

OBSTACLES TO RETURN IN RETAKEN AREAS OF IRAQ



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The UN Migration Agency

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**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION | IOM-IRAQ MISSION
DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX | DTM**



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THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IRAQ MISSION)

Main Office in Baghdad

UNAMI Compound DIWAN 2

International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq

iraq.iom.int

iraqpublicinfo@iom.int

Twitter: @IOM Iraq

Facebook: IOM Iraq

Instagram: [iom_iraq](#)

FOREWORD

BY IOM IRAQ CHIEF OF MISSION, THOMAS LOTHAR WEISS



The Iraq crisis is now in its fourth year, as ISIL entered Anbar in December 2013. Since then the conflict has gone through several phases, affecting millions of Iraqis who were forcibly displaced or remained in areas held by ISIL. As of April 2017, approximately 1.7 million Iraqis have returned and more returns are expected, as 3 million people are still displaced.

As the conflict against ISIL has evolved, and more areas are retaken, the return process has steadily expanded. In 2016, dynamics and challenges related to the return process became more urgent in the humanitarian agenda as hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals were embarking on their return journey. Conditions in areas of return clearly varied in terms of damage to properties,

access to services and accessibility, which together with the legacy of the conflict's dynamics, have dramatically affected the local social fabric and hence the capacity to re-establish a livelihood in those areas.

In order to respond to these emerging needs, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator established a Returns Working Group chaired by IOM in March 2016. The key objectives of the group are to provide a multi-stakeholder platform to strengthen coordination and advocacy and offer guidance on activities related to areas of return. Through IOM's lead role in the Returns Working Group, it is our aim to use our research findings on returns to guide programming specifically geared to expressed needs.

This study, "Obstacles to Return in Retaken Areas of Iraq," seeks to investigate and analyze the factors that limit the displaced Iraqis' willingness or ability to return to their place of origin. The study was generously commissioned by the European Union Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) as the research component of an Integrated Humanitarian Assistance Programme, which has been providing first-line assistance to IDPs across Iraq. This research investigated main push and pull factors influencing the decision to return, obstacles to return and conditions that have influenced the decision-making process to return or remain in displacement.

This comprehensive quantitative and qualitative research study, carried out in eight recently retaken sub-districts and involving in-depth interviews with key informants as well as quantitative household surveys, provides unique insights into the return process or decision to stay. It also offers a platform for further discussion, advocacy and coordination to address the numerous points identified. Through the experience of these eight retaken areas, we can better understand the dynamics involved; in turn, identified trends will allow more targeted interventions, as push and pull factors are often country-wide.

In cooperation with the Government of Iraq, the UN Country Team and humanitarian partners, IOM Iraq remains committed to support the delivery of durable solutions, in safety and with dignity. This includes assistance to families returning voluntarily, who may face significant challenges to rebuild their homes and livelihoods and regain their standard of living; families who consider displacement a better alternative and continue to try to rebuild their lives away from their homes and communities while they wait for an opportunity to return; and those who have decided to integrate locally.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CSO - Civil Society Organization

DK - I don't know (Survey answer)

DTM - Displacement Tracking Matrix

ECHO - European Union Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

GoI - Government of Iraq

HOH - Head of Household

IDP - Internally Displaced Person

IED - Improvised explosive device

IFG - Federal Government of Iraq

IOM - International Organization for Migration

ISF - Iraqi Security Forces

ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

KRG - Kurdistan Regional Government

NGO - Non-Governmental Organization

PKK - Kurdistan Workers Party

RA - Refused to answer (Survey answer)

UN - United Nations

UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

YPG - People protection units

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

More than three years after the occupation of large parts of the Iraqi territory by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the almost immediate battles that ensued to reclaim those areas, more than 3 million Iraqis remain displaced and over 1.7 million have returned to their place of origin, as the Iraqi Security Forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga and other coalition groups are retaking occupied areas at a steady pace. In the context of this fluid and complex situation, this research aims to investigate and analyze the immediate factors that limit the willingness or ability of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to return to their place of origin. The decision to return is influenced by several factors and actors, the most relevant of which are presented and analyzed in this study.

The project has two components, a qualitative one of in-depth interviews with key informants, and a quantitative one, with household surveys administered to returnees and IDPs; it was implemented in eight sub-districts distributed across five governorates that were chosen based on criteria that would allow comparison and analysis, and would be representative of the Iraqi context. Special attention was paid to the locations' ethno-religious, tribal and socioeconomic diversity and to gender balance; socially diverse key informants, representing returnees and displaced persons, were chosen for each location.

THE STUDY HIGHLIGHTS THE FOLLOWING GENERAL TRENDS:

The decision to return or stay in displacement is taken individually or by the family rather than by the tribe or community, and in most cases, returns involve all members of the family. Family, relatives and friends, followed by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), are those who mainly support these returns, while formal actors seem to play a secondary role.

Security in the area of origin clearly appeared as the main factor influencing the decision to return or remain in displacement: 52% of returnees went back because security was considered good in their location of origin, while 28% of IDPs chose to remain in displacement because of the lack of security back home. Other security-related factors influencing the decision to remain in displacement were fear from security actors, of reprisal acts, violence, and harassment or discrimination (10% of IDPs). A high level of trust towards the security actors in the area of origin, in particular, seems to encourage more returns, while the opposite holds true. Secondary factors preventing return were lack of service provision and damage or destruction of property back home.

As to property damage, both groups (IDPs and returnees) reported a similar extent of damage; the difference lay in the actor who inflicted this damage, which was different for IDPs and returnees from the same location. Where the actor having inflicted the damage is still in power, returns were expectably lower, while house damage by itself was not found to be a significant obstacle to return.

Most IDPs said they were satisfied with their decision to stay in displacement; however, this does not mean that they do not plan to return at some point: 76% of interviewed IDPs said they intend to return, half of whom within a year. Returnees, on the other hand, reported higher levels of discomfort, harassment and discrimination in their area of displacement, which could have promoted a faster return.

Of those IDPs who tried to return, 23% were not allowed to do so whether through intentional delays by local authorities in processing the documentation required to organize the return, or blockages at checkpoints.

As to fear of reprisal back home, over 31% of interviewed IDPs believe they could be victims of reprisal or violent acts if they went back to their location of origin. However, this perception is much lower among interviewed returnees (10%). Over 25% of interviewed IDPs and 20% of interviewed returnees said that they foresaw an increase of tension when returns to the areas of origin increase.

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OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

The overall objective of this research is to investigate the immediate factors limiting the IDPs' willingness to return to their place of origin in the wake of the recent events associated to the retaking of their areas of habitual residence.

The occupation of large parts of the Iraqi territory by the ISIL began in January 2014; by the second half of 2014, the ISF, Kurdish Peshmerga, and/or other coalition groups were already progressively retaking occupied areas.

As a consequence, some groups of IDPs are returning to these areas. As of December 2016, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) surveyed more than 1.2 million returnees. This number is expected to increase in the coming months as operations to retake new areas are in progress.

However, part of the population still remains displaced, and the decision to return is influenced by several factors and actors involved in the decision-making process that motivate or restrict the return process.

This research has been designed to shed light on the factors triggering or hindering returns in eight sub-districts across Iraq through a mixed method research carried out in two phases —a qualitative part and a quantitative one.





METHODOLOGY

The research project has two components: a first qualitative component (in-depth interviews with key informants) and a second quantitative component (household survey among returnees and IDPs) to be implemented in eight sub-districts located in five different governorates.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Three types of sources were used in the literature review of this research.

First, IOM data from the DTM as well as from the Returnee Assessment (March 2016) and the Integrated Location Assessment (September 2016). This data gives information on the IDP and returnee population in Iraq, district of displacement and return, period of displacement, shelter type and state of the infrastructure and services available, providing a detailed overview of the IDP and returnee population and the conditions of the locations where they live. It also offers a first glimpse of less tangible aspects such as the main protection and vulnerability issues returnees and IDPs face. This data was used as a baseline to select the locations to be studied.

The second category of sources is the existing case studies that look either directly or indirectly into obstacles to return in Iraq. It includes studies and reports published by UN agencies, NGOs and academia. The information extracted from these case studies was crosschecked, patterns were drawn, and the results were used to build the qualitative research tool complemented by the third category of sources.

The third category of sources includes theoretical frameworks. For example, indicators from the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) Metrics Framework,¹ which is used to build the Impact Assessment Matric used by United Nations Agencies, were included to assess community polarization in the data collection tool.

SELECTION OF LOCATIONS

Following the literature review, eight sub-districts located in five different governorates across the country were selected as case studies for the research study.

The selection of the locations was based on a set of criteria that would allow comparing/analyzing the factors that motivated some to return and others to remain displaced. This was done in order to make the study as representative of the Iraqi context as possible.

All selected locations are retaken areas in the context of the ISIL crisis. In all locations, two population groups, i.e. people who fled and returned, and people still living in displacement, were interviewed to triangulate information on the same area.²

Locations were selected in different governorates, in urban and rural areas, and in areas with different levels of ethno-religious and tribal diversity.

Access considerations that could affect fieldwork were also taken into account to ensure the safety of IOM field teams. Some sub-districts were ruled unsafe for fieldwork and therefore excluded from the potential list of locations.

¹ (Agoglia, Dziedzic, & Sotirin, 2010)

² People still living in displacement were interviewed in the place of displacement

The eight selected locations were as follows:


Governorate	District	Sub-district	Date are was retaken	Urban / Rural	Ethno-religious background (ER) and tribal composition (T) [1]
Ninewa	Telafar	Zummar	Oct-14	Rural	ER: Arab Sunni (70%), Kurdish Sunni (30%)
	Sinjar	Markaz Sinjar	Nov-15	Urban / rural	ER: 55 % Kurdish Muslim (Shi'a and Sunni), 10% Arab Sunni, 30% Yazidi, 5% Turkmen
Kirkuk	Kirkuk	Al Multaqa	Mar-15	Rural	ER: Arab Sunni with a few Kurdish and Turkmen families T: Al Jabour, Al Hamdany and Al Ishaqi
Salah al-Din	Tikrit	Markaz Tikrit	Mar-15	Urban	ER: Arab Sunni (90%). T: Al Jabouri and Albu Nasr
Diyala	Khanaqin	Jalawla	Nov-14	Urban / rural	ER: Arab Sunni (75%) Arab Shi'a (9%), Turkmen Sunni (4%), and Kurdish (Shi'a and Sunni 12%) T: Al Karawi
	Al-Khalis	Mansouriya	Jun-14	Rural	ER: Arab Sunni (97%) and Arab Shi'a (3%). Minority of Turkmen Shi'a families (approx. 390 families) T: Al Ezza and Al Jabour
Baghdad	Kadhimia	Sab'a Al Bour	Sep-14	Urban	ER / T: Arab Shi'a (75%), mainly from Al-Tamimi tribe. Minority of Arab Sunni, from Al Dulaimi and Al Jabouri tribes
	Abu Ghraib	Khan Dhari	Nov-14 to Dec-14	Rural	ER: Arab Sunni T: Al Zawbaa

Table 1 Information on selected locations

The decision to select the locations at the sub-district level is based on the methodology of the research. A selection of locations at a lower level would have implied a limited sample size of returnees and IDPs to survey in the second stage of the research.

Obstacles to Return in retaken areas

8 Case Studies



Map 1 Assessed locations

PHASE 1 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

The first stage of the research adopted a qualitative approach and used in-depth interviews as a data collection method. This part of the research intended to inquire about specific information at the community level (macro). Representatives of these community groups are knowledgeable about the context, factors and dynamics that affect the return of their respective groups. Therefore, qualitative in-depth interviews with key informants were selected as the preferred method for this stage of the research and 10 such interviews were conducted by IOM research teams in each location.

In each location, key informants, representing returnees and displaced people, were chosen from the following categories:

1. Local authorities representative
2. Security actor
3. Tribal leader (representing returnees)
4. Tribal leader (representing people who remain in displacement)
5. Religious leader (representing returnees)
6. Religious leader (representing people who remain in displacement)
7. Local researcher
8. Civil Society Organization (CSO) / Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) / academia representative
9. Health / education representative
10. Focal person of people who remain in displacement

In order to reflect the views of those who cannot return to their location of origin, we included as key informants one IDP focal person, one religious leader and one tribal leader from the community group that could not return.

However, in some areas the original sample had to be adapted to what was available in the selected location.³

To protect the identity of key informants, they are coded as follows in the report:⁴

- [XX_YY]: Governorate (first letter)
- [XX_YY]: Sub-district (first letter)
- [XX_YY]: Category of key informant
 - Local authorities representative [XX_LA]
 - Security actor [XX_SA]
 - Religious leader [XX_RL]
 - Local researcher [XX_LR]
 - CSO / NGO / academia representative [XX_CS]
 - Health / education representative [XX_HE]
 - Focal person of those who remain in displacement [XX_ID]
 - Tribal leader [XX_TL]

³ In the case of Khan Dhari, four extra interviews were carried out. In the first round of 10 interviews, the interviewers noticed that interviewees were reluctant to answer certain questions and therefore the validity of the information decreased. A new round of four interviews with additional key informants was included to reinforce the quality of the research.

⁴ In Zummar's case study a political leader was interviewed as key informant and coded as [XX_PL]

The fieldwork was carried out between October and November 2016, after the field teams received a four-day training on the data collection tool and data collection techniques (3–6 October 2016). The tool was translated and pre-tested through mock interviews, and modifications were made to obtain a final tool. Particular attention was given to those words that might have a different meaning when translated.

All the field teams included female interviewers and two out of four team leaders were females.

The questions of the in-depth interviews (Annex 1) and the moderators' guide used during data collection (Annex 2) are included at the end of this report, in English and Arabic.

PHASE 2 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH

The second stage of the research consisted of a quantitative household survey administered to a convenience sample of 1) returnees from the selected locations and 2) IDPs originally from the selected locations but still displaced. IOM field teams tracked the latter across nine districts where they are currently displaced.

A total of 1,399 interviews were carried out to ensure representativeness of the two population groups: returnees (n= 500) and displaced (n= 899) from each location. It was important to include both groups to be able to analyze why some have returned whereas others, displaced from the same locations, remain displaced.

		Location of Origin								Total
		Ninewa		Kirkuk	Salah al-Din	Diyala		Baghdad		
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari	
IDPs in the provinces of	Dahuk	84	193	–	–	–	–	–	–	277
	Erbil	–	–	–	90	–	–	–	–	90
	Kirkuk	–	–	104	46	–	–	–	–	150
	Diyala	–	–	–	–	96	60	–	–	156
	Baghdad	–	–	–	–	–	–	133	93	226
	Total IDPs	84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93	899 [1]
RETURNEES		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63	500

Table 2 Survey sample by location⁵

The sample of the survey also varied in each selected location depending on the population of the sub-district / number of returnees / displaced people. It also takes into account the ethno-religious and tribal diversity of each location, as well as the gender factor. The Obstacles to Return study required enumerators to interview an eligible person within the household, preferably, but not necessarily, the household head.

To ensure that women were represented, we used data collected through another study (Longitudinal Study on Durable Solutions in Iraq, 2015–2017) and we estimated the percentage of female heads of household within the Iraqi displaced population (16%). Hence, for this study field-teams were instructed to target at least that percentage of female-headed households in each location. Note that not all female respondents indicated in Table 3 are household heads, and that some female-headed households were represented by a male member during the interviews. Still, for most locations a female contingency equal to or above 20% was reached during fieldwork.

⁵ The sample of the study is not statistically representative of the displaced and returnee population in the locations and therefore cannot be extrapolated to all the returnees and IDPs.

Sex of respondent (Head of Household or any other adult member who answers on behalf of the family)		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Female	21.40%	22.30%	22.00%	16.20%	19.80%	18.30%	21.80%	23.70%
	Male	78.60%	77.70%	78.00%	83.80%	80.20%	81.70%	78.20%	76.30%
	Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
	Count	84	193	91	136	96	60	133	93
RETURNEE	Female	10.40%	21.60%	17.50%	17.60%	18.30%	32.70%	24.60%	22.20%
	Male	89.60%	78.40%	82.50%	82.40%	81.70%	67.30%	75.40%	77.80%
	Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 3 Gender of the respondents

The detailed sample distribution can be found in Annex 4. Annex 5 and 6 contain the questionnaire used for the survey (IDPs and returnees).

Quantitative data collection took place during February 2017, after a two-day training held on 25 and 26 January 2017.






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المنظمة الدولية للهجرة - العراق

GENERAL TRENDS AFFECTING RETURN


DECISION TO RETURN: DYNAMICS AND ACTORS

The decision to either return or stay in displacement is taken at a personal or family level, rather than at a community or tribal one, as shown in Graph 1. This trend persists even in those rural locations where tribes played a major role in retaking the area. In most cases, the return includes all the members of the family (Graph 2).



Graph 1 Actors involved in the decision-making process

The decision to return or stay in displacement is mostly taken at personal or family level.



Graph 2 and 3 Separation of family members during return (returnees' answers)

Families tend to return as a unit: all family members return at the same time.

Family, relatives and friends are the main actors supporting and encouraging return followed by the ISF; local actors play a secondary role in the process. Encouragement and promises were also mainly supported by families and friends and the ISF, with a smaller share from Peshmerga and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—this is due to the selection of locations.


⁶ Head of household (HoH)

Was your return supported?		Did anyone try to encourage your return by means of promises?	
No	Yes	No	Yes
63.4%	36.40%	55.40%	44.60%
By who? (within Yes answer)		By who? (within Yes answer)	
Family / relatives / friends		29.12%	34.53%
ISF		21.43%	22.42%
Government of Iraq / Provincial Council		14.29%	9.42%
KRG		13.19%	10.76%
Peshmerga		5.49%	10.76%
Local authorities (Mukhtar / Mayor / etc.)		5.49%	7.62%

Table 4 Actors involved in supporting and encouraging return⁷ (returnees' answers)
Family members, relatives and friends are the main actors supporting and encouraging return.

MAIN REASONS TO RETURN OR REMAIN IN DISPLACEMENT

Security in the area of origin is the main reason influencing returns according to the surveyed returnees in the eight sub-districts. As shown in Graph 4, security in the area of origin is followed by a range of negative factors experienced while in displacement, including the difficulty to pay rent, find a job, or adapt to a new environment. The latter is particularly noticeable in displaced families from rural areas.




Graph 4 Main reason to return (returnees' answers)


SECURITY IN THE AREA OF ORIGIN IS THE MAIN FACTOR ATTRACTING RETURNS

Security factors are those most commonly mentioned by IDPs as their main reason to remain in displacement. For some IDPs (29%) the main reason to stay in displacement is the ongoing fight or general lack of security in their areas of origin, while for others (25%) it is better security in the area of displacement. Other security-related factors mentioned by the interviewed IDPs (10%) as their main reason to remain in displacement are fear from security actors, fear of reprisal acts or violence, and fear of harassment or discrimination, as shown in Graph 5.

⁷ We consider support in broad terms, including any sort of moral or financial support, help in processing documents or in providing transportation, among others. We consider encouragement, among others, as those promises as specific guarantees offered such as provision of security, clearance of rubble and IEDs, provision of jobs, and compensations grants.



Graph 5 Main reason to stay in displacement (IDPs' answers)
Lack of security in origin is the main reason to stay in displacement.




Graph 6 Main and second reasons to stay in displacement

Although the surveyed IDPs indicated security factors as the primary reason to remain in displacement, the secondary factors hindering return were related to services and property: 28.41% of interviewed IDPs mentioned lack of services in the location of origin or better services in displacement as the second reason that makes displacement more attractive than returning and 18.3% mentioned house damage.

PROPERTY DAMAGE

Both interviewed returnees and IDPs reported similar percentages of damaged private property as shown in Graphs 7 and 8. In some case studies, however, the actor who inflicted the damage is not the same for IDPs as for returnees, as shown Table 5. Therefore, it is not the damage to the property itself, but the context in which this destruction happened, that discourages returns.



Graphs 7 and 8 House and property damage among returnees and IDPs
A total of 70% of returnees and 79% of IDPs have had their house or property damaged during the last conflict.


