosul now living Basrah.

However, not all accounts of livelihood access were negative; in fact, for those IDPs who could access jobs, employment became a way to facilitate integration into the host community. A female head of household from Salah al-Din living in Basrah reported, “I feel that I can communicate and blend into the community through my experience with work, as this is what allowed me to discover that I am strong and able to depend on myself.”


3.4 Protection of Housing, Land, and Property

Displacement created a major challenge for IDPs to secure shelter. For many, it meant a shift in housing type: 76.4% of IDPs across all governorates rent their current accommodation, either for their family alone or shared with others. This marks a dramatic change in their previous housing situation, as 84.7% of the families owned their own homes as of January 1, 2014 and 11.7% rented accommodation. A minority (around 5%) now live in a house they own, and the remainder who do not rent or own accommodation find other means of housing – unfinished buildings, hospitality of friends, relatives or host community, or other, less formal types of shelter. The statement from a former ambulance driver from Anbar now living in Basrah underscores the importance of housing and how prominently it factors into IDPs’ recollections of home: “The thing we miss most is our house because it was ours and we built it...we were very comfortable there.”

The quality of the shelter is also important to consider. Without enough money to afford repairs or to move to a better location, IDPs often have to live in poor, even unsafe, conditions. “In the winter, water leaked from the roof on days of heavy rain. We didn’t have the means to deal with this, so we had to bear it out and simply live with it,” recalled the mother of a family from Salah el-Din living in Baghdad. For many respondents, most of their income, even all of their income in a few cases, was devoted to paying rent. When given a hypothetical situation where IDPs were given a large sum of money and

asked what they would spend it on, 25.7% responded that they would spend it on costs associated with rent or homeownership.

Figure 18: Shelter type, by current governorate




Sharing living quarters was also a strategy for the 16.8% of families who identified sharing-house as one of their top three strategies to make ends meet. The qualitative interviews revealed accounts of landlords who allowed IDPs to skip months of paying rent or to make late payments when IDPs lacked adequate funds, which marks an important way that the host community supports IDPs. A family from Babylon living in Sulaymaniyah described their relationship with their landlord: “Sometimes, he gives me back the rent money, asks me if I need to take it back, and doesn’t pressure us when I pay the rent late.”

3.4.1 Housing and Durable Solutions

Through both the qualitative and quantitative interviews, the importance of securing adequate housing in achieving a durable solution was evident. “[A] person’s stability is rooted in a stable living situation; every person needs his own house to feel secure,” said a female head-of-household living in Baghdad but originally from Mosul. Indeed, 36.1% of IDPs indicated that if they received a large sum of money, they would spend it on shelter, either on rent or home ownership (25.7%), or repairs for their housing (10.4%). And 69.8% of respondents listed housing as one of the top three requisite conditions they

Figure 19: Reasons for inability to access home in place of residence on January 1, 2014, by current governorate



would need in order to return to their home governorates. Many respondents reported that their homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable due to ISIL taking over their area or in the subsequent fight against ISIL. “I don’t think about returning because it was booby trapped with explosives, and I was recently informed it was blown up and destroyed entirely,” said the mother of a family from Anbar, now living in Baghdad.


The vast majority of IDPs (96%), regardless of where they are currently living, are unable to access their place of residences as of 2014, citing “active fighting” and “community tensions” as the primary obstacles. For IDPs in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah, the percentage who report being able to access their [pre-displacement] homes is 3.5%, 1.3%, and 3.0% respectively, while it is 10.4% for those in Basrah. Future surveys will further investigate the issues encompassed in “community tensions”.

For those who want to stay and integrate where they are, access to housing, land, and property is an important factor. The father of a family from Anbar now in Baghdad expressed it this way: “I partially belong to this place, but in order to integrate into this community, I need to at least have a land deed.” A female head-of-household from Salah al-Din who wants to stay and integrate in Basrah said “I will go back only to sell my house at any possible price,” and suggests that what she and other IDPs need in order to integrate is “a piece of land for the IDPs for the purpose of stabilizing their lives.”

3.5 Ensuring Access to Documentation

The actual proportion or number of IDPs who lost official documentation is small. Just 12.9% of families reported a loss of documentation by at least one of their members. This minority of individuals, nevertheless, encountered numerous difficulties in having them reissued, and those who went through the official procedures described the process as slow, difficult, and expensive. While the expense of replacing a document is minimal (around \$3 for an identity card), the fact that many of those who have to replace their


Figure 20: Lost documentation by current governorate



documents must return to their governorates of origin creates a number of problems. The main difficulty is the expense of travel, of staying to complete and follow up the necessary submissions, and of missing out on work in the new place of residence. Security is another issue. The MoMD has established some alternative locations where replacement documentation can be issued (Basrah has such a location, for example). However, these locations do not exist in all of the governorates.

The time needed to replace the documents, due to security and the fact that ISIL stole documents, makes life difficult for individuals as well as the government. A family from Yathrib, Salah al-Din, now living in Baghdad, describes the steps they had to take: “I lost my identification card because it was confiscated when I was arrested by ISIL. The issuance of a new ID card took seven months, since I first had to inform the Adhamia center, which then referred the case to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which then had to check my data via National Security and then send it to the court, where the judge issued the verdict that I have no criminal record. The issuance [of the new card] was facilitated by a person from Yathrib who I ran into who was working at the Adhamia police station.” This statement illustrates

Figure 21: Replacement of lost documentation, by current governorate



the complexity and length of the process, and also underscores the importance of connections, or *wasta*, in facilitating the speedy replacement of documents. These connections are difficult for displaced people living in unfamiliar areas, which favors more successful integration and adaptation for those who remain within their original governorate upon displacement. For those with *wasta*, the process generally took less

time and was not as costly, as illustrated by this response: “The official documents that we could not bring with us were our ration card and my son’s driving license...ISIL stole the card when we were passing through a checkpoint in Samara. We were able to replace the ration card thanks to the help of one of our relatives in Tikrit, at no cost, and the replacement process took two weeks,” recounted a housewife from Salah al-Din living in Sulaymaniyah.

IDPs in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah have the most difficulty in replacing their documents, with 81.1% and 52.2% respectively reporting that they were unsuccessful in replacing documentation. For those in Sulaymaniyah, the added difficulty of interfacing with the semi-autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, with its own process for document renewal, contributed to their difficulties. IDPs living in the Kurdistan Region, if they leave, require the permission of the KRG security office to return, which cannot be guaranteed. Thus, traveling to their home governorates is risky.

The struggle to obtain documents which could only be issued from other governorates absorbed money




and time. A housewife from Anbar living in Baghdad mentioned the long and expensive procedure to register the family car: “Now, we have spent most of our money on the car and registration papers and permits we bought. Because of the security conditions and military groups in the city, [the authorities] prevented us from entering with our car, despite the fact that we had all of our official documents and had spent \$5,500 to procure them to get approval for the car to enter the city. Despite this, we couldn’t get approval, and the car is now on Bzeibez Bridge, and we don’t know anything about it.”

Among the barriers to replacing documentation identified by IDPs was suspicion surrounding people who had fled from ISIL-occupied areas. A teacher and mother of a family from Kirkuk living in Basrah recounted: “My passport and land title have been lost. I don’t know what happened to my land there. I tried to replace my passport and despite the fact that I have been recorded in the Basrah registration departments, my efforts did not succeed. The officer in charge accused me, when I appeared before him, of belonging to ISIL. He said, ‘How can I know that you are not from ISIL and that you didn’t kill ten innocent people?’” The resounding message among IDPs was that they are in need of a system to facilitate the issuance of documents. Enumerators recommended opening new administrative centers to alleviate the burden on IDPs needing documentation. They also proposed the possibility of producing temporary IDs which could serve throughout the duration of the displacement period. As with aid and assistance, there was a hope to see a systematic collection of data on IDPs’ need for replacement of documentation which would allow the government to play a more active role in facilitating the process.

3.6 Family Reunification

The vast majority of IDP families (98%) reported that the usual members of the family were not separated for more than three months following displacement. And for those that were, the most commonly cited reasons varied considerably within and between governorates; however, “securing the family’s property”, “beginning or continuing studies,” and changes in personal status (i.e., marriage, divorce) figured prominently, respectively accounting for 33.2%, 20.8%, and 16.2% of all cases across governorates. For those families who stayed behind, their living situation was quite difficult. “I feel sad that our family has been separated and some members have stayed behind, eating only one meal per day,” a housewife from Anbar now living in Baghdad laments. To a lesser extent, families were separated due to deaths and to individual decisions to continue academic studies in a location other than where the IDP family currently resides.


Figure 22: Separation of family members, by current governorate



3.7 Participation in Public Affairs and Social Cohesion

There are a number of different ways to measure participation in public affairs, ranging from rates of participation in political processes (voting and elections) to broader questions of integration and acceptance into the host community. An additional complicating factor in our study is the status of Sulaymaniyah as part of the Kurdistan Region, a semi-autonomous region within Iraq.


Figure 23: Relations with host community as source of tension, by governorate



fy more problematic relations between IDPs and the communities that receive them. This may reflect tension between Kurds and Arabs. This is reflected in the data, where approximately 40% of IDPs in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah cite ethnic or linguistic differences as contributing “somewhat” or “a lot” to problems in their communities, a proportion much higher than what IDPs report in Baghdad and Basrah (approximately 21%).

This question reveals a number of interesting findings about IDP empowerment in their current community. Over 50% of IDPs in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah feel that they have “a lot” or “some” influence in making their host community a better place to live, while less than 30% of IDPs in Basrah feel that way. Similarly, Basrah stands out among the other governorates on the negative side of the question, with nearly 40% reporting “not a lot” of influence. The possible explanations for these responses vary by governorate. In Baghdad, at least some of the IDPs move into area where they can start a business or do work that others do not do, and this makes them feel they have influence. In Sulaymaniyah, one explanation about why IDPs feel they have a lot or some influence is that the host community is open minded and not conservative, while the opposite is true in Basrah, where so many felt that they had not a lot of influence because Basrah is more conservative and a more tribal-based society.

Figure 24: Contribution of ethnic/linguistic differences to community problems, by governorate



3.8 Reparations

While legislation on reparations was developed in the mid-2000s, the fact that returning refugees have been prioritized and an extremely low number of cases have been addressed limits its utility for IDPs. The core pieces of legislation started in 2006, when the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly created the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD), the successor to the Iraqi Property Claims Commission of 2004, to provide compensation for “land and property issues that arose during

An indirect way of measuring participation in public affairs is to gauge the extent to which relations between the host community and IDPs cause problems in the community, as seen in Figure 23.