	Actor	IDPs from the location	Returnees to the location
JALAWLA	Asayish	37.60%	0%
	Peshmerga	10.60%	2.10%
	Don't know / refused to answer	50.60%	85.40%
KHAN DHARI	ISIL	85.70%	37.50%
	ISF	33.30%	21.40%
	Militias	2.40%	50%
MANSOURIYA	DK / RA	73.80%	20.00%
	Militias	16.70%	0%
	ISIL	9.50%	80.00%
	ISF	2.40%	20.00%
SINJAR	ISIL	77.40%	64.30%
	Stayees	24.30%	11.90%
	Returnees	19.20%	0%

Table 5 Actors who have inflicted house and property damage. IDP and returnees' answers, only in those locations and on those actors showing significant differences.

In certain locations, the actors involved in inflicting house and property damage are different for IDPs and for returnees.


INTENTIONS TO RETURN

Most of the interviewed IDPs are satisfied with their decision to stay in the area where they are currently living. However, this satisfaction does not mean that they are not planning to go back, as shown by their intention to return: 76% of them said they plan to return at some point and of these, almost half plan to do so within the next 12 months.



Graph 9 Level of contentment with the decision to stay in displacement among interviewed IDPs
Most of the interviewed IDPs are satisfied with their decision to remain in displacement.

Do you plan to return at some point?




Graph 10 Intentions to return


A total of 76% of interviewed IDPs plan to return to their area of origin.

When asked about how comfortable they felt in their areas of origin before their displacement, both interviewed IDPs and interviewed returnees felt generally comfortable in similar percentages. However, when asked about how comfortable they felt in the area of displacement, the percentage of returnees feeling uncomfortable was higher than that of IDPs (21% of returnees said they felt very uncomfortable in the area of displacement). Returnees also reported having suffered higher levels of harassment and discrimination.

Returnees were therefore feeling more uncomfortable in displacement and suffered higher levels of discrimination than those still displaced, which could have prompted their faster return, while those IDPs who feel comfortable in displacement (59%) might slow down their return even if they plan to eventually go back.



Graph 11 Level of comfort in the place of origin and in the place of displacement (IDP and returnees' answers)
Returnees felt more uncomfortable in the location of displacement than those families who remain displaced.




Graph 12 and 13 Level of discrimination / harassment in displacement (IDP and returnees' answers)
The level of harassment in the location of displacement is slightly higher among returnees.


BLOCKED RETURNS

As shown in Graph 14, 23% of interviewed IDPs did try to return at some point but they were not allowed to do so. Delays by local authorities in processing the documentation required to organize

the return movement was the most common method used to block returns, followed by blockages at checkpoints. Militias and Asayish were the main actors involved in stopping the return of the interviewed IDPs.




Graph 14 Blocked returns (IDP answers)



Graph 15 Actors involved in blocking returns (IDP answers)

A total of 23% of interviewed IDPs tried to return but were blocked.



Graph 16 Method used to block returns (IDP answers)

Returns were usually blocked by means of delays in processing the documentation required to return.

Did you try to return at some point but were not allowed?		
Yes answer by ethnoreligious distribution [1]		
Arab Shi'a Muslim	Female	10.70%
	Male	11.40%
Arab Sunni Muslim	Female	23.80%
	Male	39.00%
Kurdish Sunni Muslim	Female	0.00%
	Male	5.10%
Kurdish Yazidi	Female	0.00%
	Male	0.00%
Others / RA	Male / Female	10.00%


Overall, males, and in particular Arab Sunnis, present a higher ratio of blocked returns: 39% of this group stated that their attempt at returning was blocked. Most of these incidents were reported in Diyala Governorate.

Table 6 Blocked returns by ethno-religious sample distribution.

Arab Sunni males represent the group with the highest number of blocked returns


FEAR OF REPRISAL

Over 64% of interviewed IDPs believe they could be victims of reprisal or violent acts if they go back to their location of origin. This perception is higher among interviewed returnees (81%).




Graph 17 and 18 Fear of reprisal or violent acts in the event of return (IDP and returnees' answers)
A total of 64% of interviewed IDPs fear suffering from reprisal acts if they return.

When asked about how these displaced families would feel among the people who stayed in their place of origin during the crisis, 45% of respondents refused to respond and 13% said they would feel very or somewhat uncomfortable (Graph 19). The high number of respondents who refused to reply could be due to fear. Most significantly, one out of four IDPs and one out of five returnees believe that returns will contribute to increasing community tension in their areas of origin.



Graph 19 Level of comfort around people who stayed in place of origin during the crisis in the event of return




Graph 20 Contributions of returnees to the level of tension associated to returns (IDP and returnees' answers)





Therefore, an increase in community tension and reprisal acts among returnees could take place when the number of returns increases, as shown in Graph 20. This trend is more acute in certain locations, for instance in Markaz Sinjar (75%) and Zummar (47%) in Ninewa Governorate, and Jalawla (60%) in Diyala. These two governorates might therefore be a hotspot for community tension related to returns.



Graph 21 Level of tension associated to returns by locations (IDP answers)
Among IDPs, expected tension associated to return is more acute in Diyala and Ninewa governorates.

ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

The following section provides an overview of the main quantitative findings of the research. It is divided in four parts:

- I. Factors influencing the decision-making process of those families considering to return or stay in displacement (main reasons to return or not to return, support received or blocked returns, and level of satisfaction with the decision);
- II. How HLP issues, livelihood opportunities and level of affluence affect IDPs and returnees (how differences in the inflicted property damage, access or lack of access to livelihood in displacement, and level of affluence of the displaced families have an impact on returns);
- III. Level of contentment before displacement, while in displacement and after return with the place where respondents are / were living, level of harassment and discrimination respondents suffered before, during and –in the case of returnees– after displacement; host community, stayees and other returnees' perception of each other.
- IV. Community polarization and the perception IDPs and returnees have of several formal and informal actors playing a leading role in their areas of origin.

DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND INCENTIVES REGARDING DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN

This section provides information on the decision-making process that displaced persons followed when confronted with the choice to return to their homes. All steps have been assessed, from intentions (and planned timeframe), to the conditions effectively conducive to return, support received, obstacles encountered and satisfaction recorded upon return or when staying in displacement.

INTENTIONS, DECISIONS AND FAMILY SEPARATION

In all locations covered, the majority of displaced families intend to return at some point in the future. This holds true particularly among those from Markaz Tikrit, Jalawla, Mansouriya and Khan Dari, where nine out of ten displaced respondents plan to return to their area of origin.

However, in Sab'a Al Bour almost half of IDPs, and in Zummar and Sinjar more than a third of them do not express an intention to return (Table 7). A lower intention reported by IDPs from Ninewa (Zummar and Sinjar) corresponds to a higher satisfaction (about 100%) with the decision to stay in Dahuk Governorate and to the highest level of comfort and contentment in displacement.

As for the timing of planned returns, in six out of eight assessed locations most interviewees do not have a specific timeframe in mind. Only in Khan Dari, nearly all IDPs are determined to leave



the displacement area in the short term (58% within the next three months). Interestingly, while only half of IDPs in Sab'a Al Bour wish to return, 40% of them plan to do it within the next three months. Most of Khan Dari returnees are displaced near their area of origin, either to Khan Dari centre or to the capital of the same district, Abu Ghraib.

Do you plan to return to your previous location at some point?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	No	36.90%	34.20%	21.20%	9.60%	9.40%	6.70%	48.90%	3.20%
	Yes	63.10%	64.80%	78.80%	90.40%	90.60%	93.30%	51.10%	96.80%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Count		84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93

Table 7 Intentions to return
Interviewed IDPs from Sab'a Al Bour, Zummar and Markaz Sinjar present the lowest intention to return

Displaced families participate to the return process as decision-makers. Whether they choose to remain in displacement or to return home, the decision is taken by the immediate family – the head of household (personal decision) or the entire family or the spouse of the household head. While the head of household's opinion seems to matter more in the case of staying in displacement, returns appear to be more of a shared decision taken at the family level in half locations covered.

Tribal/community influence plays a decisive role in the choice to remain displaced only in Markaz Tikrit (32.5%) —which it is not surprising due to the composition of Tikrit's displaced population— and in the choice to return in Multaqa and Khan Dari (17.5% and 16% respectively). The latter two are in fact homogeneous regions in terms of tribal belonging, with most inhabitants pertaining to a predominant tribe; in these locations, tribes played a decisive role in retaking the areas from ISIL.

Who took the decision not to return?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Family-spouse decision	41.60%	36.80%	42.20%	42.60%	32.30%	48.30%	40.60%	71.00%
	Personal decision	53.60%	54.90%	44.20%	23.50%	64.60%	48.30%	59.40%	25.80%
	Tribal-community decision	4.80%	8.30%	6.80%	32.40%	3.10%	1.70%	0.00%	3.20%
	No decision, we are not allowed to or cannot return	0.00%	0.00%	5.80%	1.50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.70%	0.00%	0.00%
Count		84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93

The decision to return was a...		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Family-spouse decision	82.10%	96.10%	38.00%	48.50%	31.00%	28.90%	26.20%	52.30%
	Personal decision	10.40%	3.90%	41.30%	51.50%	66.20%	69.20%	72.30%	30.20%
	Tribal-community decision	7.50%	0.00%	15.90%	0.00%	2.80%	1.90%	1.50%	17.50%
	No decision, we were forced to	0.00%	0.00%	4.80%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 8 Actors involved in the decision to return or stay in displacement
Tribal/community influence plays a role in the choice to remain displaced only in Markaz Tikrit and in the choice to return in Multaqa and Khan Dari.

Family separations were recorded only in Al Multaqa (over 10% of IDP families). This is possibly linked to the need to leave family members behind to work on the land and keep crops and livestock alive, Al Multaqa being a predominantly rural sub-district as indicated in its employment structure. As for returnees, the share of separated families was slightly higher in Markaz Sinjar (10%) and Markaz Tikrit (9%). While family separations in Markaz Tikrit can be attributed to the unstable security situation in the sub-district, the delay or ban to obtain a security clearance for some family members appears to be the main factor causing family separations in Markaz Sinjar.

REASONS TO REMAIN DISPLACED OR RETURN TO THE PLACE OF ORIGIN

Decisions about staying in displacement or returning home are based on the conditions in the area of displacement and on information on the conditions in areas of origin. The outcome can therefore be regarded as a combination of pull and push factors. The following tables present the two main reasons reported by IDPs (Table 9) and returnees (Table 10) in the assessed locations.

Security in the area of displacement tends to be the most common reason reported by IDPs from the two sub-districts of Ninewa Governorate – Markaz Sinjar and Zummar – as well as by IDPs from Al Multaqa. Between 44% and 62% of respondents said it was either the first or second reason to remain in displacement. While Ninewa Governorate is still partially under the control of ISIL, the sub-district of Al Multaqa borders the Hawija frontline, which makes the area highly unstable.

Six out of ten interviewed IDPs from Al Multaqa also selected ongoing fight in the location of origin as first or second reason to remain displaced. Ongoing fight was also reported as either the first or second reason not to return by 54% of interviewed IDPs from Khan Dari – located on the road between Falluja and west Baghdad and close to the frontline.

Where security (or lack of it) was not chosen among the first two reasons, house and property damage in the location of origin emerged as the most relevant push factor for staying in displacement.



House and property damage was closely linked to lack of services back home in both Zummar and Markaz Sinjar (51%, and 43% of respondents respectively).

Fear was reported as another key factor for IDPs from the two assessed locations of Diyala – Jalawla (30%) and Mansouriya (20%), as well as by those from Markaz Tikrit (23%). This result also emerges in the direct question “do you fear any sort of reprisal against you if you go back”, described in Section 2, where especially IDPs from Jalawla and Markaz Tikrit reported high levels of fear. In Jalawla this is in addition to fear of harassment (21%) and to in Markaz Tikrit to fear of reprisal or violent acts back home (35%).

What are the two main reasons for staying in displacement?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Availability of jobs in place of displacement	2.00%	4.00%	3.00%	4.00%	4.00%	12.00%	13.00%	12.00%
	Better services in place of displacement	16.00%	16.00%	10.00%	6.00%	10.00%	10.00%	11.00%	9.00%
	Fear of ISIL returning to area of origin	0.00%	3.00%	3.00%	10.00%	0.00%	5.00%	20.00%	15.00%
	Fear of security actors in area of origin	0.00%	0.00%	1.00%	23.00%	30.00%	20.00%	1.00%	0.00%
	Fear of harassment / discrimination back home	0.00%	7.00%	1.00%	18.00%	21.00%	2.00%	5.00%	2.00%
	Fear of reprisal acts/violence back home	0.00%	2.00%	0.00%	35.00%	10.00%	5.00%	11.00%	0.00%
	House/property destroyed / damaged/demolished	49.00%	22.00%	31.00%	26.00%	52.00%	45.00%	63.00%	25.00%
	Lack of jobs back home	26.00%	3.00%	7.00%	9.00%	9.00%	8.00%	6.00%	34.00%
	Lack of services back home	51.00%	43.00%	11.00%	22.00%	6.00%	15.00%	5.00%	18.00%
	Ongoing fight / lack of security in area of origin	5.00%	39.00%	64.00%	35.00%	10.00%	28.00%	20.00%	54.00%
	Security in area of displacement	44.00%	61.00%	62.00%	9.00%	28.00%	25.00%	24.00%	20.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	3.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 9 Main reasons to remain in displacement

As for returnees, security in the area of origin tends to be the most common reason for return reported in Zummar, Jalawla, Mansouriya and Khan Dari. In particular, all respondents from Zummar chose this factor either as first or second reason for return. In Diyala, the villagers of the sub-district of Mansouriya were directly involved in retaking the area through a tribal mobilization force, while Jalawla is currently under Peshmerga control. In both locations, missing home was the second main reason to return home (50% and 82% respectively).

Homesickness and difficulties to adapt to a new environment account for most of the returns in Markaz Sinjar (78% and 65% respectively) and in Multaqa (73% and 36.5% respectively). This finding can be explained by the high percentage of rural population among these returnees, who have probably experienced serious difficulties in adapting to a new urban environment during displacement.

The strain of rent in the location of displacement is another key reason that pushed families to come back to the two Baghdad sub-districts of Sab'a Al Bour and Khan Dari (chosen either as first or second reason by 70% and 65% of respondents respectively). Most families fled rural districts to end up in urban locations, where rental prices were generally much higher – families from Sab'a Al Bour were displaced in the vicinities of Baghdad city, while families from Khan Dari went either to Abu Ghraib or Khan Dari centre.

Both in the case of IDPs and returnees, the availability of jobs and better services in the area of displacement/origin and the lack of economic opportunities in the place of origin/displacement are

reported by less than 40% of respondents, and may be considered as contributing factors rather than significant reasons for returning to the location of origin.

What were the two main reasons for returning?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Availability of jobs in area of origin	10,40%	7,80%	20,60%	1,50%	0%	3,80%	13,80%	17,50%
	Availability of services in area of origin	38,80%	0%	0%	1,50%	0%	1,90%	1,50%	6,30%
	Difficulty to adapt to new environment (rural / urban)	7,50%	64,70%	36,50%	0%	2,80%	3,80%	12,30%	6,30%
	Difficulty to pay rent in displacement	9,00%	5,90%	30,20%	39,70%	15,50%	25,00%	70,80%	65,10%
	Lack of economic opportunities (jobs) in displacement	7,50%	29,40%	19,00%	8,80%	0%	15,40%	12,30%	23,80%
	Missing home	10,40%	78,40%	73%	91,20%	81,70%	50,00%	15,40%	6,30%
	Security in the area of origin	100%	11,80%	20,60%	54,40%	98,60%	76,90%	60,00%	74,60%
	Widowhood	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1,50%	0%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 10 Main reasons to return

ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT TO RETURN

In most locations, interviewed IDP families reported that they were neither discouraged nor encouraged to return by means of promises. The only significant exception is the sub-district of Markaz Tikrit, where family and friends discouraged the return of 28% of IDPs. As mentioned above, Markaz Tikrit also presents a higher percentage of separated returnee families.

The information collected among returnees, however, is different. Particularly in the sub-districts of Zummar and Khan Dari, nearly all returnee families received promises to encourage their return, and three out of four families were significantly supported. In Khan Dari, the ISF was the main actor who offered support to return, by providing transportation, facilitating the records check and ensuring security and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) removal, a generalized common problem affecting the agricultural lands of Khan Dari. The KRG and Peshmerga, on the other hand, encouraged returns by promising security, employment and services, and by facilitating the records check in the area of Zummar. The role of informal actors – family, friends and relatives – offering moral support was also high in the sub-district.

Returns were also encouraged, although to a lesser extent, in Mansouriya (52%), Al Multaqa (35%) and Markaz Tikrit (43%). In Mansouriya and Markaz Tikrit support was mainly from informal actors – and in Al Multaqa it was the Government of Iraq (GoI) and Provincial Council who encouraged returns by facilitating the records checks.

Did anyone try to encourage your return by means of promises?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	No	4.50%	100.00%	65.10%	57.40%	87.30%	48.10%	75.40%	11.10%
	Yes	95.50%	0.00%	34.90%	42.60%	12.70%	51.90%	24.60%	88.90%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 11 Supported and encouraged returns (returnees)

Returnees consider their return unsupported in the totality of cases of Markaz Sinjar and Jalawla, and in nine out of ten cases in Tikrit. In Markaz Sinjar, key informants stated that there were neither


information campaigns about returns nor official support to help returns. Returnees came back at their own risk, after hearing that the area had been retaken. Interestingly, in Jalawla although local authorities provided an organized return in 20-day cycles, returnees felt that their return had been allowed but not really supported.

BLOCKED OR FORCED RETURNS

While none of the locations reported a significant number of forced returns, 207 out of the 899 interviewed IDPs (or 23%) reported that their attempt to return was blocked. However, the extent of this phenomenon varies according to location, with percentages ranging from 77% in Jalawla and Mansouriya, to 1% in Sinjar.

The share of blocked returns is particularly significant in Jalawla and Mansouriya, and quite significant in Markaz Tikrit, Khan Dari and Multaqa. In the two Diyala sub-districts almost 8 out of 10 interviewed IDPs tried to return at some point but reported not being allowed to do so. Some IDPs even mentioned it as a reason to stay in displacement (“No decision, we are not allowed to or cannot return”). Of all interviewed IDPs whose return was blocked, only one family in Tikrit says that some of its members returned despite the blockage.

In Khan Dari, one out of five returns was blocked. In particular, families living closer to west Baghdad were not permitted to access the area as this would change its demographic composition; this might also be due to the plan to build a wall along the northern and western parts of Baghdad to change the administrative borders of the governorate, whereby some areas previously belonging to Baghdad will be joined to Anbar.



*Graphs 22 Percentage of IDP families whose return was blocked, by location of origin.
Jalawla and Mansouriya present the highest share of blocked returns.*

The actors who blocked the returning families were different across locations. In Jalawla, most of the families were blocked by Kurdish forces, whether Peshmerga, Asayish or KRG. In Mansouriya, almost 50% were blocked by militias; many interviewees refused to respond to this question. Some (fewer) families were blocked by ISF, local authorities or tribal leaders. This is not surprising since Jalawla is under KRG control and Mansouriya under the control of the Federal Government of Iraq (IFG).

Militias, and the GoI to a lesser extent, prevented families from returning to Tikrit, and this could ex-

plain why Tikrit presents a higher share of family separation among returnees compared to the other locations.

If your return was blocked, by whom was it blocked	Origin								Grand Total
	Jalawla	Khan Dari	Mansouriya	Multaqa	Sab'a Al Bour	Sinjar	Tikrit	Zummar	
Asayish	44	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	44
Family / relatives / friends	–	–	–	–	3	2	1	5	11
Government of Iraq	–	–	1	–	–	–	11	–	12
ISF	1	19	7	–	1	–	–	–	28
ISIS	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	2
KRG	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3
Local authorities	–	–	4	6	–	–	1	–	11
Militias	–	–	20	1	–	–	29	–	50
Other	–	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	2
Peshmerga	19	–	–	4	–	–	–	–	23
Refused to respond	7	–	10	–	1	–	–	–	18
Tribal Leaders	–	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	3
Total	74	19	46	12	5	2	43	6	207

Table 12 Actors blocking the return of IDP families, by location of origin

Different strategies are used to prevent people from returning. In Jalawla, the most common means to prevent families from returning was to delay the processing of their documentation, followed by stopping them at checkpoints. The same happened to IDPs who tried to return to Mansouriya and to Tikrit. Eleven interviewed IDPs in our sample were included in a black list and were therefore prevented from returning; in the case of Tikrit, their families are also banned from returning for the next five years.