There may be a bias at work whereby respondents do not want to highlight negative responses to this question, but the results do show some variation, with IDPs in Basrah (and to a lesser extent Baghdad) citing fewer host-IDP problems, while those in Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah tend to identi-


the Ba'ath Party era.”⁵³ While it proved accommodating in offering either the property's restitution or compensation in lieu of restitution, it did not contain any provisions regarding those whose properties had been destroyed.⁵⁴ This meant that the needs of entire communities were neglected in places like the marsh areas of southern Iraq, and Kirkuk, where Saddam Hussein's regime razed entire villages. By January of 2009, Iraqis had filed 153,000 claims and despite the CRRPD rendering

decisions on about 67,000 of those cases, “only about 30,000 of those decisions are deemed to be final and enforceable, and compensation has been paid in only about 1,000 cases.”⁵⁵

Two measures adopted in 2008 were intended to apply similar policies to those displaced after 2003.⁵⁶ The first of these measures was Decree 262, which provided returnees with a lump sum of one million Iraqi dinar (\$800) upon their return home and included a mechanism to pay those who had been occupying the property 300,000 Iraqi dinar per month for a span of six months' time.⁵⁷ As a requisite condition of receiving this aid, the government wrote off the individual/family's “displaced” status. Decree 101 is the complementary legislation which meant to ensure that anyone occupying the property would promptly vacate the premises,⁵⁸ by stating that those individuals are “considered a participant in that person's forcible displacement under the country's Anti-Terrorism Law” and must promptly vacate the premises.”⁵⁹ By the end of 2008, only an estimated 10,000 families had taken advantage of Decree 262, and only a fraction of those had successfully returned to living at their properties.⁶⁰

A major flaw with this process was that the government gave absolute priority to returnees.⁶¹ This neglected the reality that many Iraqis may not have felt safe returning home because sectarian violence had drastically changed the ethno-sectarian compositions of many neighborhoods and militia groups still circulated.⁶² For those reasons, Auweraert and Isser believed that the government should offer

Figure 25. Perceptions of IDP influence in host community, by current governorate



⁵³ IOM, *Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Issues facing Returnees in Retaken Areas of Iraq*. September 2016. p. 7. - Auweraert, Peter Van and Isser, Deborah. *Land, Property, and the Challenge of Return for Iraq's Displaced*. United States Institute of Peace. 2009. p. 9.

⁵⁴ Auweraert, Peter Van and Isser, Deborah. *Land, Property, and the Challenge*. p. 8

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 8

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 9

⁵⁷ IOM, *Housing, Land and Property Issues facing Returnees in Retaken Areas of Iraq*. p. 9

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 9

⁵⁹ Auweraert, Peter Van and Isser, Deborah. *Land, Property, and the Challenge of Return for Iraq's Displaced*. p. 9

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 10

⁶¹ Ibid. pp. 16-17

⁶² Ibid. pp. 5, 14, 16-17


displaced Iraqis a wider range of options, beyond merely rewarding return.⁶³

Other, smaller scale measures also targeted the issue of reparations. Cabinet Order 54 specifically applied to Diyala Governorate, which had witnessed extensive displacement from sectarian violence, especially following 2006.⁶⁴ This measure helped to fund the reconstruction of homes, provide basic services to returnees, and create temporary jobs to help them establish stable and sustainable lives back in their place of origin.⁶⁵ Law 20 of 2009 stated that it would compensate, “the Victims of Military Operations, Military Mistakes and Terrorist Actions” and which was applicable from the time frame of 2003 onwards.⁶⁶

Since the advent of ISIL, these mechanisms have failed to function properly. A primary issue is that there are not recent statistics on the implementation of the aforementioned measures.⁶⁷ In addition, the slow and inefficient bureaucracy for processing claims is further complicated by loss/destruction of IDPs’ official documentation (or by informal ownership), high levels of secondary occupation in areas controlled by ISIL, mines and explosives on or surrounding the properties in question, and an accelerated breakdown of the dispute resolution process beginning in 2014.⁶⁸ Perhaps most problematic is the population’s lack of awareness of the mechanisms available to them:

“Across all governorates, respondents had no knowledge of the Order 262 committee, the order 101 committee or the 2009 Law No.20 Committee. Responses varied from “we are unaware of these committees actively working in our area” to “we have never heard of these committees before.” Respondents also strongly voiced the complaint that no law has been established to address issues post 2014.”⁶⁹

Figure 26: IDPs’ perception of most important factors for return to prior place of residence, by current governorate



At this time, reparations can be discussed as a durable solution mostly in terms of how respondents think about the subject, given that their displacement is fairly recent and the conflicts that displaced them are still in flux. The Council of Ministers did approve a decision (July 7, 2015) to allow compensation to those whose houses were affected by terrorist attacks, and to those who lost relatives and were injured. IDPs are certainly thinking about it, A female head-of-

household from Salah al-Din now living in Sulaymaniyah described her hopes as follows, “I don’t think about going back home because I have suffered a lot there, killing and forced displacement. I want to buy a residence here, settle down, and ask for compensation for my residence which has been destroyed in Salah al-Din.”

⁶³ Ibid. p. 16

⁶⁴ IOM, *Housing, Land and Property Issues facing Returnees in Retaken Areas of Iraq*. pp. 9-10

⁶⁵ Ibid. pp. 9-10

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ IOM. *Housing, Land and Property Issues facing Returnees in Retaken Areas of Iraq.* p. 10

⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 10

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 20

4. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This report is the first in what is expected to be a series of reports providing longitudinal analysis of Iraqi displacement. It is based on following 3848 Iraqi IDP families living outside of camps in four governorates: Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah. This sample is representative of more than 180,000 IDP families that were still displaced in December 2015. Together these four governorates host around a third of IDP families in the country. The families were asked an extensive quantitative questionnaire in March-May 2016, and subsequent in depth interviews were conducted with selected families. This material is supplemented by 80 in depth interviews with host communities carried out in May-June 2016.

This report is intended to provide a snapshot of Iraqi displacement at one particular moment in time and thus to serve as a baseline for the longitudinal analysis to come over the next few years. This initial analysis yields a number of important insights about displacement in Iraq and identifies factors important for finding durable solutions for IDPs. Overall, this study suggests the need for a more contextual and nuanced approach to durable solutions for IDPs than is usually the case.

Displacement as an urban phenomenon

The study found that the percentage of IDPs living in urban areas (87%) was higher than the percentage of urban residents for the country as a whole (69.5%), indicating that those who were displaced tended to go to urban areas, even if they came from less urban areas. For example, in Sulaymaniyah, 99% of IDPs lived in urban areas, while 85% of IDPs in both Baghdad and Kirkuk live in urban areas, and 70% in Basrah.



This observation has several implications for responding to internal displacement. First, it suggests the need for more emphasis on support to officials working at the governorate and municipal levels to take into consideration this type of urban in-migration. Such support may include additional resources at health clinics and schools, in particular, to lessen the impact of the urban influx on the host community, which already feels the rise in housing prices, among other things. Differences in the experiences of IDPs living in different governorates suggest that national responses and policies need to be tailored to specific contextual needs. A one-size fits all approach is not sufficient, particularly when it comes to solutions.

This observation also leads to the suggestion that particular attention should be directed towards those moving from rural to urban areas, particularly those IDPs who are unable to engage in their traditional agricultural livelihoods in their new urban locations. Even if IDPs have unrestricted access to labor markets (which is not the case), agricultural workers moving to the city of Baghdad, for example, are likely to need additional assistance in order to find alternative livelihoods. Alternatively, new governmental agricultural projects or incentives for land-owners to expand agricultural projects might be a way to assist IDPs from rural areas specifically. IDPs go to cities either because the services are there or because they have family or labor connections. Providing services in the rural areas, along with employment opportunities will go far not only in relieving urban congestion and burden, but also toward continuing to support the development of Iraq's agricultural sector.

Displacement as an effective protection strategy.

One of the major findings of this study is that IDPs felt safer in their place of residence than in the place from which they moved. This suggests that displacement is indeed an effective strategy for increasing personal security. While this makes intuitive sense – people move from areas where they feel less safe to places where they feel safer – it is reassuring to find this confirmed by our research, as there could have been cases where people moved to places they expected to be safer but they turned out not to be so.

The research also indicates a need to understand the particular contexts of displacement as the reasons for displacement to a particular place vary. For example, the largest group of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah came from Anbar, which is surprising given the distance between the communities of origin and destination. Moreover, Sulaymaniyah is a predominantly Kurdish-speaking area – not an intuitive choice for Arabic-speaking IDPs from Anbar, and indeed, other governorates where Arabic is the principal language. The majority of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah (74%) cited security as the reason for their displacement to Sulaymaniyah and it may be that blocked transportation routes prevented them from moving to other, closer, areas. Other reasons, including the presence of family and relatives, also seem to act as a major pull factor for choosing the governorate.

Personal security in displacement depends on contextual factors, particularly social connections.

While IDPs felt safer in displacement in comparison with the community they left, there was considerable variation in how safe IDPs felt in different governorates. For example, only 25% of IDPs indicated that they felt completely safe in Baghdad, in comparison with 95% in Sulaymaniyah. Feelings of safety and security depend on a number of factors, including the governmental authority under which they live, the particular areas where they were living, their sect, their own individual status and their prior ties with the area to which they have been displaced.

Prior ties and histories matter and seem to be directly linked to personal security. Baghdad – the governorate where IDPs reported feeling least secure – was also the governorate where IDPs reported



feeling accepted the least by the community (64%), with greater feelings of acceptance in Kirkuk (77%), Basrah (89%), and Sulaymaniyah (96%). Prior connections matter. For example, over a quarter (27.1%) of IDPs in Kirkuk came from another area of Kirkuk, and thus tended to feel safer because they count themselves “as among the people of Kirkuk,” as one respondent expressed it. This is similar to the situation for many IDPs in Basrah who were originally from Basrah or chose to come to Basrah because they had family or friends there. This sense of belonging, whether based on family ties, familiarity with the area, or other links, had a direct positive impact on people’s sense of safety and security in the governorate of displacement. The fact that there are more pre-existing linkages between IDPs and host communities in Basrah and Kirkuk than in the other two governorates could also have implications for their prospects for local integration in those communities.

Interestingly, 96% of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah, part of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and with an overwhelmingly Kurdish population, report feeling accepted. This is despite the fact that 89.7% of the IDPs report themselves as Arab. This fact speaks to the limitations of a sect-based analysis of IDP movement that suggests that people move to be with their own communities.

This finding shows that the personal displacement histories and trajectories of IDPs could have important consequences for perceptions of security in displacement as well as for durable solutions.

Petty crime as a source of insecurity for IDPs.

The role of petty (and not-so-petty) crime is a source of insecurity for IDPs, which varied significantly between governorates. More than 30% of those in Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah reported crime as a source of insecurity in comparison with less than 6% of displaced families in Basrah and Kirkuk – the two governorates where IDPs reported more social connections.

As for the main sources of insecurity, there were slight variations between rural and urban areas and between governorates. Theft was the main crime in urban Sulaymaniyah (and absent in the rural areas

of Sulaymaniyah), whereas very similar levels of petty crimes were reported in both urban and rural Basrah and Kirkuk. Rural Kirkuk stands out for the prevalence of kidnapping and reported discrimination. Petty crime seemed to be more common in rural Baghdad than urban Baghdad whereas urban Baghdad seemed to be more at risk of discrimination, targeted violence, and kidnappings. In rural areas, it seemed that the few security incidents were resolved through families while in urban areas there was more mention of police and government forces.

This seems to suggest that crime is less of an issue when IDPs have more affinity with the host community – a suggestion that makes intuitive sense. IDPs with higher levels of social capital may be less vulnerable to crime because social networks may provide good intelligence on places/people to avoid. Qualitative interviews with IDP families revealed that cultivating good relationships with the host community functioned, for some, as a strategy to ensure safety and security. For others, however, the welcome of the host community does not seem to diminish the sense of insecurity they feel.

This suggests the need for a more nuanced approach to security issues than is captured in the *Framework for Durable Solutions*. Addressing the insecurity felt by IDPs seems to indicate a need to tackle the issue of petty crime, which in turn suggests a need to engage local law enforcement officials and traditional leaders. It also suggests that strengthening the social bonds between IDPs and the communities that receive them can increase feelings of personal security for IDPs and reduce petty crime. While this research did not delve into the comparison between IDPs and the receiving communities in terms of personal security and the role of petty crime, an interesting area for further research would be to address the question of whether IDPs are more vulnerable to crime than established residents.

Safety and security and IDPs' willingness to return.

The connection between security and access to durable solutions is clear: IDPs' preferences for return, integration, or relocation to a third place are directly tied to security. When asked to identify the most important precondition for returning to their governorate of origin, the majority of IDPs in all four governorates cited security as the most important factor (66.1% in Baghdad, 69.8% in Basrah, 75.1% in Kirkuk, and 52.7% in Sulaymaniyah). Conversely, feeling safe and secure in the host governorate was often cited as a reason to stay, although that choice is not always clear-cut and there are also cases of IDPs who wished to return to their places of origin, in spite of the unstable security situation. Although the research did not specifically address the questions of different perceptions within families, some qualitative interviews indicated that there may be gender differences about preferences for return or integration based on the security situation. This could be an important issue to follow up in other research.

While return to community of origin is usually seen as the most desirable durable solution, this research suggests that IDPs decision to return is determined primarily by the security situation in the community from which they were displaced, but that in different locations, different factors are important. Our research indicates that other factors, particularly financial resources/employment and housing are also important – and the balance differs from governorate to governorate.

A significant decline in standard of living as a consequence of displacement.

In assessing the difference between their ability to access an adequate standard of living before displacement compared to their current displaced situation, an overwhelming majority of IDPs (92.6%) reported that their present standard of living represented a marked decline from pre-displacement conditions. The ability of IDPs to provide an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families varied greatly among the four governorates. In Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, 40.6% and 45.1% of IDPs reported that they were able to do so. IDPs in Basrah reported the lowest rate, with only 29.6% able to provide an adequate standard of living.

In all four governorates, local charities seem to provide a good deal of assistance to IDPs, which may account for differences in ability to access adequate living standards. For example, the highest percentage of IDPs reporting that they were able to provide an adequate standard of living was in Baghdad (73.7%) where many local charities and international NGOs are actively providing assistance, while there are many fewer such organizations in Basrah.

The significant decline in standard of living experienced by IDPs did not seem to be related to how they would spend a windfall of additional financial resources. For example, IDPs in Baghdad reported the least decline in standards of living, but as elsewhere, IDPs there would spend an additional windfall on basic items such as shelter and food.

A stark decline in the standard of housing due to displacement.

Displacement created a major challenge for IDPs to secure shelter. For many, it meant a shift in housing type: 76.4% of IDPs across all governorates rent their current accommodation, either for their family alone or shared with others. This marks a dramatic change in their previous housing situation, as 84.7% of the families owned their own homes as of January 1, 2014, with 11.7% reporting that they rented accommodation. At the time of the interview, a minority (around 5%) lived in a house that they owned. The remainder who did not rent or own accommodation found other means of housing – unfinished buildings, hospitality of friends, relatives or host community, or other, less formal types of shelter.

The quality of the shelter is also important to consider. Without enough money to afford repairs or to move to a better location, IDPs often have to live in poor and often unsafe, conditions.

Through both the qualitative and quantitative interviews, the importance of securing adequate housing in achieving a durable solution was evident. Housing was an important factor in assessing whether or not to return (though not as important as perceptions of security.) For those who wanted to stay and integrate where they are, access to housing, land, and property was an important factor.

Housing is more than physical shelter. In the qualitative interviews, a strong emotional attachment to housing – as home – was evident. Going ‘home’ was depicted as going back to a particular house. This suggests that securing access to housing is a key factor in finding solutions for IDPs which extends beyond the technical need to construct adequate shelter.

Borrowing from family and friends as a coping strategy.

Between 9% and 14.4% of IDPs reported reducing consumption of food as their primary strategy to cope with the decline in their standard of living. Respondents described going without food and basic furnishings for their homes and depending on the charity of the host community in order to make ends meet.

Many said that they received assistance from the government or from charitable organizations immediately after they were displaced. This aid often allowed them to purchase some basic necessities, pay (at least part of) their rent, and begin to get settled within the host community. But it was insufficient to restore their former standard of living. Moreover, some respondents were critical of the way in which aid is provided. Complaints of uneven access to aid seem to stem in part from a lack of coordination among aid providers.

Borrowing money, overwhelmingly from family and friends, to make ends meet was a temporary solution for over 45% of displaced families in all four governorates. In the absence of secure livelihoods, many expressed concern that this is merely a short-term solution and that they will not be able to cover their debts later. Across all governorates, 60% of IDPs reported that they were able to borrow money

following displacement, and 95.8% of IDPs who borrowed money preferred doing so informally and from relatives or extended family.

This suggests a need for more research into the coping strategies used by IDPs at the household level and on the medium- and long-term implications of debt incurred by IDPs. Similarly, borrowing from family as a survival strategy must be included in discussions about the burden born by host community.

Most IDPs unemployed or working in informal sector

In all four governorates, employment opportunities are limited for IDPs, although the job markets vary from place to place, and most IDPs report that they are not working (perhaps understanding this as working in the formal sector). However, some 20-30% of IDPs are indeed working in the informal sector as a way of making ends meet. The central Iraqi government made the decisions to continue to employ IDPs despite their displacement. This move provides a significant measure of income stability for IDPs: 21.4% of all IDPs reported that they still receive a regular salary from the government, with an additional 9.6% responding that they receive their government salary with delays or irregularity.

As noted above, employment of IDPs is a particular challenge for those who previously worked in the agricultural sector, because the lands they once owned or farmed for others are largely inaccessible. They may also now live in an area where there are limited prospects of employment for agricultural skills. Over 25% of IDPs currently in Baghdad and Kirkuk and almost 20% of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah reported agriculture as their primary source of income where they were living as of January 2014.

Lost of documentation and family separation not a significant problem

While 94% of all IDPs are registered with MoMD, this rate varies slightly by governorate. IDPs residing in Kirkuk reported an 87.7% rate of registration, while more than 97% of those in Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah are registered.

The actual proportion or number of IDPs who lost official documentation was small. Just 12.9% of families reported a loss of documentation by at least one of their members. This minority of individuals, nevertheless, encountered numerous difficulties in having them reissued, and those who went through the official procedures described the process as slow, difficult, and expensive. Due to the difficulty of reissuing lost documents, some IDPs/enumerators have expressed hopes for a simpler, less time-consuming registration process.



The vast majority of IDP families (98%) reported that the usual members of the family were not separated for more than three months following displacement.

IDP participation in governance and community life varies.

Over 50% of IDPs in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah felt that they have “a lot” or “some” influence in making their host community a better place to live, while less than 30% of IDPs in Basrah felt that way. Similarly, Basrah stood out among the other governorates on the negative side of the question, with nearly 40% reporting “not a lot” of influence. The possible explanations for these responses varied by governorate. In Baghdad, at least some of the IDPs moved into areas where they can start a business or do work that others do not do, and this made them feel they have influence. In Sulaymaniyah, one explanation about why IDPs felt they have a lot or some influence is that they reported that the host community was open minded and less conservative, while the opposite was true in Basrah, where so many felt that they did not have a lot of influence because Basrah was more conservative and a more tribal-based society. In addition, the IDPs in Basrah were more disadvantaged economically than their counterparts in the other governorates, and thus being poor may also explain why they feel they lack influence.

There is much we still do not know.

In looking at the 8 conditions identified in the *Framework for Durable Solutions* as critical components of finding durable solutions (and the four pillars used in IOM’s *Progressive Framework*), this study on Iraqi displacement affirms the importance of safety and security as the principal requirement for accessing durable solutions. It finds, however, that security in the place of displacement varies considerably and seems to be related in part to ties between the IDPs and the receiving community. This suggests that it might be important to adopt a more nuanced understanding of security – as more than the absence of the conflict which provoked the displacement – in considering either return or local integration as durable solutions.

Standard of living – at least as measured by the importance of financial resources/job in intentions to return – ranked second in importance for respondents in three of the four governorates, with housing a close third. But financial resources, jobs, and housing are, of course, all related. Like security, the research also identified a need for a more nuanced understanding of these factors and their inter-relationships. For example, although over 90% of displaced families said that they did not have a job, between 20 and 30% reported working in the informal sector. While jobs may not be readily available in the formal sector, it might be useful to identify employment opportunities in the informal sector in looking at both return and local integration.

The study seemed to suggest that ‘housing’ is not just one component of an adequate standard of living but that it is evaluated as particularly important by IDPs in the decline of their living standards and in their emotional attachment to home. This may be a particular to the context of internal displacement in Iraq, but if it is a more broadly held characteristic, consideration should perhaps be given to separating out housing from the other criteria (or to rephrasing the criteria of ‘restitution of housing, land and property’) to acknowledging its particular importance.