Militias stop people at checkpoints and do not allow them to continue, whereas Kurdish forces seem to delay the processing of documentation as a strategy to prevent families from returning.

If your return was block, how was it blocked?	Origin								Grand Total
	Jalawla	Khan Dari	Mansouriya	Multaqa	Sab'a Al Bour	Sinjar	Tikrit	Zummar	
Delay in processing return by authorities	45	19	33	7	2	2	22	3	133
Name included in blacklist	2	–	4	–	–	–	5	–	11
Other	2	–	1	2	1	–	4	1	11
Refused to respond	5	–	1	1	2	–	1	2	12
Stopped in checkpoint	20	–	7	2	–	–	11	–	40
Total	74	19	46	12	5	2	43	6	207

Table 13 Means used by actors to block the return of IDP families, by location of origin

In addition to instances where families were physically prevented from returning, there are also cases of families being discouraged to return: 57 of interviewed IDPs (or 6% of our sample) were discouraged from returning, mainly families from Tikrit, with a few from Jalawla and Mansouriya (in many cases, families from Jalawla refused to respond). Family and friends discouraged returns in more than half of the reported occasions, and in Tikrit it was sometimes the Iraqi Government.

Did anyone try to discourage you about returning?	Origin								Grand Total
	Jalawla	Khan Dari	Mansouriya	Multaqa	Sab'a Al Bour	Sinjar	Tikrit	Zummar	
No	80	90	49	101	132	191	98	84	825
Refused to respond	11	1	4	1	–	–	–	–	17
Yes	5	2	7	2	1	2	38	–	57
Total	96	93	60	104	133	193	136	84	899

Table 14 Number of IDP families whose return was discouraged, by location of origin.

If anyone discouraged you about returning, who was it?	Origin								Grand Total
	Jalawla	Khan Dari	Mansouriya	Multaqa	Sab'a Al Bour	Sinjar	Tikrit		
Community of displacement	–	–	1	–	–	–	1		2
Community of origin	–	–	–	–	–	–	2		2
Family / relatives / friends	5	–	3	2	1	2	30		43
Government of Iraq	–	–	–	–	–	–	4		4
Local authorities	–	–	1	–	–	–	–		1
Other IDPs	–	1	1	–	–	–	–		2
Other returnees	–	1		–	–	–	–		1
Refused to respond	–	–	1	–	–	–	–		1
Tribal leaders	–	–	–	–	–	–	1		1
Total	5	2	7	2	1	2	38		57

Table 15 Actors discouraging IDP families to return, by location of origin

Family members and friends discouraged the return of interviewed IDPs due to security concerns for their displaced relatives (or friends). Reasons given were along sectarian lines, mostly of tribal nature.

For example, in the case of Tikrit, the location of origin of most IDPs who were discouraged to return, one of the main reasons given for dissuading returns was the presence of Shi'a militias who control the area. Family and friends considered that the lack of government control over the militias in the area was a potential threat to returnees.

Of particular concern to them was the tribal affiliation of the displaced IDPs, who mostly belong to former ruler Saddam Hussein's tribe. Because of this, family and friends feared that their displaced relatives would be the target of revenge acts by militias and therefore tried to discourage their return.

The high level of infrastructure and property damage in specific areas of Tikrit was also mentioned in a few occasions. However, security related reasons were the most commonly reported.

SATISFACTION WITH DECISION TO STAY OR RETURN

Considering that the decisions to stay or return were taken mostly at family or individual level and little coercion was involved in either decision, it is not surprising that the majority of IDPs and returnees are satisfied with their decision. Notable exceptions are interviewed IDPs from Mansouriya and those from Markaz Tikrit who both show percentage of satisfaction lower than 50%.

How satisfied are you with your decision to stay in the area where you currently live?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Very satisfied	42.90%	44.00%	5.80%	4.40%	0.00%	1.70%	15.00%	2.20%
	Somewhat satisfied	56.00%	50.80%	54.80%	45.60%	56.30%	38.30%	46.60%	51.60%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	1.20%	2.10%	22.10%	40.40%	28.10%	38.30%	21.80%	45.20%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	0.00%	3.10%	11.50%	8.80%	12.50%	16.70%	10.50%	1.10%
	Very dissatisfied	0.00%	0.00%	5.80%	0.70%	3.10%	5.00%	6.00%	0.00%
Count		84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93

Table 16 Level of contentment with the decision to remain in displacement (IDPs)

Nearly all returnees are very or somewhat satisfied with the decision to return to their location of origin. This positive perception is reflected by a very low intention to leave the area again. Levels of agreement are particularly high among those who returned to Markaz Tikrit and Mansouriya (97% and 94% respectively). The assessment is slightly less positive in the governorate of Baghdad; 14% of returnees in Sab'a Al Bour and 9.5% in Khan Dari have a neutral opinion. Khan Dari is also the only location where the intention to leave again among returnees is quite remarkable (11% of returnees).

How satisfied are you with your decision to return?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	74.60%	7.80%	68.30%	95.60%	62.00%	94.20%	33.80%	50.80%
	Somewhat satisfied	25.40%	82.40%	31.70%	4.40%	35.20%	3.80%	49.20%	31.70%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	0.00%	9.80%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.90%	13.80%	9.50%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	3.10%	4.80%
	Very dissatisfied	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	0.00%	3.20%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 17 Level of satisfaction with the decision to return

INFLUENCE OF HLP FACTORS, LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES AND LEVEL OF AFFLUENCE

This section provides formation about how HLP factors, livelihood opportunities and level of affluence differ between IDPs and returnees and how this difference might influence the decision and possibility to return or stay in displacement.

HLP FACTORS

As shown in Table 18, the level of house and property damage is widespread in all locations. According to returnees, the most affected sub-districts are Zummar and Multaqa (over 90% of respondents reported damage or occupation) and Khan Dari (89%). Not surprisingly, these are also the locations currently closer to the frontline.

For IDPs, the most affected areas are Sinjar (91%), Markaz Tikrit (90%) and Jalawla (88%), although it should be noted that statements by IDPs on damage and/or occupation might be less well-informed than those of returnees.

Have any of your properties been damaged / occupied since the last crisis?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Yes	77.40%	91.70%	80.80%	89.70%	88.50%	70.00%	69.90%	45.20%
	I do not know	1.20%	3.10%	10.60%	4.40%	6.30%	6.70%	0.00%	39.80%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	No	21.40%	5.20%	7.70%	5.90%	5.20%	23.30%	30.10%	15.10%
	Count	84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93
RETURNEE	Yes	94.00%	82.40%	93.70%	47.10%	67.60%	19.20%	63.10%	88.90%
	I do not know	0.00%	7.80%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	No	6.00%	9.80%	6.30%	51.50%	32.40%	80.80%	35.40%	11.10%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 18 Property damage or occupied by others

A significant finding is that damage to property does not necessarily inhibit return: for instance, only 22% of IDPs from Sinjar cite lack of property as a reason for staying in displacement, although 92% claim that their properties have been damaged/occupied (Table 19).

The type of damage and, above all, the actors involved in inflicting the damage, appear to constitute better indicators of obstacles to return. For instance, the two locations where IDPs fear existing security actors most (Jalawla and Tikrit), are also those for which ‘arson’ was cited most often as the type of destruction. Tikrit’s IDPs are also scared of reprisals (Table 19), a finding that matches their claim that militias are mostly responsible for their property damage.

Mentioning Asayish as the actor responsible for destruction in Jalawla or choosing not to respond in Mansouriya, Al Multaqa and Sab’a Al Bour seems to be in line with citing “destruction of property” as a reason to stay in displacement.

In Jalawla, more than half of returnees refused to answer the same question, which might indicate fear of talking about these issues.



Who damaged your property?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	ISIL	72.60%	71.00%	28.80%	36.00%	2.10%	6.70%	42.90%	38.70%
	ISF	0.00%	0.00%	5.80%	1.50%	0.00%	1.70%	0.00%	15.10%
	KRG	0.00%	0.00%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Peshmerga	1.20%	0.50%	9.60%	0.00%	9.40%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Asayish	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	33.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Local authorities	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.70%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Militias	0.00%	2.60%	1.90%	58.10%	1.00%	11.70%	3.00%	1.10%
	Religious leaders	0.00%	0.50%	1.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.10%
	Tribal leaders	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.70%	0.00%	0.00%
	Yezidi community	0.00%	0.50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Coalition Forces	1.20%	0.50%	2.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	People who have already returned	0.00%	17.60%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Stayees	4.80%	22.30%	0.00%	0.70%	0.00%	0.00%	2.30%	0.00%
	Other	0.00%	0.00%	5.80%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	I do not know	10.70%	11.40%	35.60%	16.20%	28.10%	51.70%	21.80%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	1.90%	0.70%	16.70%	0.00%	2.30%	4.30%
	Count	65	177	84	122	85	42	93	42
RETURNEE	ISIL	94.00%	52.90%	12.70%	27.90%	1.40%	–	38.50%	33.30%
	Government of Iraq	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	–	1.50%	0.00%
	ISF	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	4.40%	4.20%	–	1.50%	19.00%
	Peshmerga	0.00%	0.00%	7.90%	0.00%	1.40%	–	0.00%	0.00%
	Asayish	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	0.00%	0.00%	–	0.00%	0.00%
	Militias	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.40%	0.00%	–	0.00%	44.40%
	Religious leaders	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	–	0.00%	0.00%
	People who have already returned	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	–	0.00%	0.00%
	Stayees	0.00%	9.80%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%	–	0.00%	0.00%
	I do not know	0.00%	27.50%	77.80%	16.20%	56.30%	–	23.10%	9.50%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	1.50%	1.40%	–	0.00%	3.20%
	Count	63	42	59	32	48	10	41	56

Table 19 Actor who damaged the property

LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES

The livelihoods of the displaced and returned populations also depend on their income, that is, on their ability to find employment or run a business of their own. The employment status of male respondents during displacement and after return (only for returnees) is indicated in Table 20.⁸

Availability of employment and its sector are linked to the reasons of return (Table 20). For instance, the two locations of origin – Multaqa and Khan Dari – where returnees were mostly pulled by the ‘availability of jobs’ are also those where agriculture is the prevalent source of livelihood. On the other hand, areas such as Sinjar (29%), where most returnees mentioned ‘lack of economic opportunities in displacement’ as their reason for returning also have the highest share of unemployed returnees during displacement (63%).

In five locations (Zummar, Sinjar, Tikrit, Mansouriya, and Sab’a Al Bour), the share of returnees who were unemployed during displacement is much higher than that of unemployed current IDPs.

⁸ The count of female respondents does not allow for a reliable tabulation broken down into the eight locations, hence only males are included in the table.

This finding was expected, as the lack of employment during displacement might foster return to the area of origin. The opposite pattern, recorded in Jalawla and Khan Dari, might be due to the fact that a significant proportion of returnees continued their agricultural activities during displacement. Many returnees in Multaqa (44%) and Khan Dari (75%) are farmers.

		Place of Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP Occupation in place of displacement	Agriculture / animal raising	1.50%	0.70%	5.30%	2.60%	1.30%	2.00%	1.00%	9.90%
	Paid job – public	19.70%	20.00%	14.70%	8.80%	11.70%	24.50%	8.70%	4.20%
	All other employment (incl. self-employment)	45.50%	40.70%	29.30%	23.70%	63.60%	51.00%	75.00%	54.90%
	Pensioner	6.10%	5.30%	10.70%	39.50%	7.80%	10.20%	2.90%	4.20%
	Unemployed	27.30%	33.30%	34.70%	25.40%	15.60%	12.20%	12.50%	26.80%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	5.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Count	66	150	75	114	77	49	104	71
RETURNEE Occupation in place of displacement	Agriculture / animal raising	0.00%	2.50%	23.10%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	34.70%
	Paid job – public	5.00%	5.00%	11.50%	21.40%	17.20%	17.10%	6.10%	8.20%
	All other employment (incl. self-employment)	46.70%	30.00%	28.80%	0.00%	58.60%	22.90%	65.30%	49.00%
	Pensioner	5.00%	0.00%	5.80%	30.40%	13.80%	2.90%	6.10%	0.00%
	Unemployed	38.30%	62.50%	30.80%	48.20%	10.30%	57.10%	22.40%	8.10%
	Refused to respond	5.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Count	60	40	52	56	58	35	49	49
RETURNEE Occupation in place of origin (after return)	Agriculture / animal raising	1.70%	12.50%	44.20%	0.00%	0.00%	28.60%	2.00%	75.50%
	Paid job – public	33.30%	5.00%	9.60%	42.90%	17.20%	17.10%	10.20%	8.20%
	All other employment (incl. self-employment)	45.00%	25.00%	26.90%	14.30%	48.30%	40.00%	61.20%	12.20%
	Pensioner	6.70%	2.50%	5.80%	30.40%	15.50%	2.90%	6.10%	0.00%
	Unemployed	11.70%	55.00%	13.50%	12.50%	19.00%	11.40%	18.40%	4.10%
	Refuse to respond	1.70%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.00%	0.00%
	Count	60	40	52	56	58	35	49	49

Table 20 Employment during and after displacement (males only)

LEVEL OF AFFLUENCE

The families' perception of their wealth differs between IDPs and returnees as well as across locations (Table 13). With the exception of Sinjar and Mansouriya, the share of families who cannot even afford basic needs is larger among IDPs than among returnees. As movement is a survival strategy, the relatively fortunate may have had a chance to return. On the other hand, those without sufficient income in displacement might have an incentive to return once the security level in the location of origin allows it.

A low level of affluence does not necessarily lead to lower levels of satisfaction in displacement. For instance, Zummar and Sinjar also show the highest percentages of families who are 'very satisfied' in the area of displacement (Table 23). On the other hand, for returnees the share of individuals who are 'very satisfied' with the decision to return is highest in Tikrit and Mansouriya, the relatively more affluent locations.

Which of the following statements best describes your household income?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	We do not have enough money for basic needs	17.90%	23.30%	15.80%	17.60%	26.00%	20.00%	49.60%	64.50%
	We are only able to buy basic products	75.00%	75.10%	72.60%	57.40%	56.30%	58.30%	42.10%	32.30%
	We are able to buy what is necessary, but we cannot afford more expensive goods	7.10%	1.60%	9.50%	18.40%	17.70%	21.70%	8.30%	3.20%
	We are able to buy some more expensive goods, but should save on other things	0.00%	0.00%	1.10%	5.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	We can afford almost whatever we want	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.70%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	1.10%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Count	84	193	95	136	96	60	133	93
RETURNEE	We do not have enough money for basic needs	16.40%	66.70%	3.20%	5.90%	15.50%	34.60%	43.10%	57.10%
	We are only able to buy basic products	32.80%	27.50%	61.90%	61.80%	80.30%	46.20%	40.00%	36.50%
	We are able to buy what is necessary, but we cannot afford more expensive goods	23.90%	5.90%	30.20%	30.90%	2.80%	19.20%	15.40%	6.30%
	We are able to buy some more expensive goods, but should save on other things	9.00%	0.00%	3.20%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	We can afford almost whatever we want	17.90%	0.00%	1.60%	1.50%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 21 Relative affluence

LEVEL OF CONTENTMENT, PERCEPTION OF NEIGHBOURS AND FEAR OF DISCRIMINATION

This section provides information on the feeling of comfort; satisfaction with population groups that were affected differently by the conflict (host communities, stayees or other returnees); and fear of or tangible discrimination faced by IDPs and returnees in the assessed locations. Indicators are drawn from the periods before displacement, in displacement, and upon return. All indicators are closely linked to the following section, as level of contentment and feeling of integration in the area of displacement and fears associated with the area of origin strongly affect the willingness to remain in current location and the intention to return.

LEVEL OF CONTENTMENT BEFORE DISPLACEMENT, DURING DISPLACEMENT AND UPON RETURN

Most IDPs and returnees had a positive memory of their situation before the crisis or before they had to flee their areas of origin. For IDPs, the level of contentment was particularly high among those from Ninewa Governorate —Markaz Sinjar (93%) and Zummar (84.5%)— as well as from Khan Dari 88.2% and Multaqa 76%.

Jalawla is the exception, as nearly two out ten IDPs were particularly dissatisfied with their situation before displacement. Jalawla is part of the Disputed Internal Boundaries between the GoI and KRG; it has seen its population double since 2007 because of the Resolution of Real Property Disputes that allowed families displaced in the 1970s to return to Jalawla.

Returnees seemed equally satisfied with their situation in the area of origin before fleeing, although their level of contentment is lower than that of IDPs (high numbers of respondents reported feeling “somewhat comfortable”).

Sab'a Al Bour is the only assessed sub-district where the level of contentment was low for both groups: one third of IDPs interviewed were feeling either somewhat or very uncomfortable before fleeing the area of origin, and this could explain why IDPs from Sab'a Al Bour report the lowest intention to return among IDPs from all other case studies (see following section). Among returnees, Sab'a Al Bour is again associated with lower levels of satisfaction (nearly 14% are either neutral or somewhat uncomfortable). The low level of pre-crisis satisfaction can be partially explained by the events that preceded the occupation of Saba'a Al Bour (and some areas of Baghdad) in 2013, or the 12-month operation "Breaking the Walls" that involved 20 incidents of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), three of which targeted Saba'a Al Bour directly.

How comfortable did you feel in your area of origin before displacing?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Very comfortable	84.50%	93.30%	76.00%	66.90%	46.90%	56.70%	21.10%	88.20%
	Somewhat comfortable	14.30%	6.20%	14.40%	31.60%	33.30%	43.30%	33.10%	10.80%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	1.20%	0.00%	3.80%	0.70%	11.50%	0.00%	12.00%	0.00%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	0.00%	0.50%	1.00%	0.00%	7.30%	0.00%	26.30%	1.10%
	Very uncomfortable	0.00%	0.00%	4.80%	0.70%	1.00%	0.00%	7.50%	0.00%
Count		84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93

How comfortable did you feel here before displacement?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very comfortable	67.20%	17.60%	81.00%	92.60%	28.20%	90.40%	52.30%	79.40%
	Somewhat comfortable	32.80%	78.40%	15.90%	4.40%	52.10%	9.60%	33.80%	15.90%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	0.00%	3.90%	0.00%	0.00%	15.50%	0.00%	9.20%	1.60%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.90%	2.80%	0.00%	4.60%	3.20%
	Very uncomfortable	0.00%	0.00%	3.20%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 22 Level of contentment before displacement (IDP and returnees' answers)

On the other hand, the level of contentment in displacement is significantly higher for IDPs than for returnees. This can be due to the fact that returnees have a worse recollection of their displacement experience, and partly explains why one group is still living away from home and another group has chosen to return.

Most returnees in Sab'a Al Bour, Al Multaqa, Zummar, Markaz Tikrit and Markaz Sinjar were uncomfortable while in displacement (percentages varying from 39% to 72%). As for IDPs, those originally from Mansouriya, Jalawla⁹ and Al Multaqa are the most dissatisfied with their displacement situation. While ethno-religious affiliation could be the main reason for the unease in Diyala Governorate, the difficulty of IDPs in Al Multaqa to adapt mostly stems from the fact that they relocated from rural dwellings to the urban environment of Kirkuk city.

⁹ IDPs from Mansouriya and Jalawla were interviewed in Baquba district, Diyala.

How comfortable do you feel here, in your area of displacement?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Very comfortable	54.80%	42.00%	5.80%	2.90%	1.00%	0.00%	25.60%	1.10%
	Somewhat comfortable	38.10%	50.30%	39.40%	29.40%	28.10%	23.30%	43.60%	49.50%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	4.80%	7.30%	24.00%	44.90%	15.60%	23.30%	8.30%	44.10%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	1.20%	0.50%	16.30%	17.60%	31.30%	26.70%	15.00%	2.20%
	Very uncomfortable	1.20%	0.00%	14.40%	5.10%	21.90%	25.00%	7.50%	3.20%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.10%	1.70%	0.00%	0.00%
	Count	84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93

How comfortable did you feel in the place where you were displaced?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very comfortable	0.00%	2.00%	12.70%	2.90%	1.40%	5.80%	6.20%	15.90%
	Somewhat comfortable	11.90%	25.50%	20.60%	2.90%	59.20%	57.70%	9.20%	52.40%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	34.30%	33.30%	9.50%	47.10%	22.50%	28.80%	12.30%	14.30%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	34.30%	17.60%	23.80%	7.40%	14.10%	3.80%	29.20%	12.70%
	Very uncomfortable	17.90%	21.60%	33.30%	39.70%	2.80%	3.80%	43.10%	4.80%
	Refused to respond	1.50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 23 Level of contentment in displacement (IDP and returnees' answers)

Predictably, IDPs originally from Mansouriya, Jalawla and Multaqa, the three sub-districts where the level of contentment in the area of displacement is lowest, expressed the lowest levels of satisfaction with the decision to remain displaced. On the other hand, all returnees feel comfortable upon return to their area of origin except for those who came back to Markaz Sinjar, where one third of interviewees were neutral about their return. The unstable security situation in the area certainly contributes to this feeling.

How comfortable do you feel here, in your location of return?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very comfortable	25.40%	2.00%	66.70%	88.20%	62.00%	90.40%	44.60%	20.60%
	Somewhat comfortable	68.70%	58.80%	28.60%	11.80%	31.00%	9.60%	41.50%	63.50%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	6.00%	35.30%	0.00%	0.00%	4.20%	0.00%	6.20%	9.50%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	0.00%	3.90%	3.20%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	1.50%	6.30%
	Very uncomfortable	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	6.20%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 24 Level of comfort upon return (returnees' answers)



PERCEPTION OF NEIGHBOURS (HOST COMMUNITY, STAYEES AND OTHER RETURNEES)

IDPs were asked to rate their sense of comfort with the host community, and in case they would go back, how would they feel about living with those who stayed and other families who also returned. The perception of the host communities among IDPs is overall positive. In particular, nearly two thirds of IDPs originally from Ninewa are very comfortable with the host community in Dahuk Governorate, and seven out of ten IDPs originally from Diyala and displaced within Diyala feel somewhat comfortable with the host community. Although the majority of IDPs originally from Baghdad are displaced within or close to their district of origin, the lowest levels of satisfaction were recorded in Khan Dari and Sab'a Al Bour. Sab'a Al Bour is also the only case with a significant percentage of IDPs who have a negative perception of the host community (13%).

When asked about how comfortable they would feel being around other returnee families in case they went back to their areas of origin, IDPs mostly expressed a somewhat positive or neutral view. Significant numbers of IDPs that would feel uncomfortable among returnees were reported only in Jalawla (13.5%), Sab'a Al Bour (10%) and Markaz Sinjar (7%), where only Yazidi families and a few minority Kurdish Shi'a families have returned so far. However, it should be noted that in all sub-districts except Jalawla, 20% to 45% of IDPs refused to answer the question.

A low response rate was also recorded when assessing the IDP perception of stayees in the location of origin. In all sub-districts but Mansouriya, 29% to 62% of IDPs refused to answer the question. Stayees are viewed negatively in Markaz Tikrit, Markaz Sinjar and Mansouriya, where over 20% of IDPs felt very or somewhat uncomfortable.



How comfortable do you feel with the host community?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Very comfortable	64.30%	67.40%	16.30%	6.60%	5.20%	6.70%	17.30%	2.20%
	Somewhat comfortable	33.30%	31.10%	65.40%	43.40%	70.80%	73.30%	39.80%	55.90%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	1.20%	0.50%	15.40%	44.90%	16.70%	16.70%	29.30%	40.90%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	0.00%	0.00%	1.90%	2.90%	7.30%	3.30%	8.30%	1.10%
	Very uncomfortable	1.20%	0.50%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.50%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.50%	0.00%	2.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.80%	0.00%
Count		84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93

How comfortable would you feel being around the rest of returnee families if you went back to your place of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Very comfortable	10.70%	6.20%	7.70%	16.90%	1.00%	0.00%	6.80%	1.10%
	Somewhat comfortable	51.20%	44.60%	48.10%	31.60%	32.30%	43.30%	23.30%	18.30%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	11.90%	6.20%	15.40%	27.90%	50.00%	43.30%	30.80%	33.30%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	2.40%	6.20%	1.00%	2.20%	12.50%	1.70%	6.80%	1.10%
	Very uncomfortable	1.20%	1.00%	2.90%	0.70%	1.00%	0.00%	3.00%	1.10%
	Refused to respond	22.60%	35.80%	25.00%	20.60%	3.10%	11.70%	29.30%	45.20%
Count		84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93

How comfortable would you feel around those who stayed in your place of origin during the crisis?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Very comfortable	4.80%	2.20%	5.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.30%	0.00%
	Somewhat comfortable	31.30%	17.90%	48.50%	9.30%	18.50%	28.10%	19.10%	7.70%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	16.90%	8.90%	8.90%	7.00%	37.00%	35.10%	22.10%	34.10%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	3.60%	11.20%	0.00%	16.30%	10.90%	22.80%	6.10%	4.40%
	Very uncomfortable	1.20%	8.90%	2.00%	5.40%	4.30%	3.50%	3.80%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	42.20%	50.80%	35.60%	62.00%	29.30%	10.50%	46.60%	53.80%
Count		83	179	101	129	92	57	131	91

Table 25 Perception of the host community, returnees and stayees among IDPs

Returnees were asked to rate how comfortable they feel among other returnees and among those who will eventually return. In all the assessed sub-districts returnees perceive other returnees positively (either very positive or somewhat positive). Only in Khan Dari, one third of returnees were mostly neutral and in Sab'a Al Bour 11% was neutral and 4.6% was somewhat and very uncomfortable. This positive assessment also applies to those who are still displaced. Returnees reported negative feelings only in Zummar (9% of respondents), while neutral feelings emerged in Zummar (34%), Sab'a Al Bour and Khan Dari (17% each). In Khan Dari 21% of returnees refused to answer the question, indicating the sensitivity the issue.

How do you feel around the rest of returnees?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very comfortable	34.30%	7.80%	55.60%	88.20%	14.10%	84.60%	21.50%	12.70%
	Somewhat comfortable	65.70%	88.20%	44.40%	11.80%	73.20%	3.80%	63.10%	52.40%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	0.00%	3.90%	0.00%	0.00%	5.60%	11.50%	10.80%	33.30%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.10%	1.60%
	Very uncomfortable	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.60%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

How will you feel when the rest of families who are now displaced come back?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very comfortable	10.40%	35.30%	46.00%	100.00%	52.10%	80.80%	29.20%	7.90%
	Somewhat comfortable	46.30%	60.80%	54.00%	0.00%	40.80%	11.50%	52.30%	54.00%
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	34.30%	2.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.20%	7.70%	16.90%	17.50%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	9.00%	2.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
	Very uncomfortable	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	0.00%	20.60%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	0.00%	20.60%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 26 Perception of returnees among other returnees

HARASSMENT, DISCRIMINATION AND FEAR OF REPRISAL

Discrimination and harassment were not common prior to displacement, and more than 90% among both IDPs and returnees report no discrimination in areas of origin.

Jalawla is a notable exception, with a totally different scenario: nearly 70% of IDPs were discriminated or harassed before fleeing Jalawla, as opposed to only 1.4% of those who have already returned.

Overall, IDPs report slightly higher values of discrimination back home before displacement than returnees, and this could constitute an obstacle to return.





Did you previously face discrimination/harassment in your place of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	No	100.00%	95.30%	91.30%	91.90%	18.80%	98.30%	91.70%	100.00%
	Yes	0.00%	2.10%	6.70%	8.10%	69.80%	0.00%	6.00%	0.00%
	I do not know	0.00%	1.60%	1.90%	0.00%	1.00%	0.00%	0.80%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.40%	1.70%	1.50%	0.00%
	Count	84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93
Before displacement, did you face any harassment/discrimination in your place of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	No	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	97.10%	95.80%	100.00%	89.20%	95.20%
	Yes	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	1.40%	0.00%	9.20%	3.20%
	I do not know	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	1.40%	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 27 Harassment and discrimination in origin before displacement among IDPs and returnees

Harassment and discrimination were very low in areas of displacement, both among those still displaced and among returnees. However, returnees report discrimination in displacement more often than IDPs, in all locations except Diyala. Overall, returnees reported rates of harassment/discrimination in displacement equal or above 10% in the five sub-districts of Zummar, Multaqa, Markaz Tikrit, Sab'a Al Bour and Khan Dari. In Markaz Tikrit, three out of ten respondents suffered from harassment or discrimination from the host community due to their ethnic affiliation. This can partially explain why some groups returned but not others.

Have you faced any harassment/discrimination while in displacement?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	No	100.00%	99.50%	97.10%	97.10%	83.30%	86.70%	96.20%	95.70%
	Yes	0.00%	0.50%	2.90%	2.20%	13.50%	11.70%	3.80%	2.20%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.70%	3.10%	1.70%	0.00%	2.20%
	Count	84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93
Have you faced any harassment/discrimination while in displacement?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	No	83.60%	96.10%	90.50%	67.60%	97.20%	98.10%	84.60%	87.30%
	Yes	10.40%	3.90%	9.50%	29.40%	2.80%	1.90%	13.80%	11.10%
	Refused to respond	6.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.90%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	1.60%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63
What about now, are you facing any sort of harassment / discrimination here after returning?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	No	94.00%	100.00%	100.00%	94.10%	100.00%	100.00%	98.50%	77.80%
	Yes	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	14.30%
	Refused to respond	6.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.40%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.90%

Table 28 Harassment and discrimination in displacement among IDPs and returnees

As to fear of reprisal in the area of origin, overall more than 80% of IDPs and returnees responded they do not perceive it. In general, IDPs are more afraid than returnees, with some notable exceptions among both groups. For instance, IDP families originally from Markaz Tikrit and Jalawla appear to be the most scared (77% and 66% respectively).

Families from Markaz Tikrit are mainly weary of militias, and families in Jalawla mostly fear reprisal from Asayish.

In addition, three out of ten interviewed IDPs in Markaz Sinjar fear reprisal in their area of origin by ISIL, stayees or other returnees. It should be noted that in all three locations, fear (of harassment/discrimination by security actors or ISIL) was among the key push factors for remaining in displacement, or an obstacle to return.

Returnees to Zummar and Khan Dari reported the greatest fear of reprisal (respectively 40% and 15%).



Do you fear any sort of reprisal against you if you go back?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	No	88.10%	62.70%	86.50%	23.50%	21.90%	61.70%	90.20%	90.30%
	Yes	8.30%	31.10%	13.50%	76.50%	65.60%	21.70%	9.80%	3.20%
	Refused to respond	3.60%	6.20%	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	16.70%	0.00%	6.50%
	Count	84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93
Do you fear any sort of reprisal or act against you or any of your family members?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	No	34.30%	98.00%	98.40%	70.60%	95.80%	98.10%	93.80%	68.30%
	Yes	38.80%	0.00%	1.60%	8.80%	4.20%	0.00%	6.20%	14.30%
	I do not know	23.90%	2.00%	0.00%	20.60%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.80%
	Refused to respond	3.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.90%	0.00%	12.70%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 29 Fear of reprisal in area of origin among IDPs and returnees

ATTITUDES TOWARDS CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ACTORS, SOCIAL COHESION AND DIVISION, AND POTENTIAL FUTURE TENSIONS

This section describes the attitude of returnees towards civilian and military actors such as the government, other civilian institutions, military forces and national and international organizations in their area of origin, which is also their area of return. It also assesses the perception of returnees with respect to present and future interactions among different groups, and if these anticipate conflicts and tensions in the light of operations aimed at retaking the areas under ISIL, and expected movements of people. It is assumed that IDPs are not as informed as returnees on these issues as they are not on the ground. Hence, with the exception of Table 35, IDPs are left out of the tabulation.

Returnees in Mansouriya and in the two sub-districts of Baghdad (Sab'a Al Bour and Khan Dari) are mostly satisfied with both the government and the ISF, which might be related to their proximity to Baghdad, the country's power centre.

Local authorities seem to receive a good share of approval from returnees in all areas except Sinjar, where 70% of returnees are very or somewhat dissatisfied with the role of local authorities. Especially in Diyala (Jalawla and Mansouriya) nearly all returnees are satisfied with the way local authorities are managing their sub-districts.



How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role the government is playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	0.00%	2.00%	3.20%	2.90%	4.20%	28.80%	12.30%	0.00%
	Somewhat satisfied	43.30%	23.50%	46.00%	27.90%	57.70%	67.30%	49.20%	47.60%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	23.90%	35.30%	14.30%	48.50%	9.90%	1.90%	21.50%	19.00%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	26.90%	21.60%	22.20%	7.40%	1.40%	1.90%	7.70%	17.50%
	Very dissatisfied	6.00%	17.60%	14.30%	11.80%	1.40%	0.00%	7.70%	15.90%
	Not applicable	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	23.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	1.40%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role the government is playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	3.00%	0.00%	1.60%	20.60%	0.00%	78.80%	30.80%	31.70%
	Somewhat satisfied	53.70%	9.80%	44.40%	22.10%	0.00%	21.20%	41.50%	36.50%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	43.30%	33.30%	15.90%	50.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.60%	25.40%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	0.00%	29.40%	15.90%	1.50%	0.00%	0.00%	3.10%	0.00%
	Very dissatisfied	0.00%	25.50%	14.30%	1.50%	0.00%	0.00%	6.20%	0.00%
	Not applicable	0.00%	0.00%	7.90%	2.90%	100.00%	0.00%	13.80%	6.30%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	2.00%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role local authorities are playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	0.00%	0.00%	6.30%	1.50%	8.50%	40.40%	23.10%	0.00%
	Somewhat satisfied	53.70%	9.80%	49.20%	27.90%	76.10%	57.70%	50.80%	36.50%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	34.30%	21.60%	14.30%	50.00%	12.70%	0.00%	7.70%	31.70%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	11.90%	43.10%	15.90%	8.80%	1.40%	1.90%	7.70%	22.20%
	Very dissatisfied	0.00%	25.50%	14.30%	11.80%	0.00%	0.00%	7.70%	9.50%
	Not applicable	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.40%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 30 Satisfaction with government, ISF and local authorities

KRG, Peshmerga and Asayish enjoyed the greatest level of appreciation among returnees in Jalawla and Zummar (between 89% and 100%). Militias were more neutrally assessed except in Sab'a al Bour, where over 40% of returnees are satisfied with their role; however, they received the lowest levels of appreciation from IDPs originally from Markaz Tikrit and Mansouriya. According to key informants of the qualitative study, mistrust towards actors in charge of security has a direct impact on potential returns and on the level of tension in these areas.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role the KRG (when applicable) is playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	32.80%	2.00%	4.80%	–	69.00%	–	–	–
	Somewhat satisfied	64.20%	31.40%	49.20%	–	29.60%	–	–	–
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	3.00%	45.10%	17.50%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
	Somewhat dissatisfied	0.00%	9.80%	15.90%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
	Very dissatisfied	0.00%	7.80%	9.50%	–	1.40%	–	–	–
	Not applicable	0.00%	0.00%	3.20%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
	Refused to respond	0.00%	3.90%	0.00%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
Count		67	51	63		71			

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role the Peshmerga is playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	76.10%	5.90%	23.80%	–	69.00%	–	–	–
	Somewhat satisfied	23.90%	39.20%	57.10%	–	19.70%	–	–	–
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	0.00%	37.30%	9.50%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
	Somewhat dissatisfied	0.00%	7.80%	3.20%	–	1.40%	–	–	–
	Very dissatisfied	0.00%	5.90%	4.80%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
	Not applicable	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	–	9.90%	–	–	–
	Refused to respond	0.00%	3.90%	1.60%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
Count		67	51	63		71			

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role the Asayish is playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	73.10%	2.00%	4.80%	–	87.30%	–	–	–
	Somewhat satisfied	23.90%	35.30%	44.40%	–	11.30%	–	–	–
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	3.00%	45.10%	19.00%	–	1.40%	–	–	–
	Somewhat dissatisfied	0.00%	7.80%	3.20%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
	Very dissatisfied	0.00%	5.90%	1.60%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
	Not applicable	0.00%	0.00%	27.00%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
	Refused to respond	0.00%	3.90%	0.00%	–	0.00%	–	–	–
Count		67	51	63		71			

Continued on next page

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role the militia controlling your area is playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	–	2.00%	–	7.40%	–	–	10.80%	0.00%
	Somewhat satisfied	–	17.60%	–	32.40%	–	–	32.30%	0.00%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	–	62.70%	–	54.40%	–	–	9.20%	0.00%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	–	5.90%	–	2.90%	–	–	4.60%	0.00%
	Very dissatisfied	–	7.80%	–	2.90%	–	–	1.50%	20.60%
	Not applicable	–	0.00%	–	0.00%	–	–	36.90%	28.60%
	Refused to respond	–	3.90%	–	0.00%	–	–	4.60%	50.80%
Count			51		68			65	63

Table 31 Satisfaction with KRG, Peshmerga, Asayish and militias

One third of returnees in all locations are very or somewhat satisfied with the role of tribal leaders. In particular, in Mansouriya, as much as 92% of returnees strongly believe in the tribal leaders' actions, as the role of tribal leaders was paramount in retaking the area. Furthermore, tribal leaders are also perceived as the most appropriate actors to foster social cohesion by nearly 40% of returnees. Tribal leaders are also positively viewed in Sab'a Al Bour, Zummar and Al-Multaqa (between half and two thirds of returnees). In Zummar, the return process was initiated by the tribal leaders and they were also the source of information that most families consulted before returning.



Religious authorities, although positively assessed, received less appreciation than tribal leaders in all areas but Zummar, where 82% of returnees were very or somewhat satisfied with their role. The religious authorities of Al-Multaqa also enjoyed high levels of satisfaction, as they have been pivotal in spreading tolerance and speaking out against violence and extremism; however, they were not necessarily considered the most appropriate actor to foster cohesion – in fact local authorities received higher approval rates.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role tribal leaders are playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	0.00%	0.00%	14.30%	8.80%	0.00%	76.90%	24.60%	6.30%
	Somewhat satisfied	62.70%	0.00%	44.40%	25.00%	32.40%	15.40%	47.70%	34.90%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	25.40%	0.00%	23.80%	23.50%	11.30%	3.80%	9.20%	22.20%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	10.40%	0.00%	9.50%	23.50%	8.50%	1.90%	6.20%	11.10%
	Very dissatisfied	1.50%	0.00%	4.80%	17.60%	7.00%	0.00%	6.20%	25.40%
	Not applicable	0.00%	100.00%	1.60%	0.00%	38.00%	1.90%	6.20%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	1.50%	2.80%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role religious authorities in your area are playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	9.00%	0.00%	9.50%	8.80%	1.40%	63.50%	9.20%	3.20%
	Somewhat satisfied	73.10%	0.00%	42.90%	19.10%	15.50%	19.20%	38.50%	23.80%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	17.90%	0.00%	34.90%	27.90%	18.30%	0.00%	29.20%	41.30%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	0.00%	0.00%	6.30%	22.10%	7.00%	0.00%	3.10%	28.60%
	Very dissatisfied	0.00%	0.00%	3.20%	19.10%	1.40%	0.00%	10.80%	1.60%
	Not applicable	0.00%	100.00%	3.20%	0.00%	49.30%	17.30%	9.20%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.90%	7.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%
Count		67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 32 Satisfaction with tribal leaders and religious leaders

Overall, national NGOs receive less appreciation than international organizations from returnees in all locations. The lowest level of satisfaction for both national and international actors was recorded in Ninewa (between 55% and 80% of returnees were somewhat or very dissatisfied). This negative assessment could be due to the fact that returns in both sub-districts were not assisted by actors on the ground and to the unstable situation of Zummar. The highest appreciation for national and international organizations was reported in Mansouriya (60%).