Finally this research suggests two other areas where further field-based research would be useful. Since a majority of IDPs reported that borrowing from family and friends was an important coping mechanism in displacement, it would be useful to see the extent to which borrowing is a factor in accessing durable solutions. Do IDPs borrow money from friends and relatives when they return? After their return, are they able to repay their debts incurred during displacement? If so, how do they generate the resources to repay their debts? If not, what are the consequences? Or is there a general expectation

that debts are forgiven when IDPs find solutions? When planning for durable solutions – whether local integration or return – are relevant authorities and agencies taking into consideration how IDPs will manage their debts? A reinstatement grant, for example, might be adequate for rebuilding a home, but inadequate to both rebuild a home and repay debts acquired during displacement. If a family decides to use the grant to repay the debt rather than rebuild the home, this would likely leave the family in a difficult situation.

A second area where future research is needed is that of social connections or networks. Our research was not focused on this and is certainly not conclusive, but there are tantalizing indications that social connections play some role in determining where people move when they are displaced, in how safe they feel in the receiving communities and in the extent to which they feel that they ‘belong’ in their receiving communities. All of these are important factors not only in the quality of life of IDPs in displacement but in the extent to which they find durable solutions and deserve further study.



APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH DESIGN

The study is based on a mixed methods approach, relying on both quantitative techniques and qualitative methods for collecting data on IDPs, and qualitative methods for collecting data on host communities and stakeholders, as detailed below. The design of both the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires was informed by a comprehensive review of the literature, including academic research and open-source and grey literature. Review of the literature will continue throughout the project and will inform the design of questionnaires used at subsequent points in the research project as well as aid in analysis of the findings.

Data collection included the following components:

- 1) Family surveys with IDPs (quantitative component).
- 2) Semi-structured in-depth interviews with IDPs (qualitative component).
- 3) Interviews with members of host communities (qualitative component).
- 4) Stakeholders' interviews (qualitative component).⁷⁰

The research is being conducted in the four Iraqi governorates of Iraq, namely Baghdad, Kirkuk, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah. Of the total of 532,000 displaced families in Iraq, 180,000 IDP families live in these four governorates.⁷¹ Other factors influencing their inclusion in the study include: the fact that they could be accessed with reasonable safety; the presence of IOM sub offices; the heterogeneity of the displaced population with respect to governorate of origin and religious background; and variation in the numbers of IDPs hosted by each governorate. Further information about the political, economic and social context for IDPs in each of these four governorates is provided Appendix 2.

Quantitative / Household Study

Using IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) system, the sample was selected from the population list of IDPs displaced by ISIL after December 2013, with a one stage stratified design that considers governorate of displacement and governorate of origin as stratification variables. This design generates a sample that is representative of the IDP households living in four governorates which have experienced particular displacement due to the activities of ISIL (Basrah, Baghdad, Sulaymaniyah, and Kirkuk) and originating from seven governorates (Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din). As such it is representative of a total of 180,485 families across the two domains of stratification, with a margin of error ranging between 2.8% and 6.0%, and 95% confidence interval. This design generates four independent samples, one per governorate of displacement, or seven independent samples, one per governorate of origin. Representativeness is not guaranteed in the 28 cells.

The sample size was allocated to the different strata by fixing the margins of the distribution and im-

⁷⁰ Copies of the questionnaires (in both English and Arabic) are available upon request.

⁷¹ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix- Iraq Mission*. December 2015.



posing some restrictions on less numerous groups (namely IDPs from Babylon living in Basrah and Kirkuk, and IDPs from Baghdad and Diyala living in Basrah) to ensure their presence in the sample. For further information about the methodology, see Appendix 1. Data is collected by enumerators from each governorate who were hired and trained by IOM.⁷² A particular innovation of this study was the use of the TextIt System which is a text-messaging platform that allows the enumerators to maintain monthly contact with IDP families participating in the study and to track their movement. Each enumerator programs text message flows into the TextIt program in order to send a text message to all of the families for whom they are responsible. A monthly mass SMS is sent to the families to verify their current location. If the family responds that they have moved, the field team then follows up with the family to verify the new location and to update the database. The enumerators also ask a short set of questions about the reasons for the family's move. The TextIt flow of questions and answers with each monthly contact with each family is extracted from TextIt and stored in database format. The family receives a monthly phone allowance of 10,000 IQD (~8 USD) to facilitate their participation in the study.

For the purpose of this study, the unit of observation is the “family,” comprised of a family head (male

⁷² See Selecting Enumerators under Phase I of the project for more information about the composition of the field teams

or female), his/her spouse, children, and other relatives attached to the family just prior to its fleeing.

The quantitative questionnaire is comprised of two sections:

- The Family Survey: This section featured 106 questions organized in sections roughly corresponding to the IASC's Framework on Durable Solutions.
 - Migration and movement history
 - Employment, source of livelihood, and financial security
 - Ability to enjoy adequate standard of living without discrimination
 - Ability to enjoy without discrimination long-term safety, security, and freedom of movement
 - Family separation and reunification
 - Loss and replacement of documentation
 - House, land, and property
 - Social capital
 - Preferences and intention for resettlement
 - Perception of stability
- The Roster: The roster is a shorter survey with demographic information at the individual level for each member of the family. Questions include basic demographic information such as sex, age, place of birth, marital status, as well as religious/ethnic identification, education, and employment status. A second roster tracks individuals who left with their families as of January 1, 2014 but who are no longer with the family due to death, migration, kidnapping, or some other change in location.

There is also a text box at the end of the questionnaire so that the enumerators may record additional information not captured in the questions and indicate their general impressions of the family's story.

The survey was answered by the head of family, often with the input of his/her spouse or adult children, and sometimes in the presence of other family members. In March 2016, the enumerators shared their preliminary field experiences, provided feedback on the qualitative and quantitative questions, and were trained on TextIt and research methods. Over the two-week training and following the pilot test of the data collection tools, the enumerators' feedback was incorporated into a working document used to adjust the questionnaire as well as to develop a field manual that detailed basic definitions and explanations of the questions. The sample design targeted 4,000 families, and, once in the field, 3,854 or 96 percent were captured for the final sample. The data presented here are the 3,854 sampled family responses merged with the individual roster data which generates a sample of 20,636 family members. In order to estimate the population of IDP families and persons, probability weights were constructed of the ratio of the DTM target families over the number of sampled families in the matrix of 4x7 governorates of residence/origin discussed above and included in Appendix 1. Applying the weights to the sample observations yields the 180,485 target families and an estimated 945,086 individuals. The estimated number of individuals, or the IDP population, is a little smaller than that reported for the four governorates in IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix. This is primarily because the DTM's population estimate is derived by multiplying its count of IDP

families by 6, which is the average size of all Iraqi families, whereas there are 5.2 persons per family in this sample of IDPs.

Table 4: Changes in Individual IDP Research Participants, by governorate

GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS (ROUND 1, APRIL 2016)	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS (ROUND 2, DECEMBER 2016)	NUMBERS WHO CHANGED DISTRICT/ GOVERNORATE BETWEEN ROUNDS	NUMBERS WHO RETURNED HOME BETWEEN ROUNDS	NUMBERS WHO REMAINED IN SAME GOVERNORATE	NUMBERS WHOM SURVEY WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT
BAGHDAD	1052	1021	948	6	67	31
BASRAH	600	588	485	44	59	12
KIRKUK	1116	1084	826	81	177	32
SULAYMANIYAH	1086	1031	848	32	151	55
TOTAL	3854 (100%)	3724 (97%)	3107 (81%)	163 (4%)	454 (12%)	130 (3%)

Qualitative interviews

At the end of the quantitative interview, the enumerators asked the respondent if he/she is willing to engage in a longer, in-depth interview, part of the qualitative component of the study. The inclusion of qualitative methods in this longitudinal study provides more details about forced migration dynamics over time, through tracking the choices and changes in IDPs' lives. In addition, the qualitative interviews express, in their own words, the experiences of those most deeply affected and thereby provide much needed detail and explanations to the trends seen in the quantitative study. Qualitative interviews conducted with members of the host communities allow for an understanding of how the presence of IDPs is perceived in various locations and by different members of the host community, including neighbors, merchants, laborers, educators, and professionals.

The qualitative questionnaire is comprised of 24 open-ended questions that both expand on themes addressed in the quantitative section and cover topics not covered in the quantitative section, including memories of IDPs' home governorates before displacement, detailed accounts of IDPs' displacement experiences, and specific incidents of interactions with the host community. As with the quantitative component, there was a final text box for notes in which the enumerators could record additional information not captured in the transcript of the interview, such as the family's overall demeanor, particular issues, etc. The enumerators were asked to provide basic demographic information about the respondent and submitted the qualitative interview transcripts to the analysis team through a secure data storage server.

Four ISIM researchers first translated the interview transcripts from Arabic to English. The ISIM data analysis team then used Dedoose, a secure qualitative data analysis program, to code and analyze the qualitative material in both Arabic and English. The Arabic language output was used in a qualitative data analysis workshop with the Iraqi enumerators in September 2016, which marked significant involvement of the Iraqi enumerators in the analysis process. The Georgetown team utilized the Iraqi teams' qualitative thematic reports to form the basis of the qualitative analysis of the first round of data collection.

Additional Interviews

STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS: The research team, including the IOM enumerators, is in the process of conducting individual, face-to-face interviews with 30 stakeholders, such as MoMD employees, representatives from the UN Country Team, local and provincial government authorities, national and international humanitarian and development organizations, local Iraqi aid organizations, and international donors. Stakeholders will be identified from the study team’s mapping of the organizations with knowledge of IDPs and their needs, as well as from other information collected by the study team. Additionally, information on local Iraqi organizations is collected through the household study, as well as via the NGO Coordination Committee of Iraq for Iraq (NCCI).⁷³ These small organizations are often highly localized and they provide a large amount of assistance to IDPs; assistance at this level often takes place under the radar of large international service providers, so particular attention was devoted to learning more about these organizations. The enumerators will be responsible for locating representatives of these organizations and conducting interviews with them.

HOST COMMUNITY INTERVIEWS: Additionally, each study team identified 20 host community members and conducted an approximately hour-long interview with 21 questions, for a total of 80 host community interviews per data collection cycle. The enumerators ask local host populations to talk about their perceptions of IDPs, the extent to which IDPs are settling into their new communities,



⁷³ A list of the Iraqi NGOs in each governorate is available on the website of the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq: map.ncciraq.org.

and their perceptions of both IDP and host community access to basic services, including education, employment, housing, and healthcare. Ten of the interviews are conducted with neighbors of IDPs, and are identified by the enumerators as they visit the IDP families for the in-depth qualitative interview or other follow-up. The other 10 interviews are conducted with host community members working in professions that have been impacted by the IDP influx: this includes but is not limited to doctors, pharmacists, teachers, local business owners, etc. The host community interviews are conducted in Arabic in Baghdad and Basrah, but in Sulaymaniyah and to some extent in Kirkuk, these interviews are conducted in Kurdish. Obtaining host community perspectives can significantly inform design of future programs to address the needs of IDPs in a way that is also sensitive to host community needs.



APPENDIX 2: GOVERNORATE PROFILES

Data collected during this first phase of the study is largely reported by governorate. The following section thus presents a short synopsis of each of the four governorates included in the study in order to allow for some understanding of the results.

The four governorates of study – Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah – like all of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, contain mixed populations from a variety of ethno-linguistic groups and religions. Each governorate has a clear majority population, and each has many minorities. Each also has economic strengths and differing natural resources, with economic stratification among its population, and rural and urban distinctions.

Overall, Iraq has a population of 36 million people, of whom 11.1 million are classified as rural.⁷⁴ Life expectancy stands at just over 69 years. According to the World Bank, Iraq's GDP puts it in the upper middle income category, at \$14,894.80 per capita in 2015. The corresponding figure for 1990 was \$7,442.8. The change parallels the global figures of \$5,413 per capita in 1990 and \$15,470 in 2015, although Iraqis' income was higher, relative to the global average, in 1990 than it is at present.⁷⁵ At the same time, “many Iraqi governorates have witnessed significant declines in poverty of more than 10 percentage points between 2007 and 2013: these include Salah el-Din, Karbala, Babylon, Diyala, Basrah, and Al-Anbar. Wasit, Al-Najaf, Douhuk, Kirkuk and Baghdad saw smaller declines in poverty, and Sulaymaniyah and Erbil saw little change.”⁷⁶

As of April 2016, or when data was collected, there were 3,418,332 IDPs throughout the country of whom 322,346 individuals (almost 10%) lived in 56 formal camps.⁷⁷

Baghdad

The smallest of Iraq's governorates in land size, Baghdad is the largest in terms of population with 24% of the country's total population, or 7.181 million residents, of whom the majority (87%) live in the urban area of Baghdad city.⁷⁸ Baghdad city is the capital of Iraq, home to the Iraqi central government, and a center of banking, commerce, and industry.

⁷⁴ The World Bank, [Rural Population Data: 1960-2015](#), 2016

⁷⁵ The World Bank, [GDP Per Capita PPP \(Current International\): 1990-2015](#), 2016

⁷⁶ The World Bank, [Poverty Estimates and Trends in Iraq: 2007-2012](#), 2016. p. 22

⁷⁷ Reach, Iraq Assessment Report. [Comparative Multi-Cluster Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons Living in Camps](#). June, 2016. p. 2

⁷⁸ 2009 Statistics from the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, [Central Statistics Organization](#). For more on Baghdad Governorate, see [NGO Coordinating Committee for Iraq](#).

There are currently an estimated 437,892 IDPs residing in Baghdad governorate.⁷⁹ Just less than 300,000 of those IDPs came from Anbar Governorate, while Ninewah and Salah al-Din respectively contributed the second and third largest IDP populations.⁸⁰

Baghdad has a population composed of Sunni Muslim, Shi'a Muslim, and Christian populations, who traditionally resided in mixed neighborhoods and had a highly integrated social fabric.⁸¹ Urban migration in the 1940s and 1950s brought hundreds of thousands to Baghdad from rural areas. Kurds from the north and Shi'a tenant farmers fleeing oppressive conditions from the central and southern areas became integral parts of the growing urban population.⁸²

Heightened sectarianism in Baghdad, following the U.S. invasion in 2003, produced significant waves of internal displacement during 2004 and 2005, and subsequent external displacement to Syria and Jordan. Following the 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari shrine in Samarra, more than one-third of IDPs fleeing regional instability settled in Baghdad.⁸³ In addition, "according to UN estimates, 80 percent of the sectarian violence in 2006 took place within a fifty-five kilometer radius of Baghdad."⁸⁴ As a result, more than 400,000 residents of the city eventually fled their homes.⁸⁵ Displacement continued as Sunni and Shi'a militia groups alike fought to establish their rule over different neighborhoods in the city, which led to a large-scale reconfiguration of Baghdad's social fabric, and produced neighborhoods of highly homogenous ethno-sectarian composition. By 2007, five of the city's seven million residents lived in neighborhoods with a single predominant sect.⁸⁶ In 2009, the government declared the *Diyala Return and Integration Initiative* amidst perceptions of heightened domestic stability, but it was a premature assessment and, "[a] UNHCR survey of almost 2,400 returnees to Baghdad (about 72 per cent of whom had been internally displaced) found that 61 per cent of them regretted going home, and 60 per cent of those cited security concerns as the reason."⁸⁷

More recently, ISIL-related displacements, which began in 2013, have resulted in additional waves of displacement to Baghdad with much larger numbers between September 2014 and April 2015, a time characterized by, "ongoing clashes between Daesh [ISIL] and various armed groups" in different governorates.⁸⁸ By May of 2015, Baghdad had absorbed 16% of the country's IDPs, making it the second largest host for IDP populations nationally, following Anbar.⁸⁹

Baghdad draws many IDPs because of the affordable housing prices, geographic centrality, and "proximity to conflict areas."⁹⁰ Among Baghdad's over 430,000 IDPs, 158,694 live with other families, in large part because so many IDPs have family in the area, and 239,628 reside in rental housing. Only

⁷⁹ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix-Iraq Mission*

⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸¹ Damluji, Mona. "Securing Democracy in Iraq: Sectarian Politics and Segregation in Baghdad, 2003-2007" in *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review*, ed. Vol. 21, Issue 2. 2010. pp. 76-78.

⁸² Phillips, Doris. "Rural-to-Urban Migration in Iraq." *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. July 1959, p. 409

⁸³ "[Baghdad Governorate Profile](#)." International Organization for Migration. May, 2015

⁸⁴ Auweraert, Peter Van and Isser, Deborah. "Land, Property, and the Challenge of Return for Iraq's Displaced." p. 4

⁸⁵ Damluji, Mona, "Securing Democracy in Iraq." p. 78

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 78

⁸⁷ IDMC, *Response Still Centred On Return Despite Increasing IDP Demands for Local Integration*. Oct. 10, 2011. Web 4 Nov. 2016

⁸⁸ "IOM, *Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Issues facing Returnees in Retaken Areas of Iraq*. p. 7.⁸⁹ "Baghdad Governorate Profile." International Organization for Migration

⁸⁹ "Baghdad Governorate Profile." International Organization for Migration.

⁹⁰ Ibid

17,214 IDPs live in camps.⁹¹ The influx of IDPs has strained the city's ability to provide basic services for the city's residents. IDPs face difficulties with overcrowding, bad housing conditions, and economic deprivation. Given these conditions, a May 2015 IOM report found that the vast majority of IDPs want to return to their place of origin,⁹² a view that may change with time and increased opportunities for employment in Baghdad. However, in the second half of 2016 a number of deadly ISIL bomb attacks targeted Shi'a neighborhoods of the city. Such insecurity may make integration of IDPs more difficult, despite the IDPs' intentions, as residents come to fear people they do not know coming into and out of their neighborhoods.

Sulaymaniyah

Sulaymaniyah is the northeastern-most governorate of Iraq, and part of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). It has a total population of 1.78 million people, and the total area is 17,023 km². Like Baghdad, the population is largely urbanized with almost 85% of its population living in urban areas.⁹³ There are currently an estimated 159,000 IDPs residing in Sulaymaniyah, just under half of whom – approximately 85,176 people – came from Anbar governorate, while Salah al-Din and Diyala contributed the second and third largest IDP populations, respectively.⁹⁴

Sulaymaniyah has an overwhelmingly Kurdish population. The majority of residents are Sunni, although there is also a Shi'a population. Due to Saddam Hussein's policies that targeted Kurdish residents, Sulaymaniyah "was...the site of mass human rights violations and genocidal actions carried out by the previous regime and [it] bore the brunt of the Kurdish civil war."⁹⁵

The violent repression of the Kurds by the Hussein regime meant that among today's residents of Sulaymaniyah, almost everyone has had experience with forced displacement.⁹⁶ It was against this historical context of abuse that IDPs, overwhelmingly of Arab origins, began arriving in the region.⁹⁷ It is estimated that IDPs now constitute one-third of the Kurdistan Region's residents.⁹⁸ Sulaymaniyah experienced a steady stream of IDPs which intensified with the offensive of ISIL since September 2014. Since the spring of 2016, as the military focused on liberating areas held by ISIL, the number of IDPs arriving in Sulaymaniyah has substantially decreased.⁹⁹ The government at present needs sustainable, long-term solutions to the economic, refugee, and IDP issues it faces, because a full 80% of IDPs prefer to remain in Sulaymaniyah.¹⁰⁰ In our population, only 42% want to stay in the short term, and 12% in the long term, while 37% are still waiting to decide for both the short and long term.

Since 2014, the Kurdistan region has experienced a major economic downturn, largely as a result of

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² "Baghdad Governorate Profile." International Organization for Migration

⁹³ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix- Iraq Mission*. See also NGO Coordinating Committee. "[Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile](#)."

⁹⁴ Ibid

⁹⁵ Siddiqui, Nadia and Guiu, Roger, et. al. "Assessment of Community Perceptions of Social Cohesion In Areas of Protracted Displacement and Stabilization in Iraq." International Organization for Migration. Sept. 2016. p. 67.

⁹⁶ Ibid, pp. 71-72

⁹⁷ Ibid p. 73

⁹⁸ Chatham House: Middle East and North Africa Programme Workshop Summary. *Internal Displacement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Impact, Response and Options*. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. May 16-18, 2016, p. 2.

⁹⁹ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix-Iraq Mission*

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p 3

decreased funding from the Baghdad government, inadequate taxation systems, and declining oil prices.¹⁰¹ This economic downturn occurred at the same time as the spread of ISIL and the arrival of huge numbers of both Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs. In addition, the expanding population led to fierce competition for the limited available jobs, a decrease in wages, and a shortage of available housing.¹⁰² Nonetheless, in comparison with national averages, the economic situation in Sulaymaniyah remains stronger than elsewhere.

In addition to the IDP population, 96% of Syrian refugees (227,971) in Iraq live in the KRI. While the majority of Syrian refugees reside in the governorates of Erbil and Dohuk, there are relatively fewer in Sulaymaniyah (25,000), the majority of whom are living among the host community (with only 2,900 in Arbat Camp).¹⁰³ Because the Syrian refugees, most of whom are Kurds, are living in the Kurdistan Region, the Iraqi Central government does not contribute significant funding or attention to Syrian refugee needs, which presents a significant financial burden on the Kurdistan Region, as well as the host community. In the Kurdistan Region, Syrians are allowed to work, which means they can exercise more self-reliance and feel less like objects of aid. It also may explain why there are significantly more adult Syrian men than women living in Iraq (as well as the large number of individuals present without their families).