Within the next 3 months, will tension in your area of origin...		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Decrease a lot	50.70%	2.00%	12.70%	1.50%	0.00%	36.50%	40.00%	23.80%
	Decrease slightly	16.40%	13.70%	22.20%	8.80%	0.00%	3.80%	38.50%	57.10%
	Neither increase nor decrease	22.40%	29.40%	33.30%	23.50%	28.20%	9.60%	4.60%	9.50%
	Increase slightly	0.00%	27.50%	0.00%	17.60%	0.00%	0.00%	4.60%	1.60%
	Increase a lot	0.00%	3.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.90%	0.00%	0.00%
	I do not know	10.40%	23.50%	31.70%	48.50%	60.60%	48.10%	12.30%	7.90%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Do you think that returns will contribute to tension or will ease it?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Contribute a lot	1.50%	27.50%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%	19.20%	1.50%	0.00%
	contribute slightly	11.90%	51.00%	0.00%	8.80%	1.40%	1.90%	4.60%	3.20%
	Neither contribute nor ease	19.40%	2.00%	30.20%	33.80%	31.00%	1.90%	15.40%	15.90%
	Ease slightly	10.40%	9.80%	20.60%	0.00%	2.80%	0.00%	36.90%	33.30%
	Ease a lot	3.00%	2.00%	33.30%	0.00%	0.00%	51.90%	30.80%	20.60%
	I do not know	38.80%	7.80%	15.90%	55.90%	45.10%	25.00%	10.80%	23.80%
	Refused to respond	14.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	19.70%	0.00%	0.00%	3.20%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 34 Quarterly tension outlook and expectations regarding returns



The final assessment given by both IDPs and returnees is on their views about which institutions or groups should provide and foster social cohesion (Table 35). While more than 80% of IDPs from Jalawla prefer the Iraqi Government to do that, more than 90% of returnees in that location prefer the Kurdish Regional Government to do so, indicating a division. In Mansouriya, tribal leaders are the first choice for both IDPs and returnees. IDPs and returnees from Zummar and Sinjar prefer the KRG, while returnees in Sinjar prefer international security actors (including but not limited to People's Protection Units (YPG) / Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)). Multaqa residents (both IDPs and returnees) as well as IDPs from Tikrit show a preference for local authorities, while almost half of Tikrit's returnees have refused to respond to this question, which might indicate resentment.

Which actor would be the most appropriate to foster cohesion? (answer)		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
IDP	Government of Iraq	9.50%	21.20%	40.40%	22.10%	80.20%	55.00%	13.50%	10.80%
	KRG	73.80%	50.30%	27.90%	19.10%	28.10%	0.00%	2.30%	1.10%
	Local authorities	25.00%	19.20%	54.80%	47.10%	14.60%	31.70%	32.30%	3.20%
	IOs / INGOs	3.60%	9.30%	18.30%	16.90%	6.30%	1.70%	17.30%	10.80%
	Local NGOs	0.00%	1.00%	12.50%	5.90%	1.00%	1.70%	8.30%	2.20%
	Religious leaders	13.10%	30.10%	2.90%	1.50%	12.50%	15.00%	8.30%	38.70%
	Security actors	25.00%	22.30%	28.80%	25.00%	38.50%	48.30%	32.30%	58.10%
	Militia	0.00%	0.00%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.00%	0.00%
	US Army	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.40%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Tribal leaders	21.40%	39.40%	40.40%	69.90%	13.50%	76.70%	47.40%	19.40%
	Refused to respond	10.70%	19.20%	1.00%	0.70%	3.10%	0.00%	8.30%	0.00%
	Count	84	193	104	136	96	60	133	93
RETURNEE	Government of Iraq	0.00%	11.80%	14.30%	4.40%	0.00%	0.00%	6.30%	1.60%
	KRG	64.20%	25.50%	6.30%	0.00%	91.50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Local authorities	1.50%	0.00%	49.20%	4.40%	0.00%	28.80%	23.40%	1.60%
	IOs / INGOs	1.50%	2.00%	3.20%	2.90%	1.40%	0.00%	0.00%	3.20%
	Local NGOs	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	10.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Religious leaders	6.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.70%	19.00%
	Security actors	16.40%	0.00%	6.30%	1.50%	0.00%	28.80%	34.40%	44.40%
	Militias	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.70%	0.00%
	International security actors	0.00%	60.80%	0.00%	2.90%	0.00%	3.80%	3.10%	0.00%
	Tribal leaders	10.40%	0.00%	15.90%	25.00%	0.00%	38.50%	20.30%	30.20%
	None of them	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	0.00%
	I don't know	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	0.00%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	48.50%	7.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	64	63

Table 35 Most appropriate actors to provide social cohesion

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the role IOs and INGOs are playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	0.00%	0.00%	7.90%	10.30%	8.50%	44.20%	12.30%	17.50%
	Somewhat satisfied	3.00%	13.70%	31.70%	29.40%	46.50%	15.40%	20.00%	39.70%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	41.80%	25.50%	33.30%	55.90%	18.30%	32.70%	18.50%	27.00%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	44.80%	43.10%	15.90%	2.90%	16.90%	3.80%	21.50%	12.70%
	Very dissatisfied	10.40%	17.60%	9.50%	1.50%	5.60%	0.00%	20.00%	1.60%
	Not applicable	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	0.00%	0.00%	3.80%	6.20%	1.60%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.20%	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with role Local NGOs are playing in your area of origin?		Origin							
		Zummar	Markaz Sinjar	Multaqa	Markaz Tikrit	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Sab'a Al Bour	Khan Dari
RETURNEE	Very satisfied	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	7.40%	0.00%	25.00%	12.30%	0.00%
	Somewhat satisfied	0.00%	0.00%	12.70%	22.10%	33.80%	34.60%	26.20%	46.00%
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	34.30%	19.60%	50.80%	55.90%	25.40%	28.80%	15.40%	34.90%
	Somewhat dissatisfied	49.30%	43.10%	22.20%	2.90%	14.10%	3.80%	18.50%	14.30%
	Very dissatisfied	14.90%	37.30%	11.10%	11.80%	9.90%	3.80%	21.50%	3.20%
	Not applicable	1.50%	0.00%	1.60%	0.00%	12.70%	3.80%	6.20%	1.60%
	Refused to respond	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.20%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Count	67	51	63	68	71	52	65	63

Table 33 Satisfaction with International Organisations and local NGOs

When asked about the short-term outlook of the level of tension in the community, more than 30% of Sinjar's returnees and 18% of those in Tikrit state that they expect tensions to increase (Table 34). Sinjar is in fact the only location where most returnees expressed a moderate or strong concern about divisions within the community because of ethnic or religious issues – note that Sinjar is a multi-ethnic ethnic and multi-religious area, with a majority of Kurdish Yezidis. On the other hand, more than half of returnees in Zummar, Sab'a Al Bour, and Khan Dari expect tension to decrease in the near future and over half of returnees in Zummar, Multaqa, Mansouriya, Sab'a Al Bour, and Khan Dari also expect ongoing returns to ease tension in their area.

SNAPSHOTS


OF ASSESSED LOCATIONS

ZUMMAR SUB-DISTRICT


DISTRICT: TELAFAR
GOVERNORATE: NINEWA



Population (approx.):
20,000 inhabitants



55% Urban
45% Rural



Arab Sunni 70%
Kurdish Sunni 30%

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

ISIL's advance on Zummar town and its oil fields took place in August 2014. This advance allowed ISIL to reach Mosul dam and expand its territory towards the borders of Syria and Turkey. Zummar was retaken in October 2014 by the Peshmerga, whose advance was facilitated by the International Coalition's airstrikes.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN DYNAMICS



Number of displaced families:
7,350 families (44,100 individuals)



Location of displacement: **Mainly Dahuk**
Timeline of displacement: **August 2014**



Number of returnee families: **7,000 families (42,000 individuals)**
Timeline of returns : **October to December 2014**

RETURN: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

HLP FACTORS:

- 37% of interviewed IDPs are not returning because their house or property is damaged. An additional 10% do not return due to lack of services in Zummar. Overall, 94% of interviewed returnees and 77% of interviewed IDPs reported that their properties were damaged during the last conflict.
- Key informants reported the illegal use of private (empty) residences by returnees whose house is too damaged to be inhabited. This could create conflict in the area once the legal owners return.

ECONOMIC FACTORS:

- 10% of interviewed IDPs do not return because there are no jobs in the sub-district.

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- This study identified a split between Kurdish tribes who helped the Peshmerga retake the area and some Arab tribes displaced as a result of shelling during the campaign to retake ISIL areas —and who remain displaced. Over 63% of interviewed returnees are somewhat satisfied with the role tribal leaders are playing in the area. However, 83% of interviewed IDPs answered “not applicable”, meaning that their tribal leaders had not returned, and none rated the tribal leaders' role positively. Furthermore, 20% of IDPs consider the community is becoming divided due to tribal issues.
- Key informants repeatedly mentioned that tension and mistrust between returnees and stayees were issues to be reckoned.

PULL

SECURITY FACTORS:

- The high level of returns to Zummar is mainly due to security in the area (it is the main reason of return for 99% of returnees).

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- Kurdish tribal leaders have been actively engaged in encouraging returns despite the lack of support and information campaigns by formal actors. The return of tribal leaders to the area was meant to set the example for the rest of returnees.

DISPLACEMENT: PUSH & PULL FACTORS


PULL

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- 43% of interviewed IDPs are very satisfied with their decision to remain displaced and 37% of interviewed IDPs do not plan to return to Zummar sub-district.

COMMUNITY POLARIZATION RELATED TO RETURNS

Both IDPs and returnees agreed that returns would contribute to increasing tension in the area.




Graph 24 Tension related to returns (IDPs from / returnees to Zummar)

PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

PREFERRED ACTOR TO FOSTER COHESION


The KRG is the preferred actor by both returnees and IDPs to foster cohesion in the area.

Graph 25 Preferred actor to foster cohesion among the community (IDPs from / returnees to Zummar)
Multiple choice answer



LOCAL ACTORS' ROLE ASSESSMENT

Graph 26 Assessment of actors' role in location of origin (IDPs from / returnees to Zummar. Excluding DK / RA answers)




MARKAZ SINJAR SUB-DISTRICT


DISTRICT: SINJAR
GOVERNORATE: NINEWA



Population (approx.):
10,000 inhabitants



55% Urban
45% Rural



Kurdish Muslims
(Shi'a and Sunni) 55%
Yazidi 30%
Arab Sunni 10%
Turkmen Shi'a 5%

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Markaz Sinjar fell under ISIL's control in August 2014 following the Peshmerga's retreat, which allowed ISIL's advance into large areas of Ninewa Governorate. After the fall of Sinjar, ethnic and religious communities were intentionally and systematically targeted. In December 2014, there was a joint offensive by the Peshmerga, the PKK and the YPG to retake part of the areas controlled by ISIL. The sub-district was eventually retaken in November 2015 after a second offensive supported by US airstrikes.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN DYNAMICS



Number of displaced families:
6,000 families (18,000 individuals)



Location of displacement:
Mainly Dahuk and Ninewa

Timeline of displacement: **August 2014**



Number of returnee families: **288 families (1,728 individuals)**
Timeline of returns : **January 2016 – ongoing**

RETURN: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

HLP FACTORS:

- Over 91.7% of interviewed IDPs and 82.3% of interviewed returnees have had their properties damaged in the last conflict. For both returnees and IDPs, ISIL was the actor most commonly associated to the damage; however, 17.8% of IDPs indicated that stayees were those responsible for the damage to their properties, and 14.11% mentioned damage was caused by returnees.

SECURITY FACTORS:

- Lack of security in the area is the main reason not to return for 37% of interviewed IDPs. An additional 47% remain displaced because they enjoy better security in the area of displacement.

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- The vast majority of returnees are Yazidi except for a minority of Kurdish Shi'a families. The prospect of Arab Muslim families returning to Markaz Sinjar in the short term are low, regardless of them being affiliated or not with ISIL. Almost 59% of interviewed Arab Sunnis said they were not planning to return to Markaz Sinjar. Of those who said they were planning to return, 89% stated that they did not know when they would do so. The percentage of interviewed displaced Arab Sunnis who do not plan to return is twice that of other ethno-religious groups.

- 31% of interviewed IDPs fear reprisal if they return. This percentage increases among the Arab Sunni (45%) and Kurdish Sunni population (49%).

Political factors:

- There is increasing competition to control political posts among Kurdish political actors, causing division among returnees who side with one group or the other.
- No official campaign has taken place to provide information about the return process and key informants interviewed consider that the information returnees received was incomplete. All interviewed returnees said they were not encouraged to return and that their return had not been supported.

DISPLACEMENT: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PULL

HLP FACTORS:


- The difficult situation in IDP camps and the lack of basic services, including medical care, are factors prompting return to Sinjar, according to key informants.

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- The difficulty to adapt to the new environment in the city is the main reason prompting returns to Markaz Sinjar (33.3% of returnees).

COMMUNITY POLARIZATION RELATED TO RETURNS

There is a high risk of tension related to returns. Most interviewed IDPs and returnees believe that return will contribute to increasing tension in Markaz Sinjar, with 78.4% of returnees stating returns will contribute to some extent to tension.




Graph 27 Tension related to returns (IDPs from / returnees to Markaz Sinjar?)

PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

PREFERRED ACTOR TO FOSTER COHESION


There is no consensus among interviewed IDPs and returnees about which actor is the most appropriate to foster cohesion in Markaz Sinjar. IDPs mentioned a variety of actors, including tribal and religious leaders, local authorities, the Gol and KRG. Returnees only seem to perceive international security actors and the KRG as trusted actors to foster cohesion.

Graph 28 Preferred actor to foster cohesion among the community (IDPs from / returnees to Markaz Sinjar) Multiple choice answer



ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF LOCAL ACTORS¹⁰

Graph 29 Assessment of actors' role in location of origin (IDPs from / returnees to Markaz Sinjar. Excluding DK / RA answers)




¹⁰ Interviewed returnees to Markaz Sinjar selected NA when assessing tribal and religious leaders since they said they have not permanently returned to the area.

AL MULTAQA SUB-DISTRICT


DISTRICT: KIRKUK
GOVERNORATE: KIRKUK



Population (approx.):
62,000 inhabitants



6.5% Urban
93.5% Rural



Majority of Arab Sunnis, with a few Kurdish and Turkmen families. The most influential tribes are Al Jabour (50,000 members), Al Hamdany and Al Ishaqi

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Al Multaqa sub-district was taken by ISIL in June 2014. The fall of Al Multaqa took place at the same time as other areas of Kirkuk Governorate, including Hawija, immediately after the group's takeover of Mosul and the surrounding areas of Ninewa Governorate. The area was retaken by the Peshmerga in March 2015.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN DYNAMICS



Number of displaced families:
2,500 to 3,500 families
(estimated between 15,000 to 21,000 individuals)



Location of displacement:
Kirkuk district, either Kirkuk's center or nearby villages
Timeline of displacement: **August to January 2014**



Number of returnee families: **400 families**
(estimated around 2,400 individuals)
Timeline of returns : **April 2015**

RETURN: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

HLP FACTORS:

- This research identified high levels of property damage, with 80.8% of interviewed IDPs and 93.6% of interviewed returnees having had their properties destroyed during the last crisis. This is further validated by the DTM Returnee findings, whereby 100% of returnee families are reported to be living in "critical shelters" even though they have returned to their areas of habitual residence.
- Arable land was "mostly damaged" in 50% of assessed locations in the sub-district and grazing land in a quarter of them. In 75% of locations, UXOs were preventing agricultural work in at least a few fields. The danger of landmines and UXOs was the main security concern for returnee families in 50% of assessed locations.

SECURITY FACTORS:

- Al Multaqa sub-district borders the Hawija and Riyadh districts of Kirkuk Governorate. These areas are controlled by pockets of ISIL resistance, which cover approximately 50% of southwest Kirkuk Governorate. There seems to be a clear connection between ISIL's control over Hawija and the limited number of returns to Al Multaqa. In fact, 51% of interviewed IDPs do not return due to ongoing fight in the area of origin.

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- This study could detect the resentment of those who stayed in Al Multaqa towards those who chose to flee, mostly from the rural areas of al Multaqa to Kirkuk city. Feelings of being abandoned by their community brought the stayees to consider that those who fled chose an "easy" alternative.

PULL

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- No ethnic, religious or tribal tensions within the community were reported. Almost half of IDPs and returnees considered that the community is not at all becoming divided because of ethnic, tribal or social issues, and approximately 30% considered that divides are not applicable in the sub-district due to the homogeneity of its inhabitants. This finding could also be related to the internal nature of this displacement, whereby the population remained within Kirkuk Governorate.

DISPLACEMENT: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

ECONOMIC FACTORS:

- 13% of returnee families mentioned the difficulty to pay rent in displacement as the reason that pushed them to return despite the lack of security in the area.

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- The rural character of Al Multaqa has also prompted returns to the area, with 23.81% of returnees stating they had difficulties to adapt to a new urban environment while they were displaced.


PULL

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- As mentioned above, both returnees and IDPs from Al Multaqa were displaced within the same district in Kirkuk. Therefore, no conflict with the host community was reported, while the level of harassment experienced by IDPs and returnees during displacement is one of the lowest, with 97.1% of IDPs and 90.5% of returnees not having suffered any.

COMMUNITY POLARIZATION RELATED TO RETURNS

As shown below, a very low risk of community tension related to returns was reported: a total of 84% of interviewed returnees and 69% of interviewed IDPs consider returns will ease tension or not affect it.




Graph 30 Tension related to returns (IDPs from / returnees to Al Multaqa)

PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

PREFERRED ACTOR TO FOSTER COHESION


There is a generalized perception that local authorities would be the most appropriate actor to foster cohesion in Al Multaqa.

Graph 31 Preferred actor to foster cohesion among the community (IDPs from / returnees to Al Multaqa) Multiple choice answer



ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF LOCAL ACTORS

Graph 32 Assessment of actors' role in location of origin (IDPs from / Returnees to Al Multaqa. Excluding DK / RA answers)




MARKAZ TIKRIT SUB-DISTRICT


DISTRICT: TIKRIT
GOVERNORATE: SALAH AL-DIN



Population (approx.):
225,000 inhabitants



67% Urban
33% Rural



**Majority of Arab
Sunni Muslims (90%)**

The most influential tribes in Tikrit area are the Al Jabouri, one of the oldest and largest tribes in Iraq, and the Albu Nasr, the tribe of former ruler Saddam Hussein.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Markaz Tikrit was taken by ISIL in June 2014. The group capitalized on the resentment of disenfranchised Sunni tribes and militias who had been privileged during Saddam Hussein's rule to take over Tikrit.

Markaz Tikrit was retaken in March 2015, after a one-month joint campaign of the ISF, militias and Sunni tribal fighters.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN DYNAMICS



Number of displaced families:
**23,500 to 26,500 families (estimated between
141,000 to 159,000 individuals)**



Number of returnee families: **21,160
families (estimated 126,960 individuals)**
Timeline of returns : **70% of returns be-
tween June and August 2015, and more
moderately up to December 2015**



Location of displacement:
Kirkuk (47%), within Salah al-Din (37%) and Erbil (23%)
Timeline of displacement: **June to September 2015**

RETURN: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

HLP FACTORS:

- A total of 90% of interviewed IDPs and 47% of interviewed returnees have had their properties destroyed or damaged.
- There was some tension among returnees regarding property use. A number of families occupied empty houses upon their return, which resulted in confrontations when the legal owners or tenants returned to Tikrit. To mitigate the problem, the local government has given houses that belonged to people affiliated with ISIL to those returnees who had their habitual residence damaged. This has been done informally and not through any approved restitution and compensation mechanism.

SECURITY FACTORS:

- The change of actors in charge of security in Markaz Tikrit is a destabilizing factor in the community. Fear of security actors is the main reason not to return reported by 11% of IDPs from Markaz Tikrit, and 26% mention fear of reprisal acts and violence as the second reason not to return. In particular, 76% of interviewed IDPs from Markaz Tikrit are very dissatisfied with the role militias are playing in their sub-district of origin. Overall, the mistrust of local authorities towards the new militia has been discouraging them from incentivizing return more consistently.
- Fear of harassment and discrimination back home is the reason that pushed 10% of IDPs from Markaz Tikrit to remain displaced. This might be linked to tribal tension as well; in fact, 54% of interviewed IDPs from Markaz Tikrit consider that the community is getting moderately or slightly divided due to tribal issues.
- Furthermore, IDPs who have a relative affiliated with ISIL are banned from returning to Markaz Tikrit for a period of five years.

POLITICAL FACTORS:

- Increasing competition among tribal leaders to access political posts in the provincial elections of April 2017 was also reported. Tribal leaders encourage the return of those IDPs who are part of their constituency.

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- This study detected the resentment of those who stayed in Al Multaqa towards those who chose to flee, mostly from the rural areas of al Multaqa to Kirkuk city. Feelings of being abandoned by their community brought the stayees to consider that those who fled chose an "easy" alternative.

PULL

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- No ethnic, religious or tribal tensions within the community were reported. Almost half of IDPs and returnees considered that the community is not at all becoming divided because of ethnic, tribal or social issues, and approximately 30% considered that divides are not applicable in the sub-district due to the homogeneity of its inhabitants. This finding could also be related to the internal nature of this displacement, whereby the population remained within Kirkuk Governorate.

DISPLACEMENT: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

ECONOMIC FACTORS:


- Difficulty to pay rent in displacement motivates the return to Markaz Tikrit of 18% of interviewed returnees.

Social factors:

- Complaints about discrimination and mistreatment in areas of displacement are push factors prompting many returns to Markaz Tikrit. Over 40% of returnees felt very uncomfortable while in displacement and 29% faced some sort of harassment or discrimination.

COMMUNITY POLARIZATION RELATED TO RETURNS

A minority of interviewed IDPs (3%) and returnees (10%) considers that returns will contribute to tension. However, 56% of returnees refused to answer the question.




Graph 33 Tension related to returns (IDPs from / returnees to Markaz Tikrit)

PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

PREFERRED ACTOR TO FOSTER COHESION


Tribal leaders are considered the most appropriate actors to foster cohesion among returnees and IDPs in Markaz Tikrit.

Graph 34 Preferred actor to foster cohesion among the community (IDPs from / returnees to Markaz Tikrit)
Multiple choice answer



ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF LOCAL ACTORS

Graph 35 Assessment of actors' role in location of origin (IDPs from / returnees to Markaz Tikrit. Excluding DK / RA answers)





JALAWLA SUB-DISTRICT

DISTRICT: KHANAQIN
GOVERNORATE: DIYALA



Population (approx.):
93,000 inhabitants



Highly heterogeneous area. Population composed of Arab Sunnis (75%) with a significant presence of Arab Shi'a (9%), Turkmen Sunni (4%), and Kurdish groups (Shi'a and Sunni 12%). High number of ethno-religiously mixed families. Al Karawi (Arab Sunni) is the main tribe in the area.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Peshmerga forces and ISIL engaged in a battle for the control of Jalawla in June 2014. Eventually ISIL took over the area in August 2014 and took advantage of the resentment of some of the newly resettled Arab families in the area to control Jalawla. In 2007, the sub-district witnessed a significant population increase when Arab families from Khanaqin resettled in the area. This happened after the Commission on the Resolution of Real Property Disputes approved the compensation to Kurdish families who had displaced to Khanaqin in the 1970s during the Arabization campaign.

Peshmerga forces retook control of Jalawla in November 2014 with the support of militias. Once the area was retaken, tension between the Peshmerga and the militias prompted the former to expel all militias from the area, marking the beginning of returns to the sub-district.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN DYNAMICS



Number of displaced families:
12,000 families (72,000 individuals)



Number of returnee families: 9,000 families
(54,000 individuals)



Location of displacement: Diyala (92% of displaced families)
mostly within the same district of origin - Khanaqin
Timeline of displacement: June to August 2014

Timeline of returns : December 2015, ongoing.
Progressive return movement is also dependent on a 20-day cycle approved by Asayish and organized by the local authorities of Jalawla

RETURN: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

HLP FACTORS:

- 31% of IDPs mentioned "house and property damaged" as the main reason not to return.

SECURITY FACTORS:

- Fear of the security actors in the area of origin is the reason not to return for 16.7% of interviewed IDPs. In fact, IDPs from Jalawla negatively rate the role of the Peshmerga (62.5% very dissatisfied) and Asayish (76% very dissatisfied).

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- 35% of displaced families from Jalawla reported that the community tends to get extremely or very divided due to ethnic issues, followed by 29% who say divisions are due to tribal issues. Furthermore, most displaced families (69.8%) indicated that they had been harassed in their place of origin before displacement.

PULL

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- Jalawla constitutes a clear example of how return and displacement movements are influenced by ethno-religious and tribal considerations. As returnees belong to a variety of ethno-religious groups, the sample interviewed reported that security in the area is the reason that attracted the majority of returnees to go back (92% of interviewed returnees). This is further corroborated by the positive perception of Peshmerga and Asayish among interviewed returnees (88.7% of surveyed returnees were very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the Peshmerga's role and 98.6% with Asayish's role in the area), as opposed to the views of interviewed IDPs, who are mainly Arab Sunni.
- Local authorities are highly involved in organizing return in 20-day cycles, with information on returns disseminated on the local administration's Facebook group.

ECONOMIC FACTORS:

- The reinstatement of official working hours for government employees, together with a special single batch of approved returns of 700 public administration employees and their families on April 2016, triggered the reestablishment of services in the area, which is in turn attracting further returns.

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- The heterogeneous return trend illustrates of the ethno-religious diversity of the sub-district.

DISPLACEMENT: PUSH & PULL FACTORS


PUSH

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- Interviewed IDPs feel very (22%) or somewhat uncomfortable (31%) in their area of displacement. This might explain why 90.6% of IDPs plan to return to Jalawla, 47.1% of them in the short term (within the next 12 months) despite a high level of community polarization and tension linked to returns.

COMMUNITY POLARIZATION RELATED TO RETURNS

Risk of tension related to return is high: 53% of displaced interviewees consider that returns will contribute to increasing tension and 64.8% of returnees refused to answer.




Graph 36 Tension related to returns (IDPs from / returnees to Jalawla)

PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

PREFERRED ACTOR TO FOSTER COHESION


IDPs and returnees do not have the same views on which actor would be the most appropriate to foster cohesion among the community. IDPs believe the Gol would be the most appropriate, whereas returnees clearly prefer the KRG. This is in line with the different perceptions of IDPs and returnees on the security actors associated to the KRG.

Graph 37 Preferred actor to foster cohesion among the community (IDPs from / returnees to Jalawla) Multiple choice answer



ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF LOCAL ACTORS

Graph 38 Assessment of actors' role in location of origin (IDPs from / Returnees to Jalawla. Excluding DK / RA answers)




MANSOURIYA SUB-DISTRICT


DISTRICT: AL KHALIS
GOVERNORATE: DIYALA



Population (approx.):
85,000 inhabitants



10% Urban
90% Rural



Majority of Arab Muslim Sunni (97%)
with an Arab Shi'a minority (3%) and a
Turkmen Shi'a minority (390 families)
The main tribes are Al Ezza (60%) and Al
Jabour (40%)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

In January 2014, ISIL took the town of Al Udeim in nearby Mansouriya, and from there started spreading to the Diyala River Valley. Complaints were made about the absence of security forces to protect rural areas. Mansouriya fell under the group's control in June 2014 together with seven other villages. Only ISIL's attack in the capital of Diyala, Ba'quba, in the same month, was repelled. In October 2014 ISIL's presence in the sub-district started being repelled as local tribes created a tribal mobilization force. The area was considered fully retaken by the end of January 2015.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN DYNAMICS



8,900 to 9,900 families (estimated
between 53,400 and 59,400 individuals)



Number of returnee families: **7,400 families**
(estimated around 44,400 individuals)



Location of displacement: **Diyala Governorate (77%), mainly
to Ba'quba and Khanaqin, and Kirkuk Governorate (14%)**
Timeline of displacement: **June 2014**

Timeline of returns : **First period: October 2014 when
Mansouriya's tribal mobilization force was created and
started to repel ISIL. Second period: February 2015 after
the neighboring town of Al Udeim was retaken**

RETURN: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

HLP FACTORS:

- Although public services have been restored, the high level of private property damage still hinders returns. 70% of IDPs originally from Mansouriya had their properties damaged in the last crisis, while 22% consider the damage to their property as the main reason not to return. Also, there are reported cases of civilian property illegally used by the Iraqi Army and militias in the area.
- A general lack of confidence in the government reportedly prevents returnees and IDPs from applying to compensation grants. However, displaced farmers decided to return due to the need to work the land to keep crops productive and livestock alive.

SECURITY FACTORS:

- The complex and unsafe security situation in certain areas of Mansouriya might be preventing the return of potential investors and other economic actors, who also fear that militias might attempt to extort them and ask for bribes.
- Respondents showed fear that ISIL could return to Mansouriya, as several attacks have taken place in the area since it was retaken. In particular, orchard areas north of the Diyala River Valley are considered a terrorist safe heaven, where ISIL has built bases for fighters and their families during "recovery" times.
- Based on the findings of this study, the spiral of insurgent attacks and posterior militia retaliatory acts is likely to increase in Diyala, which could hinder the long-term return of the population.

PULL

SECURITY FACTORS:

- Notwithstanding the overall level of tension and unsafety of this area, security remains the main reason to return for the majority of interviewed returnees (73%), most of who have been actively engaged in the fighting to retake the area.

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- Between 1,200 and 1,400 tribal members were mobilized by the tribal sheikhs in October 2014 to retake the Mansouriya area. Families of those members who participated in the tribal mobilization force returned first to join their relatives; this can also explain why 77% of interviewed returnees reported being very satisfied with the role played by tribal leaders in Mansouriya.

DISPLACEMENT: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- Most interviewed returnees were previously displaced within Diyala (77%), where there have been widespread accusations of abductions and forced disappearances carried out by militias and mostly targeting the Sunni population. The fear of random killings might also have prompted returns to this community.

SECURITY FACTORS:

- Because it is a rural area, missing home is the reason to return for 23% of interviewed returnees, who reported challenges to adapt to urban life during displacement. Different living conditions and uncomfortable accommodation arrangements were recurrent issues affecting the displaced population from this area.


PULL

ECONOMIC FACTORS:

- Only 5% of interviewed IDPs reported availability of jobs as a reason to remain displaced.

COMMUNITY POLARIZATION RELATED TO RETURNS

As shown below, half of interviewed IDPs and returnees believe that returns will contribute to easing tension among the community.




Graph 39 Tension related to returns (IDPs from / returnees to Mansouriya)

PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

PREFERRED ACTOR TO FOSTER COHESION


Tribal leaders are the actor most widely perceived as able to foster cohesion among community groups —both by returnees and IDPs from Mansouriya.

Graph 40 Preferred actor to foster cohesion among the community (IDPs from / returnees to Mansouriya) Multiple choice answer



ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF LOCAL ACTORS

Graph 41 Assessment of actors' role in location of origin (IDPs from / Returnees to Mansouriya. Excluding DK / RA answers)




KHAN DHARI SUB-DISTRICT

DISTRICT: ABU GHRAIB
GOVERNORATE: BAGHDAD



Population (approx.):
65,000 inhabitants



25% Urban
75% Rural



Arab Sunni (99%). The most influential tribe is Al Zawbaa (90% of Khan Dhari's population)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

In April 2014, ISIL attacked the Euphrates River dam at Nuaimiya (south of Falluja) and released its water, flooding vast areas of Khan Dhari. ISIL's advance and the counter-military operations in the area spanned from July to November 2014, until the ISF eventually controlled the area.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN DYNAMICS



Location of displacement: **Baghdad Governorate (83%), mostly within the same district —Abu Ghraib**
Timeline of displacement: **First period: April 2014 due to the flood that affected the region. Second period: July to November 2014 due to military operations to prevent ISIL's advance**



3,000 families (18,000 individuals)



Number of returnee families:

683 families (4,098 individuals)

Timeline of returns : **September to October 2016**

RETURN: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

HLP FACTORS:

- Current shortages in water and electricity to operate the water pumps is preventing the return of families employed in the agricultural sector. A ban on the imports of fertilizers to Khan Dhari is another factor that negatively affects those returnees engaged in agricultural activities.
- No compensations have been made for loss of agricultural land due to the 2014 flooding, although claims have been officially submitted.

SECURITY FACTORS:

- 12% of interviewed IDPs (mostly those living close to west Baghdad) have tried to return at some point but were not allowed in. These areas would be affected by an ongoing project aimed at building a wall along the western and northern parts of the Baghdad Belt, which would affect the traditional control of the land between Sunni and Shi'a communities.
- 14% of interviewed returnees reported that they have been harassed upon returning to Khan Dhari, and 8% refused to respond. The role of militias is rated extremely negatively among returnees from Khan Dhari—or no answer was given. Most interviewed IDPs also refused to answer the question.

PULL

ECONOMIC FACTORS:

- 89% of interviewed returnees responded that they were encouraged to return by promises, mainly by the ISF (73%) and the Gol or provincial council (11%). In particular, security in the area (45%) and cleaning of rubble, UXOs and IEDs (30%) were the most common promises made to the returnees prior their return.
- Availability of jobs was reported as the main reason to return by 10% of interviewed returnees. Since lack of jobs back home is also the main reason not to return for 13% of interviewed IDPs, it can be inferred that job provision would constitute a strong pull factor towards returns to Khan Dhari.

DISPLACEMENT: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

HLP FACTORS:


- Most families from Khan Dhari fled within the same sub-district, Abu Ghraib. Both Abu Ghraib and Khan Dhari's town centers are small and ill-prepared locations to host high numbers of displaced, which resulted in overcrowded households in displacement.

SECURITY FACTORS:

- 16% of interviewed returnees came back due to the difficulty to pay rent in displacement, while an additional 8% returned due to the lack of economic opportunities.

COMMUNITY POLARIZATION RELATED TO RETURNS

Although 53.97% of returnees and 30.11% of IDPs mentioned that returns would ease tension in the area, the high number of interviewees refusing to answer the question weakens the result.




Graph 42 Tension related to returns (IDPs from / returnees to Khan Dhari)

PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

PREFERRED ACTOR TO FOSTER COHESION


Security actors are considered the most appropriate to foster cohesion in the area, followed by religious and tribal leaders.

Graph 43 Preferred actor to foster cohesion among the community (IDPs from / returnees to Khan Dhari) Multiple choice answer



ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF LOCAL ACTORS

Graph 44 Assessment of actors' role in location of origin (IDPs from / Returnees to Khan Dhari. Excluding DK / RA answers)




SAB'A AL BOUR SUB-DISTRICT


DISTRICT: KADHIMIYA
GOVERNORATE: BAGHDAD



Population (approx.):
75,000 inhabitants



93% Urban
7% Rural



Mostly Arab Shi'a (75%), mainly from Al Tamimi tribe. A minority of Arab Sunni, from Al Dulaimi and Al Jabouri tribes

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

After the territorial advance of ISIL in January 2014 to gain control of Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIL conducted separate attacks in the northern Baghdad Belt, where parts of Sab'a Al Bour are located. ISIL eventually gained control of Sab'a Al Bour in its initial advance towards Baghdad in June 2014.

The area was retaken three months later, in early September 2014, in a joint campaign of the ISF and militias. However, the area suffered continuous bomb attacks throughout 2015 and 2016.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN DYNAMICS



1,800 families (10,800 individuals)



Number of returnee families:

1,355 families (8,130 individuals)

Timeline of returns : **June 2015 to January 2016.**

Steady return of approximately 100 to 120 families per month



Location of displacement: **Baghdad Governorate (97%)**

Timeline of displacement: **80% between June and July 2014 but the displacement flow continued until the end of 2014**

RETURN: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

HLP FACTORS:

- The high level of shelter destruction is one of the main issues preventing returns, with 41% of interviewed IDPs from Sab'a Al Bour indicating property damage as the main reason for not returning. Namely, 70% of interviewed IDPs and 63% of interviewed returnees had property damaged due to the last conflict.
- The opening and rehabilitation of health centers is a shared demand among key informants. Based on the DTM Integrated Location Assessment (ILA), in 50% of assessed locations in Sab'a al Bour there was no health facility or hospital, while in 25% of locations with a health facility, it was damaged.
- A public reconstruction fund to rebuild the areas destroyed by the military operations was announced in September 2014. The delay in rebuilding the area might lead to an increase of tension among returnees who already held public demonstrations on March 2016 to demand an improvement of services.

SECURITY FACTORS:

- The Sunni population in Sab'a al Bour represents 26% of the host community but only 3% of returnees, whereas Shi'as account for 73% of the host community and 97% of returnees. Key informants foresee an increase in sectarian tension due to religious divides when the remaining returnees go back to their location of origin.
- However, interviewed returnees and IDPs from Sab'a Al Bour agree that the area is becoming divided mainly due to tribal issues, with 9% of returnees and 12% of IDPs from the location considering it is becoming extremely or very divided. In fact, 10% of interviewed IDPs feared some sort of reprisal if they eventually went back to Sab'a Al Bour.

DISPLACEMENT: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

PUSH

ECONOMIC FACTORS:

- Difficulty to pay rent in displacement is the main reason to return for 40% of interviewed returnees.

PULL

SECURITY FACTORS:


- 16% of interviewed IDPs reported that they prefer to remain displaced because they enjoy better security in their area of displacement.

SOCIAL FACTORS:

- Almost half of the interviewed IDPs originally from Sab'a Al Bour do not plan to return; 15% mentioned they were very satisfied with their decision to remain in displacement and 47% were somewhat satisfied. The intention to stay in displacement is very high compared to the other assessed locations.

COMMUNITY POLARIZATION RELATED TO RETURNS

Most returnees and IDPs from Sab'a Al Bour believe that returns will contribute to easing tension.




Graph 45 Tension related to returns (IDPs from / returnees to Sab'a Al Bour)

PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

PREFERRED ACTOR TO FOSTER COHESION


Tribal leaders, security actors and local authorities are perceived as the most appropriate actors to foster cohesion by both interviewed IDPs and returnees.



Graph 46 Preferred actor to foster cohesion among the community (IDPs from / returnees to Sab'a Al Bour) Multiple choice answer

LOCAL ACTORS' ROLE ASSESSMENT

Graph 47 Assessment of actors' role in location of origin (IDPs from / Returnees to Sab'a Al Bour. Excluding DK / RA answers)



FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

These final considerations aim to provide an overview of the main factors that may contribute to the decision of returning or remaining in displacement once areas of origin are retaken, and the main obstacles IDPs encounter when they decide to move back to their place of origin.

Although all assessed communities show unique localized dynamics that have characterized the occupation and retaking of their sub-districts, and particular push and pull factors influencing return and displacement, it is possible to identify some macro trends within these complex human processes.

CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS BEFORE RETURNING

This section summarizes the main considerations that displaced families take into account when gauging the options to return or remain in displacement.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Both the qualitative and quantitative data collected for this study strongly indicate that the main consideration the interviewed IDPs and returnees take into account when deciding to return or not to their area of origin is security.

Lack of security is the main reason behind the decision to remain displaced, whereas when security is ensured it becomes the main factor favoring return. In our case studies, lack of security is correlated to the proximity of the locations to the frontline and to the ongoing fighting in the area of origin.

The extent of return in some of the selected communities points to the same conclusion. For instance, Al Multaqa (Kirkuk) and Khan Dhari (Baghdad) present the lowest share of returns with only 13% and 23% returnee families, respectively. Both sub-districts are close to areas still affected by conflict: Al Multaqa borders the Hawija frontline, whereas Khan Dhari is close to Fallujah. Moreover, some locations are still unsafe not only because of their proximity to the frontline but also because in the case of arable land, IED contamination is still common.

Although some areas have been retaken, their proximity to the frontline and the perceived instability in the place of origin remain the most relevant obstacles to return, as highlighted by both IDPs and returnees interviewed.

The perception of the security actors who control the area of displacement compared to that of those in charge of the area of origin is also a relevant aspect that displaced families include in their decision-making process. A high level of trust towards the security actor(s) in control of the areas of origin facilitates and promotes a higher number of returns—a result further supported by a lower level of anticipated community tension among different groups in such cases—while fear of security actors in the place origin is a strong drawback that reinforces the perceived advantage of staying in displacement.