Kirkuk

In 2009, the Iraqi government estimated the population of Kirkuk at 1.290 million (3% of Iraq's total population) in a small area of 9,679 km² (2.2% of Iraq).¹⁰⁴ Kirkuk is also highly urbanized with an estimated 31% of its residents living in rural areas.¹⁰⁵ There are currently an estimated 372,324 IDPs residing in Kirkuk.¹⁰⁶ Of those, 133,110 were IDPs internally displaced from within Kirkuk Governorate itself. Anbar and Salah al-Din contributed the second and third largest IDP populations, respectively.¹⁰⁷

Kirkuk's population is representative of all of Iraq's sects and ethnic groups.¹⁰⁸ The area has great oil wealth: "Kirkuk is currently the second largest oil-producing governorate. The 970-kilometer Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil field is Iraq's largest crude oil export line. From this location, at least 500,000 barrels of oil are pumped towards Turkey daily."¹⁰⁹

Since the 1920s, national governments have implemented policies to change the area's demographics among the area's Turkmen, Kurdish, and Arab populations.¹¹⁰ As a result of Iraqi nationalization of the petroleum industry in 1972, "the central government redrew boundaries and renamed many governor-

¹⁰¹ DeWeaver, Mark. "[Kurdistan's Great Recession: From Boom to Bust in the Rentier Economy](#)." Institute of International and Regional Studies (IRIS). American University of Iraq, Sulaimani. October 2016. pp. 1-3; UNHCR et al, *Displacement as challenge and opportunity Urban profile: Refugees, internally displaced persons and host community Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq*. April 2016. p. 4.

¹⁰² Chatham House: Middle East and North Africa Programme Workshop Summary. *Internal Displacement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Impact, Response and Options*. p. 6.

¹⁰³ [Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal](#)

¹⁰⁴ [2009 Statistics from the Iraqi Ministry of Planning](#), Central Statistics Organization

¹⁰⁵ [Kirkuk NCCI Governorate Profile](#)

¹⁰⁶ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix-Iraq Mission*

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

¹⁰⁸ Siddiqui, Nadia and Guiu, Roger, et. al. "[Assessment of Community Perceptions of Social Cohesion In Areas of Protracted Displacement and Stabilization in Iraq](#)." pp. 77-78.

¹⁰⁹ [Kirkuk NCCI Governorate Profile](#), p. 3

¹¹⁰ Siddiqui, Nadia and Guiu, Roger, et. al. "[Assessment of Community Perceptions of Social Cohesion In Areas of Protracted Displacement and Stabilization in Iraq](#)." pp. 77-78.

ates, dividing Kirkuk into two parts. One part was given the name “At-Ta’ mim,” meaning “nationalization” in Arabic. The new boundaries established an Arab majority in that area.”¹¹¹ Furthermore, Saddam Hussein initiated an Arabization campaign that displaced Kurds in order to produce a population more amenable to the designs of his authoritarian regime and its ideology of Arabization.¹¹² When the Hussein regime was toppled in 2003, many formerly displaced Kurds began returning to the region, which led to conflicts over housing and property rights.¹¹³ The governorate reverted formally to being called Kirkuk. It has also been a site contested by the main two Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union for Kurdistan (PUK). “Since 2005, there have been no elections in Kirkuk, largely due to violence and political stalemate. Many residents of Kirkuk allege that corruption and a refusal to compromise among public officials is delaying the restoration of Kirkuk’s public utilities and dilapidated infrastructure.”¹¹⁴

Kirkuk has seen a consistently high volume of IDPs. ISIL’s presence explains the spike in IDPs from June-July of 2014, when 83,676 IDPs entered the governorate.¹¹⁵ The next influx of IDPs occurred between September 2014 and March 2015, when several governorates, including Kirkuk, experienced major displacements due to “ongoing clashes between Daesh [ISIL] and various armed groups.”¹¹⁶ The number of IDPs began to decline after March 2016, though not nearly as quickly as most other governorates.¹¹⁷

As in many other locations which had an influx of IDPs, Kirkuk experienced a rise in rental prices, which had previously been quite affordable, and a decrease in job opportunities.¹¹⁸ The presence of armed groups in the governorate, which has made some areas, like Al-Hawiga and Dabes, temporarily inaccessible to aid workers.¹¹⁹ In 2015, Kirkuk governorate had a particularly high rate of IDPs who were renting homes, which increased their need for stable sources of income and further strained the ability of some families to provide adequate food.¹²⁰ Our study showed that IDPs in Kirkuk were almost twice as likely to be living in unfinished buildings (15%) compared to the other governorates (8%). This may be a result of the passage of time and IDPs inability to pay rent, which then pushes them out of rental housing and into unfinished buildings. Thus, the problems associated with unemployment are compounded by the increased level of IDPs needs.¹²¹

Basrah

Basrah’s population of 2.556 million makes it the third largest governorate in Iraq, behind Baghdad and Ninewa (Mosul). Located in the far south of the country, it is Iraq’s point of access to the sea, and covers an area of 19,070 km², much of which comprises marsh and lakes surrounded by

¹¹¹ [Kirkuk NCCI Governorate Profile](http://www.usip.org/publications/land-property-and-the-challenge-of-return-iraq-s-displaced), p. 2 <http://www.usip.org/publications/land-property-and-the-challenge-of-return-iraq-s-displaced>.

¹¹² Siddiqui, Nadia and Guiu, Roger, et. al. “[Assessment of Community Perceptions of Social Cohesion In Areas of Protracted Displacement and Stabilization in Iraq](#).” p. 78.

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ [Kirkuk NCCI Governorate Profile](#), p. 2

¹¹⁵ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix- Iraq Mission*

¹¹⁶ IOM, *Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Issues facing Returnees in Retaken Areas of Iraq*. p. 7

¹¹⁷ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix- Iraq Mission*

¹¹⁸ Siddiqui, Nadia and Guiu, Roger, et. al. “[Assessment of Community Perceptions of Social Cohesion In Areas of Protracted Displacement and Stabilization in Iraq](#).” p. 79.

¹¹⁹ “[Kirkuk Governorate Profile](#).” International Organization for Migration. August 2015. Web. 4 Nov. 2016

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Ibid

a desert environment. The population is largely urban (79.9%) and the governorate is a center for trade, transportation, and storage. The massive oilfields of Basrah produce two-thirds of Iraq's oil output.¹²²

Basrah is one of the most predominantly Shi'a-majority areas of the country.¹²³ Following the repression of the population under Saddam Hussein's regime, with the U.S. invasion and removal of the Hussein regime, the governorate became a center of Shi'a militia activities.¹²⁴ Since the beginning of ISIL's activities in Iraq, Basrah has been a consistently stable and safe area¹²⁵ although the destruction from recent wars has had a significant negative impact on the region's infrastructure.

There are currently an estimated 10,290 IDPs residing in Basrah among a total population of 2.556 million.¹²⁶ The vast majority of IDPs are from the governorates of Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and Anbar, in descending order. Basrah received one wave of IDPs when clashes arose in Ramadi in January of 2014, with many more arriving in the summer of 2014. Nevertheless, IDPs constitute less than 1% of the city's population. One-third (33%) of the IDPs who came to Basrah and live in Basrah now were originally from the governorate or have relatives living there, which facilitates cohesion and integration. The relatively small number of IDPs in Basrah has allowed the governorate to absorb their arrival quite easily, without any major strains on services or infrastructure. IDPs generally found housing, although many IDPs reside in low-quality housing or in the poorest neighborhoods. As time goes on and they deplete their savings or aid money is not forthcoming, ever-growing numbers of IDPs are moving to the Shabat al-Arab camp, which provides limited housing and all necessary educational and health services.¹²⁷



¹²² http://www.ncciraq.org/images/infobygov/NCCI_Basra_Governorate_Profile.pdf

¹²³ Human Rights Watch, *Basra: Crime and Insecurity Under British Occupation*. June 2, 2003

¹²⁴ "Basrah Governorate Profile." International Organization for Migration. June 2015

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ IOM, *Displacement Tracking Matrix-Iraq Mission*

¹²⁷ Ibid

APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY: DECISIONS OF THE IRAQI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

[الامانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء General Secretariat of the Council of Ministries]

The research team conducted a thorough review of decisions by the Iraqi Council of Ministers that were relevant to addressing internal displacement in Iraq. This was undertaken in recognition of the importance of closely analyzing the perspectives of relevant actors and the policies made to address internal displacement in Iraq in order to achieve a deeper and more nuanced understanding of IDPs' ability to access durable solutions, a central aim of this project. The timeframe for the team's analysis extends from height of ISIS-induced displacement in summer 2014 to May 2016, the time of the first round of quantitative and qualitative data collection. The decisions were accessed from the Iraqi Council of Ministers website (<http://www.cabinet.iq/>), reviewed in Arabic, and summarized in English. The summaries below are arranged chronologically.

1. Rebuilding the Affected Areas

Release Date: 09/Sept/2014; Status: Approved

- The Council approves the creation of a fund initiative to rebuild the areas that were hit by the terrorist acts. The council commissioned the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministries to oversee the implementation and management of the fund.

2. Educational Adjustments and Genocide of Minorities

Release Date: 18/Nov/2014; Status: Approved

- The Secretary of Education is given full power to address the current (insecure) situation and has the right to make any decision about a problem that benefits the students.
- The local councils have the power to declare Saturdays of every week as a regular school day. This decision is agreed upon due to the need to complete the required number of learning hours, when necessary.
- The council approves that the violence against the Yazidis, Turkomans, Christians and Shabak be considered genocide.

3. Repatriation Measures

Release Date: 25/Nov/2014; Status: Approved

- The Council refers the response from the Committee of Aid and Shelter for IDPs to the

Iraqi parliament for investigation over alleged suspicion of maltreatment (fraud and theft).

- The Council recommends that the Committee of Aid And Shelter for IDPs conduct periodic field visits to evaluate IDPs' situations and needs, and to work on ending their suffering.
- The Council decides that the Committee of Aid and Shelter for IDPs will facilitate and put in order mechanism to help IDPs to return to their home.
- The council approves to transfer amount of 200,000,000 (Two hundred million) Iraqi Dinars to the Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD) to support the administrative costs for better services (which is 2% of the total of 10 billion Iraqi dinars allocated to the MoMD in Parliamentary Decision 293 from 2014), due to the limit of the MoMD budget allocations.

4. Advanced Payment for the Governorate of Nineveh

Release Date: 09/Dec/2014; Status: Approved

- The council approves the transfer of 1 Billion Iraqi Dinars as an advance to pay the debts and to ensure the civil activities are operational.

5. MoMD Exemption

Release Date: 16/Dec/2014; Status: Approved

- The council approves to grant an exemption to the MoMD, based on the fifth amendment of the public doctrine for the Ministry of Finance (119995), which relieves them from providing end of year closing account reports.

6. The Release of Salaries for IDP Government Employees

Release Date: 07/Jan/2015; Status: Approved

- The council approves the recommendations to create a mechanism for salary payments for the workers who live in hotspots that are not under federal control.

7. Compensation of al-Anbar Residents

Release Date: 17/Feb/2015; Status: Approved

- The council approves the compensation for homeowners whose homes were affected by the terrorist and military attacks in Anbar province. Additionally, a committee will be formed and oversee the implementation of the rehabilitation project.
- Abdulbasit Torky Saeed, General Director of the Office of Financial Supervision, is assigned to direct and create the rebuilding fund of houses affected by violence.

8. Landmine Removal

Release Date: 10/Mar/2015; Status: Approved

- The government dedicated 50 billion Iraqi dinars to the ministry of environment for landmine removal in liberated areas from ISIS.

9. Recognition of Genocide and Random Housing

Release Date: 24/Mar/2015; Status: Approved

- The events below will be indicated as genocide. Camp Speicher and Badoush Prison killing; The killing of tribesmen who belonged to Bu’Nimer, Al-Jbour, Al-Laheeb, Al-Abeed; The killing and forced migration of Christian, Yazidi, and Shabak in the plains of Nineveh and Sinjar.
- The Prime Minister approves and assigns the High Commission of Housing to provide a national strategy to the Ministry Cabinet. The policy will address the possible solutions of the random housing that appears on government properties.

10. Modification of Contracts for the IDP Government Employees

Release Date: 31/Mar/2015; Status: Approved

- Modify the contracts of the displaced administrative (government) employees so they can work in the areas they fled to and secure employment opportunities. The modifications should allow the workers to work in their current locations and be paid for that work.

11. Compensation for Property

Release Date: 07/July/2015; Status: Approved

- Allow compensation to those who have houses affected by terrorist attacks, lost relatives and were injured.

12. Key point: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

Release Date: 13/July/2015; Status: Approved

- Iraq acknowledged the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and agreed to implement its strategies.

13. Compensation for the Residents of Khan Sa’ad Province

Release Date: 21/July/2015; Status: Approved

- Compensations of martyrs and injured people in Khan Bani Sa’ad province. And also to rebuilt the destroyed homes and markets. The compensation commission will accomplish this step.
- To facilitate the issuance of documents that are related to the martyrs and the pensions for the retirees.
- To simplify the documentation process in government departments for the people, standard governmental documents will be used in any government office. (For example, using the national ID or passport; using the housing card or letter of support for housing).

14. Reform Phase

Release Date: 09/Aug/2015; Status: approval and implementation

- Nation-wide political and structural reforms “to overhaul the government bureaucracy, scrapping three vice presidential posts and the offices of three deputy prime ministers,” with a goal to cut down on corruption and sectarian politics.¹²⁸

15. Compensation and Rebuilding Marketplaces

Release Date: 18/Aug/2015; Status: Approved

- Plan and implement compensation process for the victims’ families who were affected by terrorist acts, decision effective immediately. Moreover, the committee will plan and implement the required processes to rebuild the affected marketplaces.
- This decision will cover the areas of;
 - *Al-Habebeya (Baghdad).*
 - *Jameela (Baghdad).*
 - *Hoe’dy (Diyala).*

16. New National ID Card and School Exams

Release Date: 06/Oct/2015; Status: Approved

- To adopt the new national ID card as an identification form instead of the old national ID and nationality certificate or a passport.
- For students who failed the second (re-test) phase exams of the subjects they failed in the first phase, The Ministry of Education will extend the period to a third phase.

17. Repatriation Measures and Covering Returnee Document Fees

Release Date: 10/Nov/2015; Status: Approved

- The cabinet discussed the IDP situation and the Iraqi refugees outside of Iraq. They agreed to form a committee managed by representatives from the Ministry of Interior, Office of the Prime Minister, and other government departments to take the right actions to address the IDP situation. They decided to give the Ministry of Interior the authority to issue temporary passports for those who want to return but cannot pay for the required documents.

18. National Policy for the IDP situation and Movement of Fertilizer

Release Date: 15/Dec/2015; Status: Approved

- The implementation of the national policy to address the IDP situation.
- To assign the minister of MoMD management of the High Commission for Shelter and Support for IDPs.
- Allow chemical fertilizer to enter the province of Kurdistan for delivery to Kirkuk and Ninevah.

¹²⁸ al-Jazeera. “[Iraq cabinet backs PM Abbadi’s sweeping reforms.](#)” 9 August 2015

19. Heating Oil for IDPs

Release Date: 29/Dec/2015; Status: Approved

- The Cabinet, and in collaboration with the Ministry of Oil, has agreed to facilitate the distribution of heating gasoline and to provide it for free to IDPs.

20. Benefits for the Popular Mobilization Forces and Relatives of Victims

Release Date: 12/Jan/2016; Status: Approved

- Give priority to the first-degree relatives of martyrs and participants to the Popular Mobilization Forces to be assigned and employed in vacancies and positions within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior and organizations that are not -related to any ministry, while taking into consideration their qualifications.

21. Salary Transfers for Retired IDP Employees

Release Date: 26/Jan/2016; Status: Approved

- Agreement that the Ministry of Finance/Department of Retirement and Pension along with its non-related organizations oversee and facilitate completing the retirement procedures for IDP employees who reached the retirement age to cash-out their pensions to help them support their families in their current places, taking into consideration their current hardship, on the condition that a written and signed a document stating that there are no financial liabilities on the IDP employee in his workplace of origin.

22. Property and Lands for the Families of Victims

Release Date: 02/February/2016; Status: Approved

- Distribution of real estate/lands to the relatives of the martyrs, wounded, and the disabilities.

23. IDPs in Najaf

Release Date: 09/Feb/2016; Status: Approved

- A collaboration between the Ministry of Electricity and the Ministry of Construction and Housing will initiate the connection of the infrastructure (electricity and water) to a compound housing IDPs in Najaf. The complex was built on a land provided by the Ministry of Agriculture. These services will also cover four schools, a clinic, a police station, and a marketplace.

24. MoMD Exemption and Budget Authorization

Release Date: 16/Feb/2016; Status: Approved

- The Cabinet approves that the MoMD will be exempted from most of the clauses of the Ministry of Finance requirement for the year's budget reporting and its amendments. These exemptions cover the aid goods and household relief items. Moreover, the Cabinet approves the building and refurbishing of the camps exclusively from the accounted budget for 2016 under the laws of the social assistance and support.

25. Housing and Further Displacements

Release Date: 08/Mar/2016; Status: Approved

- To support the people to get adequate housing and to help in the housing problem, the Cabinet approves and implements the recommendations provided by the Minister of Planning to allow for the distribution of housing and shop stalls for the poor.

- The government will cover 50% of the housing cost and fees, and the beneficiary will cover the other half. This process will give more opportunities for poor people to obtain housing. The people's payment can be divided up to 15 or 20 years. The government will cover the admin cost of those processes at a rate of 1%.

- The government will cover 50% of the shop's cost and fees, and the other half will be covered by the beneficiary. This process will give more opportunities for poor people to support markets and also provide for themselves. The people's payment can be divided up to 5 to 10 years. The government will cover the admin cost of those processes at a rate of 1%.

- The cabinet approved that the Committee of Aid and Shelter for IDPs will take precautions in case of a new wave of displacement occurs, with the start of the liberation of areas under the control of ISIS.

26. Month of Ramadan Assistance and Assistance for Orphans

Release Date: 17/May/2016; Status: Approved

- After discussing the IDP situation, the council orders the Ministry of Finance to release cash assistance funds to cover the months and especially the month of Ramadan.
- The board agrees to appoint the Ministry of Trade as an authorized facilitator to remove the past due payments on those who did not renew their food rations card. These will cover the household who had their sole breadwinner and provider either missing or killed and also those who have minor dependents. Moreover, these new laws will include the homes who have a child who suffers from terminal illness and the mentally and physically disabled.



ملخص تنفيذي

يعيش أكثر من 4 مليون عراقي كنازحين، وهذا يعني ان النازحين يشكلون 10% من تعداد العراق الكلي والذي يبلغ 33 مليون نسمة. إن حالات النزوح المتكررة قد أرهقت العراق لعدة عقود، وخصوصاً مع صعود الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام (داعش) مؤخراً والمعارك الناتجة عنها. إن هذه الدراسة المطولة والتي تمت من قبل المنظمة الدولية للهجرة وجامعة جورجتاون ستعمل على كشف طرق تعامل النازحين وخبرتهم مع النزوح، كيفية تكيفهم مع وضعهم وإيجاد حلول دائمة. من خلال مسح اجري مع 4000 عائلة عراقية نازحة منذ كانون الثاني من سنة 2014 والمقابلات النوعية مع المجتمع المضيف والنازحين، تهدف هذه الدراسة الى خلق وسيلة لمساعدة الباحثين وصانعي القرار لبناء فهم أكثر وضوحاً ودقة لواقع النازحين لتعزيز حلول دائمة أكثر تأثيراً.

كما نصت وثيقة هيكلية الحلول الدائمة التابعة للجنة الدائمة للمنظمات المشاركة، ان تحقيق الحلول المستدامة يعني ان لا يستمر النازحين بمواجهة التحديات والصعوبات الناتجة عن النزوح والتي بدورها تشعرهم بالضعف. وأن يتمتعوا أيضاً بحقوقهم من الناحية الانسانية والقانونية والشعبية بدون اي تمييز على حساب نزوحهم.

سيقدم هذا التقرير وصفاً وتحليلاً للنتائج التي تمت ملاحظتها في الدورة الاولى من جمع البيانات، والتي تمت بين شهري اذار ونيسان. وستعتبر الدورات الاضافية اللاحقة كوسيلة للمقارنة على المدى البعيد عند عودة واستقرار واندماج النازحين. سيقدم الفصل الاول وصفاً عاماً عن وثيقة هيكلية الحلول الدائمة التابعة للجنة الدائمة للمنظمات المشاركة ومعلومات اساسية عن النزوح في العراق.