It is important to note that the level of trust in the security actors in control in the place of origin seems to vary according to whether the security actor is new or traditional. For example, in the case of Markaz Tikrit, the lack of trust towards the newly appointed militia in charge of security was identified as a source of tension. This has a direct impact on returnees and potential returnees to the area, who are uncomfortable with the militia's presence, and an indirect one, with local authorities and community leaders not engaging in facilitating the return process for fear of what might happen to their constituencies.

In contrast to Markaz Tikrit, in Jalawla the handover of security to the Peshmerga—also a new actor in the sub-district—marked the beginning of more significant returns to the area. The high level



of trust towards the actor encouraged the involvement of local authorities and community leaders, who felt more comfortable in joining efforts to facilitate the return process, largely benefitting the community.

The type of security actors (new or traditional / from the area or external to it) and the perception towards them also play a role during displacement and become a push factor prompting return; this was reported by IDPs who feel discriminated against and do not trust the security actors in the displacement area.

The perception towards the security actors in the area of origin or in the area of displacement plays an essential role in the decision-making process of the surveyed IDP and returnee populations in relation to whether to remain in displacement or return.

HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS

A high level of private property damage is a widespread consequence of the ISIL crisis and it is found across all the assessed locations. But what role does property damage play when the displaced families evaluate their possibility to return or remain in displacement?

First of all, it is worth noting that both surveyed returnees and IDPs present similar percentages of house and property damage (70% of interviewed returnees and 79% of interviewed IDPs). What differs in some case studies is the context in which the house was damaged and, more importantly, the presence or absence of the actor who inflicted the damage. As expected, in areas where the alleged perpetrators are still in power, return movements have not been taking place at the same pace as in areas where the security actors changed.

Without undermining the importance of house and property damage for those affected IDPs and returnees, the research has shown that house damage does not constitute an obstacle to return, but the presence of the actor who inflicted the damage in the area of origin is.

Therefore, when displaced families ponder on their decision to return or not once the area has been retaken, HLP issues are not considered on their own but linked to security considerations.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Livelihood options and previous or current employment status play an important role in influencing the decision to return. In all locations, the percentage of unemployment among IDPs who returned almost doubled that of IDPs who chose not to return. Notably, having a job in the place of displacement is a good incentive to stay, in the same way as the lack of employment can facilitate the decision to return.

However, separate considerations for rural areas should be made, as these have shown specific characteristics that influence returns. Rural populations and farmers suffer long-term losses if the land is not timely and consistently farmed, and therefore return to rural areas took place even when conditions were unfavorable, with services and infrastructure not yet restored or when the location was still deemed unsafe. For this group, returning home is necessary so as not to suffer long-term losses, even though the promises or requests for agricultural compensations do not seem to have been addressed yet.

In addition to the long-term losses that farmers may suffer if the land is not farmed timely, other socio-economic factors also fostered the return to rural areas. For instance, this study shows that IDPs from rural areas who displaced to urban areas had fewer opportunities to find a job in displacement and reported more difficulties to adapt to urban life.

Livelihood and employment in the place of origin and displacement appears to be a decisive factor influencing the decision of returning or remaining in displacement. IDPs who have a job in the location of displacement are less inclined to return home, unlike those who are unemployed and who may return to seek new opportunities. Farmers are a separate category and respond to different considerations.

SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The communities selected in our case studies have different ethnic, tribal and religious belongings. Contrary to expectations, homogeneous communities do not present faster returns than heterogeneous ones. Across the eight communities assessed, the main factor that helps facilitating returns seems to be the agreement and willingness of community leaders to cooperate with each other, regardless of whether they have the same ethno-religious background or not.

Therefore, displaced families take into account the level of involvement of their community leaders in fostering community cohesion when taking their decision to return.

The involvement of non-official actors, particularly tribal leaders, is a key factor towards encouraging and setting in motion a sustainable return process to recently retaken areas.

FACTORS LIMITING RETURN ONCE THE DECISION HAS TAKEN PLACE

This section summarizes the main obstacles faced during the return process once the decision of returning has been taken, and upon arrival to the area of origin.

SECURITY FACTORS

Almost a quarter of interviewed IDPs decided to return but were not allowed to. Their return was blocked mainly by security actors, either formal or semi-formal, depending on the actor in control of security in the location.

For those interviewed IDPs who were blocked from returning, the method of blockage was by delaying the processing of documentation. Therefore, it took place once the decision to return was taken but before leaving the place of displacement. However, almost a fifth of them had initiated the return and were stopped at a checkpoint on their way back to their location of origin.

Therefore, once the decision to return takes place, it is at times curbed by the actual possibility to return —mostly linked to being allowed back by formal or semi-formal security actors.

SOCIAL FACTORS

Although less limiting, social pressure can also hinder the decision to return. Families and friends have in some occasions played a role in discouraging the decision to return, and they do so mainly invoking security reasons along sectarian terms.

Informal actors can also influence the decision to return by discouraging those willing to return.

INCENTIVES AND PROMISES

Nearly all returnee families received promises to encourage their return or had their return somehow facilitated, mainly through transportation and record checks. Security actors promised security provision and clearing areas from IEDs and UXOs and government representatives committed to invest in reestablishing services and improving access and support to livelihood opportunities. However, no group, in any location, mentioned systematic or official campaigns.

Despite these commitments, this research identified a general lack of trust among those who had returned in the reliability of the promises made by various actors to encourage their return, particularly central and local authorities. Reportedly, returnees did not take into account these promises when making the decision of returning to the areas of origin.

Returning IDPs perceive incentives to return as something that might or might not happen in the long term; therefore, incentives and promises do not constitute a decisive factor influencing the decision to return.

HLP ISSUES UPON ARRIVAL

The current informally implemented solutions to the HLP challenges could also contribute to increasing community tension. In certain cases, such as in Zummar sub-district, the high level of damage has prompted the illegal occupation of private (empty) residences by returnees whose house is too damaged to be inhabited. In other instances, such as in Markaz Tikrit, the local government has given houses that belonged to ISIL members to those returnees whose habitual residences were damaged. In other locations, the active involvement of local sheikhs in instructing the population not to occupy houses belonging to IDPs has prevented the issue, such as in Mansouriya. In all cases, however, solutions were implemented informally, while official restitution and compensation mechanisms could not be identified in any of the assessed communities.

Illegal occupation of private property by returnees and informal allocation of empty residences by the government to returnees are two mechanisms that have been used to mitigate the im-

mediate accommodation demands of returnees whose house was destroyed during the crisis. In the long term, the illegal occupation of residences could lead to an increase in community tension, particularly when the legitimate owners return.

INTENTIONS TO RETURN

Most of the interviewed IDPs were satisfied with their decision to stay in the area where they were currently living. Nonetheless, more than three quarters of interviewed IDPs were planning to return at some point in the future, almost half within the next year.

Also, a quarter of interviewed IDPs and a fifth of interviewed returnees consider that their return will contribute to tension. This is particularly pronounced in the case studies located in Ninewa and Diyala governorates. If community tension increases, it could lead to a new wave of displacement among those who have already returned.

The decision to return or remain in displacement is not definitive. It is based on the circumstances and expectations of the families in displacement.



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In-depth Interviews (Qualitative tool) ¹¹

BLOCK 1: RETURN PROCESS (40 minutes)

1. RETURNEES

- 1.1. Here in NOL, do you know how many of the displaced families returned? هل تعرف كم عدد العوائل التي رجعت الى الاماكن الاصليه ؟
- 1.2. What are the reasons that attract people to come back? ماهي الاسباب التي دفعت النازحين الى الرجوع ؟
- 1.3. Was their return supported / facilitated? هل عملية الرجوع كانت مدعومة ؟
- 1.4. Was the return forced? هل عملية الرجوع كانت بالقوة ؟ /
- 1.5. Did anyone try to stop their return? هل قام احد بمحاولة ايقاف عملية الرجوع ؟ /
- 1.6. Was there any promise done to encourage the IDPs to return? هل هناك اي وعود تشجع النازحين للعودة ؟
 - 1.6.1. Would you say these promises have been met? هل هذه الوعود نفذت ؟ /
- 1.7. [ONLY IF "NO" in 1.6.1] What could happen if these promises are not met? ماذا سوف يحدث اذا لم تنفذ هذه الوعود ؟
- 1.8. Did any particular issue in their place of displacement prompt their return? هل هناك اي مشكله معينه في منطقه النزوح تجبرهم على العوده ؟ اذا كان الجواب ب (لا)
- 1.9. Who did the returnees get reassurance before coming back? من الذي يعطي الطمانيه للنازحين لمساعدتهم على العوده ؟
- 1.10. Are the returnees from any specific ethno, religious or tribal group? هل يوجد اي تصنيف للعائدين من ناحية (العرق, الدين, العشيرة)
- 1.11. Are there any families who stayed here while ISIS was occupying the area? هل يوجد اي من العوائل التي لم تنزح عندما اجتاحت داعش هذه المنطقة (IF YES in Q 1.11) اذا الاجابة نعم
- 1.12. How do you look at them? ماهي انطباعاتك عنهم
- 1.13. How do the returnees look at them? وماهي انطباعات العائدين عليهم

2. IDPs

- 2.1. And how about the people who did not return in here, how many people remain displaced? ماذا عن الناس الذين لم يرجعوا الى منطقة الاصل ؟ كم عدد الناس الذين مازالوا نازحين ؟
- 2.2. What is preventing them to return? ما الذي يمنعهم من العوده ؟
- 2.3. Is there any specific group who are not returning to NOL? (IF NO SKIP TO 2.6) هل يوجد مجاميع معينة لم تعد الى مكانها الاصلي ؟
- 2.4. Have the demographics of NOL changed with this people not returning? هل تغيرت ديموغرافية المكان الاصلي بسبب عدم عودة هذه المجاميع ؟
- 2.5. Is someone facilitating / supporting their return? هل يوجد شخص او جهة معينة قدمت الدعم لعملية العوده ؟
- 2.6. Is any specific actor stopping their return? هل هناك اشخاص معينين يمنعون عودتهم ؟ /
- 2.7. Which factors need to be in place for them to come back? ما هي العوامل التي يجب ان تتوفر لتشجيع عملية الرجوع ؟

IF ANY FAMILY STAYED IN THE LOCATION DURING ISIS (IF NOT GO TO 3) هل العوائل التي لم تنزح اثناء دخول داعش

¹¹ IOM Field teams

2.8. How will the families who stay look at the IDPs when they come back? ما هي نظرت العوائل التي لم تنزح الى العائدين الى المنطقة

2.9. What will be the returnees' reaction? ماذا سيكون رد فعل العائدين ؟

3. COMMUNITY ACTORS

3.1. In your opinion what is the role played by government authorities towards return? ما هو الدور الذي تلعبه الحكومة اتجاه العائدين ؟

3.1.1.And the local administration? والادارة المحلية

3.1.2.And the security actors? وممثلين الامن ؟

3.1.3.How about tribal leaders? ماذا عن قادة العشائر ؟

3.1.4.And religious authorities? والقادة او السلطات الدينية؟

4. INFORMATION ACCESS

4.1. When it comes to the information given to the IDPs before returning concerning the possibility of returning, who did disseminate this information? من قام بنشر المعلومات المعطاة للنازحين قبل رجوعهم والمتعلقة باحتمالية رجوع النازحين؟

4.2. How this information was disseminated? كيف تم نشر هذه المعلومات؟

4.3. The information disseminated, was it targeted to a specific group or accessible to everyone?

4.4. هل هذه المعلومات تستهدف فئة معينة او تستهدف الجميع؟

4.5. Would you say the information the returnees received before coming back was complete?

4.6. هل تستطيع القول ان المعلومات التي استلمت من قبل العائدين قبل رجوعهم كانت كاملة وواقية ؟

4.7. Was there any official campaign, message or communication carried out? هل كان هناك اي حملات دعائية رسمية, منشورات او اعلانات, طرق تواصل استخدمت؟

BLOCK 2: OBSTACLES TO RETURN (30 minutes)

1. PRACTICES

1.1. For the people who returned, can you explain me what was the procedure? للشخص الذي رجعوا الى مناطقهم الاصلية , هل تستطيع ان تشرح ماذا كانت مراحل الرجوع ؟

1.2. Was the process initiated by the governorate of origin or the governorates of displacement? هل ان العملية بدأت من قبل محافظة الاصل او محافظات النزوح؟

1.3. Until which extent would you say the decision to return is personal, household or community-based? الى اي حد يمكنك ان تقول ان قرار الرجوع هو شخصي , مرتكز على الاسرة والمجتمع ؟

1.4. As far as you know, did the returnees have their records check? حسب علمك , هل تم تدقيق سجلات الراجعين؟

1.5. Which other procedures the people who return had to follow to be able to do so? ما هي الاجراءات الاخرى المطلوبة للذين رجعوا ان يقوموا بها؟

1.6. Was any displaced person prevented to return? هل تم منع اي شخص نازح من الرجوع ؟

2. PERCEPTIONS

2.1. The people who came back, how comfortable or uncomfortable do you think they feel in their place of return? الناس الذين عادوا, هل كانوا مرتاحين او غير مرتاحين, هل تعتقد بأنهم يشعرون بالراحة في مكان العودة؟

2.1.1. Do they fear any sort of reprisal? هل يشعرون بأي نوع من انواع الانتقام؟

2.1.2. Are the people who return satisfied or unsatisfied with their decision to return? هل العائدين راضين ام غير راضين على قرار عودتهم؟

2.1.3. Are some of the returnees planning to leave again? هل بعض من العائدين خططوا للمغادرة مرة اخرى؟

2.2. And the people who stayed, how comfortable or uncomfortable they are seeing the returnees back? والناس الذين بقوا, كيف كانوا مرتاحين او غير مرتاحين, ماهو رأيهم عن الناس العائدين؟

2.3 What about the people who did not return, do you think they fear any sort of reprisal if they return? ماذا عن الناس الذين لم يعودوا, هل تعتقد انهم يخافون من اي نوع من الانتقام اذا عادوا؟

3. COMMUNITY TENSIONS AND VINDICATIVE ACTIONS

3.1. Was there any competition among leaders to control political posts or real estate market? هل هنالك أي توتر (مشاكل) للمشاركة بالسياسة؟

3.2. Any tension related to compensation of victims? هل هنالك مشاكل بخصوص تعويض الضحايا؟

3.3. Any tensions related to ownership of land and property? هل هنالك خلافات بخصوص ملكية الاراضي والممتلكات؟

3.4. Is there any illegal use of private or government properties? هل هناك اي استغلال غير قانوني للممتلكات الخاصة او الحكومية

3.5. What are other sources of tension affecting NOL population? ماهي مصادر المخاوف الاخرى التي تؤثر على سكان المنطقة (اسم المنطقة)؟

3.6. Did violence augmented since the returnee families started to go back? هل ازداد العنف منذ بدء العوائل النازحة بالرجوع الى سكنهم الاصلي؟

3.7. In NOL, has any vindictive action occurred against the families who return? في المنطقة (اسم المنطقة) هل حصل أي عمل انتقامي ضد العوائل العائدة؟

3.8. And against the families who stayed by the returnees? هل حصل أي عمل انتقامي للعوائل التي لم تنزح من قبل العائدين؟

3.9. And what about the displaced families who did not return, any of their property was damaged, demolished or arson? ماذا عن ممتلكات العوائل التي لم تعود, هل هي محطمة, مهدمة, محروقة

BLOCK 3: SOCIETY POLARIZATION (15 minutes)

1. In your opinion, until which extent would you say the community is getting dividing because of: من وجهة نظرك, الى اي مدى يمكنك ان تقول ان المجتمع سيقسم بسبب

1.1. Ethnic issues اسباب عرقية

1.2. Religious issues اسباب دينية

1.3. Tribal Issues اسباب عشائرية

2. Is there any other identity issue dividing the community here? هل هناك أي عوامل اخرى تؤدي الى انقسام في المجتمع, في المحافظة

3. In your opinion, will this division diminish or increase within the next 3 months? من وجهة نظرك, هل هذا التقسيم سوف يقل او يزيد في الاشهر الثلاثة القادمة

3.1. And within the next 3 to 12 months? ماذا عن الاشهر ال 3 الى 12 المقبلة؟

3.2. What about when the current displaced people return? ماذا عن عودة النازحين الحاليين؟

4. Is there any harassment to a specific group, either the ones living here or currently displaced?
هل هناك أي ممارسة تمييزية في مكان ضد مجموعة معينة من السكان في منطقته الاصل ، سواء تلك التي تعيش فيها أو منطقته التي نزلت اليها ؟
5. Is there any mechanism in place to prevent division among people within the community?
هل هناك أي آلية لمنع الانقسام
6. And to prevent tension between the people who stayed and the people who are returning?
ولمنع التوتر بين الناس الذين بقوا والناس الذين يودون العودة ؟
7. Do you think people are ready to compromise with members of other identity groups living here?
هل تعتقد أن الناس في المنطقة على استعداد لتقديم تنازلات مع أعضاء القوميات الأخرى التي تعيش هنا؟
- 7.1. What could be done to encourage this compromise?
في توقعك ما الذي ممكن فعله ليشجع على التسوية
- 7.2. Which actors would be the most appropriate to foster compromise?
ما هي الجهات الفاعلة التي ستكون الأنسب لتعزيز التسوية؟

المقابلات النوعية – دليل المُقابل (وقت المقابلة الفعلي 95 دقيقة)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MODERATOR تعليمات للشخص الذي سوف يجري المقابلة

- All questions conversational interviewing except if mentioned differently
- كل الاسئلة هي مقابلة حوارية ماعدا المذكور بصورة مختلفة
- Do not ask WHY? Question, rephrase into WHAT? Question
- لا تسأل لماذا , أعد صياغة السؤال الى ماذا ؟
- Do not give concrete examples even when PROBE needed
- لا تعطي امثله ملموسة حتى عندما يكون هناك حاجة الى توضيح

INTRODUCTION & GROUND RULES (5 minutes)

التعليمات , والقواعد الاساسية (5 دقائق)

- Hello, my name is _____. Thank you for participating with us in this project for IOM.
- اهلاً , اسمي هو , شكراً للاشتراك معنا في هذا المشروع مع المنظمة الدولية للهجرة .
- I am here to gather your what are differences between the families who have returned and those who have not returned yet in [NAME OF LOCATION]
- انا هنا لمعرفة رأيك في الاختلافات ما بين العوائل التي عادت الى منطقة الاصل (اسم الموقع) وتلك التي لم تعد بعد .
- There are no right or wrong answers. I encourage your honest feedback and opinions. All opinions are welcome!
- لا يوجد هناك اجابات خاطئة او اجابات صحيحة , انا اشجعك على اعطاء اراء صريحة , وكل الاراء مرحب بها .
- If you need a break at any time, please let me know, we can stop and continue after.
- اذا كنت بحاجة الى استراحة في اي وقت , لطفاً ابليني بذلك , يمكننا التوقف والاستمرار بعد حين

BLOCK 1: RETURN PROCESS (40 minutes)

الجزء الاول / عملية العوده

1. RETURNEES

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1.1. Here in NOL, do you know how many of the displaced families returned?
هل تعرف كم عدد العوائل التي رجعت الى الاماكن الاصلية ؟ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How many IDPs return?
كم عدد النازحين العائدين ؟ • When were they displaced?
متى نزحوا ؟ |
|--|---|

KI: Key Informant - NOL: Name of Location - NOGL Name of Governorate

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where were they displaced? من اين نزحوا • When did they start returning? متى بداءوا بالرجوع ؟
1.2. What are the reasons that attract people to come back? ماهي الاسباب التي دفعت النازحين الى الرجوع ؟	STANDARDIZE QUESTION, PROBE IN NO DIRECTING WAY ONLY (Potential moderator answer: "whatever it means to you") دقق في كلمه مستحيل الرجوع (شرح مفصل)
1.3. Was their return supported / facilitated ? هل عملية الرجوع كانت مدعومة ؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In which way? ماهي الطريقة ؟ • By who? من قبل ؟
1.4. Was the return forced? هل عملية الرجوع كانت بالقوة ؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In which way? ماهي الطريقة ؟ • By who? من قبل ؟
1.5. Did anyone try to stop their return? هل قام احد بمحاولة إيقاف عملية الرجوع ؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who?- Actors من هم ؟ • How? – Procedures وكيف كانت الاجراءات ؟
1.6. Was there any promise done to encourage the IDPs to return? هل هناك اي وعود تشجع النازحين للعودة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which promises? ماهي الوعود؟ • Who promised what? من الذي وعد؟ • Any economic incentive? هل هناك وعود اقتصاديه؟ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Who gave it? من اعطاها ؟ ○ How much? كم هي الكمية؟
1.6.1. Would you say these promises have been met? هل هذه الوعود نفذت؟	YES:: نعم <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How? كيف ○ When متى ○ By who? عن طريق من NO: لا