إن المحافظات الاربع (بغداد، البصرة، كركوك، والسليمانية) استضافت ما يعادل 33% من العدد الاجمالي من العائلات النازحة في العراق والتي نزحت بسبب احتلال الدولة الإسلامية اي بما يقارب 180,000 عائلة من اجمالي 522,000 عائلة نازحة في العراق.

ان الأساس المنطقي الذي تم على أساسه اختيار المحافظات الأربع، والتي ستكون مفسرة بشكل مفصل في الفصل الثاني، هو التنوع الحاصل ضمن مجتمع النازحين. يشمل هذا التنوع المحافظة الاصلية التي نزحوا منها والتنوع العرقي والديني والارقام المختلفة للنازحين في كل محافظة استضافت النازحين. هذا بالإضافة الى عامل الأمان الذي يساعد العاملين على إجراء المقابلات بأمان نسبي. تشمل هذه الدراسة النازحين الذين يسكنون في مناطق خارج المخيمات. كانت نسبة النازحين في المخيمات في هذه الفترة تشكل 10% من اجمالي النازحين في العراق.

هنالك عدة قرارات حكومية اتخذها مجلس الوزراء بعد كانون الثاني 2014 (في الملحق رقم 4) والتي تعالج احتياجات النازحين، كقدرتهم على نقل وظائفهم الحكومية، القروض السكنية للفقراء، و منحة المليون دينار عراقي والتي تقدم للنازحين مرة واحدة (بما يعادل ٨٠٠ دولار أمريكي)، واليات لتعويض الذين فقدوا بيوتهم اثناء المعارك الدائرة. إن نجاح تنفيذ هذه القرارات كان مختلفاً على عدة اصعدة: 94% من اجمالي النازحين مسجلين مع وزارة الهجرة والمهجرين، الكثير منهم استلم منحة المليون دينار عراقي، و ايضا قالوا انهم استطاعوا الاحتفاظ بوظائفهم الحكومية. لكن مع ذلك، لم يستلم أحد تعويضاً لبيوتهم المدمرة واغلب النازحين لم يعلموا ان هناك آلية تعويض ممكنة من الاساس.

يقدم الفصل الثالث بشكل كلي استنتاجات للبيانات الناتجة عن الدورة الاولى للدراسة. والتي تظهر للعراقيين الذين هربوا بأن النزوح هو بالفعل وسيلة حماية فعالة، وأن الغالبية العظمى من النازحين يشعرون بالامان في مناطق سكنهم الحالية أكثر من مناطقهم التي نزحوا عنها. بشكل عام، هذه ليست الحال دائماً للمهجرين داخلياً، لكن بسبب الترحيب الايجابي للمجتمع في العراق

واقليم كردستان، شعر عدد قليل جدا بتميز ويردود فعل عنيفة تجاههم لكونهم نازحين. يمكن لهذا التقرير القيام بعملية مقارنة ذات مغزى بين النازحين الذين هربوا والذين بقوا في مناطق سكنهم والذين عادوا خصوصا ان عمليات تحرير الاراضي من تنظيم الدولة الاسلامية مستمرة حالياً.

هناك أهمية للعلاقات السابقة والتاريخ المشترك، ويبدو أنها ترتبط ارتباطا مباشرا بمفاهيم الأمن الشخصي. نجد في بغداد – وهي المحافظة التي يشعر فيها النازحون داخليا بأنهم الأقل أمانا وهي أيضا المحافظة التي أفاد فيها النازحون بأنهم الأقل قبولا من المجتمع بنسبة قدرها (64%)، بينما هناك شعور أكبر بالقبول في كركوك بنسبة قدرها (77%) وفي البصرة بنسبة قدرها (89%) والسليمانية بنسبة قدرها (96%). أكثر من ربع النازحين في محافظة كركوك جاءوا من منطقة أخرى في كركوك، وبالتالي يميلون للشعور بالأمان لأنهم يعتبرون أنفسهم "من سكان كركوك"، الشيء الذي عبر عنه أحد الأشخاص الذي تمت مقابلته. هذا الوضع يشابه وضع الكثير من النازحين داخليا في البصرة والذين كانوا أصلا من البصرة أو اختاروا القدوم إلى البصرة بسبب وجود أسرة أو أصدقاء لهم هناك. هذا الشعور بالانتماء، سواء كان مبنيا على أساس الروابط الأسرية أو التآلف مع المنطقة أو عمل سابق أو أسباب أخرى، كان له تأثير إيجابي مباشر على شعور الناس بالأمن والأمان في محافظة النزوح. ومن الجدير ذكره بأن 96% من النازحين داخليا في محافظة السليمانية، وهي جزء من إقليم كردستان العراق وغالبية سكانها من الأكراد، أبلغوا عن شعورهم بالقبول بالرغم من أن 89.7% من النازحين داخليا عرّفوا عن أنفسهم كعرب. تعبر هذه الحقيقة عن محدودية التحليل المبني على أساس الطائفية لحركة النازحين والتي تشير إلى ميل الناس للتحرك باتجاه مجتمعاتهم الخاصة.

وعلى الرغم من أن الناس أفادوا بأنهم يشعرون بالأمن والأمان في أماكن سكنهم الجديدة، إلا أنهم يعانون من انخفاض حاد في مستويات المعيشة، وخاصة فيما يتعلق بجودة السكن، لقد أدى الطلب المتزايد على سوق العقارات للإيجار إلى ارتفاع الأسعار كما دفع الكثيرين إلى العيش بظروف مشابهة لظروف الحياة في الأحياء الفقيرة إضافة إلى التأثير سلبا على الفقراء من أبناء المجتمع المضيف. وجد النازحون حولا وكان أول هذه الحلول هو الاعتماد على العائلة والأصدقاء - من خلال المساكن المشتركة بنسبة (حوالي 25%) واقتراض المال بنسبة (ما يقارب 50%) بالإضافة إلى المساعدات الدولية والعمل الخيري. لقد اجتذبت شبكة العلاقات هذه 87% من النازحين داخليا إلى المناطق الحضرية حيث كان لهم عائلة وعلاقات عمل. وهذه النسبة من النازحين الذين يعيشون في المناطق الحضرية هي أعلى من نسبة السكان الحضر في البلد والتي تشكل ما مجموعه (70%). تشير هذه النتيجة إلى ضرورة تعديل السياسات بناء على المعطيات وذلك لتخفيف العبء عن المجتمعات الحضرية عن طريق زيادة الخدمات للجميع. وأيضاً عن طريق السياسات يجب مساعدة النازحين من المناطق الريفية للبقاء في المناطق التي يستطيعون فيها استخدام مهاراتهم العملية، وبالتالي يتم تشجيع إعادة تطوير المناطق الريفية في العراق باعتماد مشاريع زراعية حكومية جديدة أو حوافز لأصحاب الأراضي لتوسيع مشاريعهم الزراعية.

لا يزال الحصول على فرصة عمل والتي تساهم في تأمين احتياجات العائلة تحديا. تسمح بعض القطاعات (كالخدمة المدنية الحكومية والجيش وصناعة النفط وما إلى ذلك) للنازحين داخليا بنقل الوظائف إلى أماكن إقامتهم الجديدة، بعضهم وجد فرص عمل في القطاع الخاص، والبعض الآخر لم تعد مهاراتهم (مثل الزراعة) مناسبة لأسواق العمل حيث يعيشون الآن. نتيجة لذلك، يعمل أفراد الأسرة بما فيهم الشباب والنساء والرجال الذين عملوا سابقا لحسابهم الخاص، بأعمال غير منتظمة أو كعمالة مُستغلة. كشفت الدراسة بأن عدم وجود عمل منتظم يؤثر على إحساسهم بتقدير الذات وقدرتهم على رعاية أطفالهم وإرسالهم إلى المدرسة. مثل هذه التجارب تدفع هذه الأسر أيضاً، والتي هي فعلا الأكثر حرمانا، إلى أن تكون من أول العائدين إلى أماكنهم الأصلية. وتؤثر أيضا المنافسة المتزايدة على العمالة في القطاع غير المنظم على السكان المحليين الذين يواجهون منافسة متزايدة مع النازحين داخليا بالحصول على أجور متدنية جدا، مما يؤثر بشكل غير متناسب على الفئات الأكثر حاجة في المجتمع المضيف.

في الوقت الذي عادة ما تعتبر فيه العودة إلى مجتمع المنشأ على أنها الحل الدائم والمرغوب فيه من المنظور السياسي، إلا أنه لا يعتبر الحل المرغوب به بشكل أكبر من وجهة نظر العديد من النازحين داخليا. أولئك الذين وجدوا سكنا معقولا وأعادوا بناء بعض مظاهر العيش الخاصة بهم، أو أولئك الذين يشعرون بقدر أكبر من الأمان، يعبرون عن رغبة في البقاء حيث هم أكثر من رغبتهم في العودة. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، وجدت الدراسة بأن النازحين سيتخذون قرار العودة على أساس الوضع الأمني في المجتمع الذي نزحوا عنه. تأتي عوامل أخرى كالعامل والحالة المادية، فضلا عن وجود المسكن - كثاني أهم العوامل في اتخاذهم لقرار العودة. وبالتالي، مع تحرير المناطق من تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام والمشار إليه (داعش)، إذا كان هناك دفعة لعودة النازحين داخليا، فمن الضروري إعادة الأمن والأمان إلى تلك المناطق وأن يكون هناك وسائل للذين عادوا لإعادة بناء سبل معيشتهم.

في نهاية المطاف، ما تشير إليه هذه الدراسة هو الحاجة إلى اتباع نهج أكثر دقة وتوازناً لإيجاد حلول دائمة للنازحين داخليا، كما هو موضح في الفصل الرابع. وعلى الرغم من أن الحكومة المركزية العراقية وعلى مدى السنوات الثلاث الماضية قد سنت تشريعات لمساعدة النازحين داخليا، إلا أنه لم يتم إحراز أي تقدم في تنفيذ الوعود الخاصة بالإصلاحات والتعويضات عما فقده. لعبت المساعدات الدولية دورا هاما في تلبية احتياجات النازحين العراقيين. وقد وجد بعض العراقيين حلولاً دائمة بمساعدة أسرهم وأصدقائهم وأفراد المجتمع المضيف. ولكن في النهاية، فقط عن طريق تأمين الحماية لكل العراقيين سيجد النازحين داخليا حلولاً دائمة. ستساعدهم السياسات التي سُنّت لدعم النازحين داخليا في العراق على إعادة بناء حياتهم ومعيشتهم وتحقيق الاندماج الاجتماعي المُجدي سواء من خلال العودة أو الاندماج أو إعادة التوطين.



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PART ONE APRIL 2017

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