KI: Key Informant - NOL: Name of Location - NOGL Name of Governorate

¹² One Questionnaire was excluded after the data-cleaning process

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ When KI think they will be made? لماذا هو يفكر هكذا؟ ○ Why he thinks like that? لماذا هو يفكر هكذا؟
1.7. [ONLY IF "NO" in 1.6.1] What could happen if these promises are not met? ماذا سوف يحدث اذا لم تتفقد هذه الوعود؟	PROBE: Can you explain me more? ممكن شرح مفصل ؟
1.8. Did any particular issue in their place of displacement prompt their return? هل هناك اي مشكله معينه في منطقته الزوج تجبرهم على العوده ؟ اذا كان الجواب ب (لا)	
1.9. Who did the returnees get reassurance before coming back? من الذي يعطي الطمانينه للنازحين لمساعدتهم على العوده ؟	Add: اضعف <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is any specific figure in NOL playing a significant role in reassuring IDPs about their return? هل هناك شخص (جهة معينة) يلعب دور معين ليعطي النازحين الطمانينه للعودة الى مناطقهم ؟ • How is he/she doing it? كيف هو او هي (جهة معينة) تفعل ذلك ؟ • Which one? اي صنف من العائدين ؟
1.10. Are the returnees from any specific ethno, religious or tribal group? هل يوجد اي تصنيف للعائدين من ناحية (العرق، الدين، العشيرة) ؟	
1.11. Are there any families who stayed here while ISIS was occupying the area? هل يوجد اي من العوائل التي لم تنزح عندما اجتاحت داعش هذه المنطقة ؟	
(IF YES in Q 1.11) اذا الاجابة نعم	
1.12. How do you look at them? ماهي انطباعاتك عنهم ؟	
1.13. How do the returnees look at them? وماهي انطباع العائدين عليهم ؟	
2. IDPs	
2.1. And how about the people who did not return to NOL, how many people remain displaced? ماذا عن الناس الذين لم يرجعوا الى منطقة الاصل ؟ كم عدد الناس الذين مازالوا نازحين؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How many? كم عددهم ؟ • Where are they? اين هم الان ؟
2.2. What is preventing them to return? ما الذي يمنعهم من العودة ؟	

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2.3. Is there any specific group who are not returning to NOL? (IF NO SKIP TO 2.6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who is this group (ethno / religious / tribal/ etc.) ماهي هذه المجاميع ؟ (قومية , دينية , قبلية , الخ • What are the reasons? ماهي اسباب عدم العودة؟ • Related to historical context? هل للأمر علاقة باحداث تاريخية قديمة ؟
2.4. Have the demographics of NOL changed with this people not returning? هل تغيرت ديموغرافية المكان الاصل بسبب عدم عودة هذه المجاميع؟	
2.5. Is someone facilitating / supporting their return? هل يوجد شخص او جهة معينة قدمت الدعم لعملية العودة ؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who? من ؟ • How? كيف ؟
2.6. Is any specific actor stopping their return? هل هناك اشخاص معينين يمنعون عودتهم؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who? من ؟ • How? كيف ؟
2.7. Which factors need to be in place for them to come back? ما هي العوامل التي يجب ان تتوفر لتشجيع عملية الرجوع ؟	
IF ANY FAMILY STAYED IN THE LOCATION DURING ISIS (IF NOT GO TO 3) 2.8. How will the families who stay look at the IDPs when they come back? ماهي نظرت العوائل التي لم تنزح الى العائدين الى المنطقة ؟	افعال انتقامية , عدم ثقة , ... الخ (مثال ذلك). ما الذي يجعلك تفكر بهذه الطريقة ؟ • What makes you feel like that?
2.9. What will be the returnees' reaction? ماذا سيكون رد فعل العائدين ؟	افعال انتقامية , عدم ثقة , ... الخ (مثال ذلك). ما الذي يجعلك تفكر بهذه الطريقة ؟ • What makes you feel like that?
3. COMMUNITY	
3.1. In your opinion what is the role played by government authorities towards return? ما هو الدور الذي تلعبه الحكومة اتجاه العائدين ؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which one? اي منها ؟ • What is the reason? ما هو السبب ؟
3.1.1. And the local administration? والادارة المحلية	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which one? اي منها ؟ • What is the reason? ما هو السبب ؟
3.1.2. And the security actors? وممثلين الامن ؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which one? اي منها ؟ • What is the reason? ما هو السبب ؟
3.1.3. How about tribal leaders? ماذا عن قادة العشائر ؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which one? اي منها ؟ • What is the reason? ما هو السبب ؟
3.1.4. And religious authorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which one? اي منها ؟

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القادة او السلطات الدينية	• ما هو السبب؟ What is the reason?
4. INFORMATION ACCESS إمكانية الوصول الى المعلومات	
4.1. When it comes to the information given to the IDPs before returning concerning the possibility of returning, who did disseminate this information? من قام بنشر المعلومات المعطاة للنازحين قبل رجوعهم والمتعلقة باحتمالية رجوع النازحين؟	
4.2. How this information was disseminated? كيف تم نشر هذه المعلومات؟	• Channels ما هي الوسائل؟
4.3. The information disseminated, was it targeted to a specific group or accessible to everyone? هل هذه المعلومات تستهدف فئة معينة او تستهدف الجميع؟	IF SPECIFIC GROUP: • To whom لمن؟ • How كيف؟
4.4. Would you say the information the returnees received before coming back was complete? هل تستطيع القول ان المعلومات التي استلمت من قبل العائدين قبل رجوعهم كانت كاملة وواضحة؟	IF NOT: اذا كانت الاجابة لا: • What was missing? ما هو المعلومات الناقصة؟ • In which ways it differed from being accurate and truthful? بأي طريقة كانت هذه المعلومات غير دقيقة او غير واضحة؟
4.5. Was there any official campaign, message or communication carried out? هل كان هناك اي حملات دعائية رسمية، منشورات او اعلانات، طرق تواصل استخدمت؟	IF YES: اذا كانت الاجابة بنعم At which level? Local, governmental, etc. • على اي مستوى كانت؟ محلية؟ على مستوى المحافظات؟ الخ • Info about the campaign: channels, information given, etc. اعطي معلومات كافية عن الحملات الدعائية، الوسائل المستخدمة والمعلومات المعطاة

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	o ماذا كان السبب؟ What was the reason?
1.6 Was any displaced person prevented to return? هل تم منع اي شخص نازح من الرجوع؟	[IF YES] اذا الاجابة نعم • Reasons of rejection اسباب الرفض؟ • Who rejected them من الذي قام برفضهم؟ • Were the reasons reasonable هل ان الاسباب منطقية؟ • What makes the KI think like that? ما الذي يجعل مزودي المعلومات يفكرون هكذا؟
2 PERCEPTIONS التصورات	
2.1. The people who came back, how comfortable or uncomfortable do you think they feel in their place of return? الناس الذين عادوا، هل كانوا مرتاحين او غير مرتاحين، هل تعتقد بأنهم يشعرون بالراحة في مكان العودة؟	Answers: 1. Very comfortable جدا مريحة 2. Somewhat comfortable مريحة حذا ما 3. Not comfortable either uncomfortable لا مريح ولا غير مريح 4. Somewhat uncomfortable غير مريح لحد ما 5. Very uncomfortable غير مريح جدا
2.1.1. Do they fear any sort of reprisal? هل يشعرون بأي نوع من انواع الانتقام	• By who? من قام بذلك؟ • Of which kind? من اي نوع من انواع الانتقام؟ • Is there a precedent? هل هناك اي سوابق؟
2.1.2. Are the people who return satisfied or unsatisfied which their decision to return? هل العائدين راضين ام غير راضين على قرار عودتهم؟	Answers: 1. Very satisfied راضين جدا 2. Somewhat satisfied راضين لحد ما 3. Not satisfied either dissatisfied لا راضي ولا غير راضي 4. Somewhat dissatisfied غير راضين لحد ما 5. Very dissatisfied غير راضين ابدا

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2.1.3. Are some of the returnees planning to leave again? هل بعض من العائدين خططوا للمغادرة مرة أخرى؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What are the reasons? ما هي اسباب المغادرة؟
2.2. And the people who stayed, how comfortable or uncomfortable they are seeing the returnees back? والناس الذين بقوا, كيف كانوا مرتاحين او غير مرتاحين, ماهو رأيهم عن الناس العائدين؟	<p>Answers:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Very comfortable</i> راضين جدا 2. <i>Somewhat comfortable</i> راضين لحد ما 3. <i>Not comfortable either uncomfortable</i> لا راضي ولا غير راضي 4. <i>Somewhat uncomfortable</i> غير راضين لحد ما 5. <i>Very uncomfortable</i> غير راضين ابدا
2.3 What about the people who did not return, do you think they fear any sort of reprisal if they return? ماذا عن الناس الذين لم يعودوا, هل تعتقد انهم يخافون من اي نوع من الانتقام اذا عادوا؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IF YES اذا نعم • Of which kind? [STANDARDIZE QUESTION] - (اي نوع؟) (سؤال موحد) • What makes them think like that? - ما الذي يجعلهم يفكرون هكذا؟ • Does the KI think their perception is accurate? - هل ان مزودي المعلومات يعتقدون بأن ادراكهم دقيق؟ • What makes the KI think like that? - ما الذي يجعل مزود المعلومات يفكر هكذا؟
3 COMMUNITY TENSIONS AND VINDICATIVE ACTIONS	
3.1 Was there any competition among leaders to control political posts or real estate market? هل هناك أي توتر (مشاكل) للمشاركة بالسياسة؟	<p>اذا نعم: [IF YES]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What happened? ماذا حصل؟ • Between who? بين من؟ • How the KI labels the incident (rivalry between families, tribes, ethnic or religious groups, etc.) كيف تصف هذا الخلاف (منافسة بين العوائل, العشائر, الاختلاف بالقومية او المجاميع الدينية)؟
3.2 Any tension related to compensation of victims? هل هناك مشاكل بخصوص تعويض الضحايا؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What happened? ماذا حصل؟ • Between who? بين من؟
3.3 Any tensions related to ownership of land and property? هل هناك خلافات بخصوص ملكية الاراضي والممتلكات؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What happened? ماذا حصل؟ • Between who? بين من؟
3.4 Is there any illegal use of private or government properties? هل هناك اي استغلال غير قانوني للممتلكات الخاصة او الحكومية	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What happened? ماذا حصل • Who is involved? من المشترك

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3.5 What are other sources of tension affecting NOL population? ماهي مصادر التوتر الاخرى التي تؤثر على سكان المنطقة؟	ماهي مصادر التوتر الاخرى التي تؤثر على سكان المنطقة
3.6 Did violence augmented since the returnee families started to go back? هل ازداد العنف منذ بدء العوائل النازحة بالرجوع الى سكنهم الاصلي؟	
3.7 In NOL, has any vindictive action occurred against the families who return? في المنطقة (اسم المنطقة) هل حصل أي عمل انتقامي ضد العوائل العائدة؟	<p>اذا نعم: [IF YES]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What? ماذا حصل؟ • Against who? ضد من؟ • By who? من قبل من؟ • Have the perpetrators been identified / charged? هل تم القبض على الفاعلين؟
3.8 And against the families who stayed by the returnees? هل حصل أي عمل انتقامي للعوائل التي لم تنزح من قبل العائدين؟	<p>اذا نعم: [IF YES]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What? ماذا حصل؟ • Against who? ضد من؟ • By who? من قبل من؟ • Have the perpetrators been identified / charged? هل تم القبض على الفاعلين؟
3.9 And what about the displaced families who did not return, any of their property was damaged, demolished or arson? ماذا عن ممتلكات العوائل التي لم تعود, هل هي مدممة, محروقة	<p>اذا نعم: [IF YES]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What? ماذا حصل؟ • Against who? ضد من؟ • By who? من قبل من؟ • Have the perpetrators been identified / charged? هل تم القبض على الفاعلين؟

BLOCK 3 SOCIETY POLARIZATION (15 minutes) الانقسامات في المجتمع	
1. In your opinion, until which extent would you say the community is getting dividing because of من وجهة نظرك, الى اي مدى يمكنك ان تقول ان المجتمع سيقسم بسبب	Answers:
1.1. Ethnic issues اسباب عرقية	1. <i>Extremely</i> كثيرا جدا
1.2. Religious issues اسباب دينية	2. <i>Very</i> كثيرا
1.3. Tribal Issues اسباب عشائرية	3. <i>Moderately</i> نوعا ما
	4. <i>Slightly</i> قليلا
	5. <i>Not at all</i> ابدا
	REASON: _____

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2. Is there any other identity issue dividing the community here? هل هناك أي عوامل أخرى تؤدي إلى انقسام في المجتمع في المحافظة	[IF YES] إذا الإجابة نعم • KI to explain which one? واحدة؟ اجعل مقدم المعلومات يجيب أي واحدة
3. In your opinion, will this division diminish or increase within the next 3 months? من وجهة نظرك , هل هذا التقسيم سوف يقل أو يزيد في الأشهر الثلاثة القادمة	• What makes the KI think like that ما الشيء الذي يجعل مقدم المعلومات يفكر في هذا الشيء
3.1. And within the next 3 to 12 months? 12 إلى 3 ماذا عن الأشهر الـ 3 إلى 12 المقبلة؟	• What makes the KI think like that ما الشيء الذي يجعل مقدم المعلومات يفكر في هذا الشيء
3.2. What about when the current displaced people return? ماذا عن عودة النازحين الحاليين	• What makes the KI think like that? ما الشيء الذي يجعل مقدم المعلومات يفكر في هذا الشيء
4. Is there any harassment to a specific group, either the ones living here or currently displaced? هل هناك أي ممارسة تمييزية في مكان ضد مجموعة معينة من السكان في منطقة الاصل ، سواء تلك التي تعيش فيها أو منطقة التي نزحت إليها ؟	[IF YES] إذا الإجابة نعم • Which practice? ما هي الممارسة؟ • Since when? منذ متى؟ • Affecting who? تؤثر على من؟ • By whom? بواسطة من؟
5. Is there any mechanism in place to prevent division among people within the community? هل هناك أي آلية لمنع الانقسام	[IF YES] إذا الإجابة نعم • Which one? أي واحد؟ • Who is implementing it? من ينفذ ذلك؟ • Preventing polarization between which groups? منع الانقسام بين الجماعات؟
6. And to prevent tension between the people who stayed and the people who are returning? ولمنع التوتر بين الناس الذين بقوا والناس الذين يودون العودة ؟	[IF YES] إذا الإجابة نعم • Which one? أي واحد؟ • Who is implementing it? من ينفذ ذلك؟ •

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7. Do you think people are ready to compromise with members of other identity groups living here? هل تعتقد أن الناس في المنطقه على استعداد لتقديم تنازلات مع أعضاء القوميات الأخرى التي تعيش هنا؟	• What makes the KI think like that ما الشيء الذي يجعل مقدم المعلومات يفكر في هذا الشيء
7.1. What could be done to encourage this compromise? في توقعك ما الذي ممكن فعله ليشجع على التسويه	
7.2. Which actors would be the most appropriate to foster compromise? ما هي الجهات الفاعلة التي ستكون الأنسب لتعزيز التسوية؟	• For each actor: لكل الجهات: • What are the reasons? ما هي الأسباب؟ • In which way could it be involved? ما هي الطريقة التي سوف تشارك في ذلك؟


CLOSURE (5 minutes)

Mr. / Ms. XXX, thank you very much for your interaction. I apologize for taking long time. I hope we meet again in next opportunities.

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Obstacles to Return¹³ in retaken areas

8 Case Studies



¹³ Due to the limitations of the sample size and distribution, only information on these four ethno-religious groups can be reliably tabulated. Other ethno-religious groups have therefore been excluded from the ethno-religious comparisons throughout the report.

Annex 4: Detailed survey sample ¹⁴

		Ninewa		Salah al-Din	Kirkuk	Diyala		Baghdad		TOTAL
		Sinjar	Zummar	Tikrit	Multaqa	Jalawla	Mansouriya	Khan Dari	Sab'a Al Bour	
IDP	Arab Shia Muslim	0	0	1	1	6	5	1	94	108
	Arab Sunni Muslim	22	4	135	97	88	55	92	27	520
	Kurd Sunni Muslim	88	75	0	0	0	0	0	0	163
	Kurd Yazidi	79	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	84
	Turkmen Shia Muslim	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	Turkmen Sunni Muslim	4	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	7
	Shabak Sunni Muslim	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	Assyrian Christian	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	Chaldean Christian	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Refuse to respond	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	12
	Total	193	84	136	104	96	60	93	133	899
RETURNEE	Arab Shia Muslim	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	49	56
	Arab Sunni Muslim	0	40	68	63	46	51	63	15	346
	Kurd Shia Muslim	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
	Kurd Sunni Muslim	0	27	0	0	16	0	0	0	43
	Kurd Yazidi	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50
	Turkmen Sunni Muslim	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	3
	Total	51	67	68	63	71	52	63	65	500

		Origin Location																	
		Nineva				Kirkuk		Salah Al-Din		Diyala				Bagdad					
		Zummar		Sinjar		Multaqa		Tikrit		Jalawla		Mansouriya		Sab'a Al Bour		Khan Dari		TOTAL	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
IDPs in the provinces of	Duhok	18	66	43	150	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	61	216
	Erbil	–	–	–	–	–	–	9	81	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	9	81
	Kirkuk	–	–	–	–	24	80	13	33	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	37	113
	Diyala	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	19	77	11	49	–	–	–	–	30	126
	Baghdad	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	29	104	22	71	51	175
	Total IDPs	18	66	43	150	24	80	22	114	19	77	11	49	29	104	22	71	188	711
RETURNEEs		7	60	11	40	11	52	12	56	13	58	17	35	16	49	14	49	101	399

		Case Origin							
RESPONDENT FAMILY STATUS		Jalawla	Khan Dari	Mansouriya	Multaqa	Sab'a Al Bour	Sinjar	Tikrit	Zummar
IDP	Head of household	93.8%	100.0%	93.3%	70.19%	95.5%	89.6%	95.6%	88.1%
	Other members	1.0%	0.0%	3.3%	1.92%	.8%	0.0%	0.0%	6.0%
	Sons/daughters	1.0%	0.0%	1.7%	4.81%	2.3%	5.2%	2.9%	4.8%
	Spouse	4.2%	0.0%	1.7%	12.50%	1.5%	5.2%	1.5%	1.2%
	Refused to respond	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	10.58%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Count	96	93	60	104	133	193	136	84
RETURNEE	Head of household	84.5%	100.0%	100.0%	88.9%	96.9%	76.5%	70.6%	82.1%
	Other members	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%
	Sons/daughters	11.3%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	3.1%	3.9%	17.6%	14.9%
	Spouse	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	19.6%	11.8%	1.5%
	Count	71	63	52	63	65	51	68	67

¹⁴ Interviewed returnees to Markaz Sinjar selected NA when assessing tribal and religious leaders since they said they have not permanently returned to the area.

		Case Origin							
LEVEL OF EDUCATION		Jalawla	Khan Dari	Mansouriya	Multaqa	Sab'a Al Bour	Sinjar	Tikrit	Zummar
IDP	Complete high-school	3.1%	4.3%	5.0%	1.0%	2.3%	2.6%	7.4%	4.8%
	Complete primary school	27.1%	19.4%	21.7%	24.0%	51.9%	21.2%	15.4%	19.0%
	Complete secondary	1.0%	1.1%	6.7%	1.9%	3.8%	3.6%	5.1%	6.0%
	Illiterate (doesn't read and write)	5.2%	60.2%	10.0%	23.1%	9.8%	43.0%	9.6%	34.5%
	Incomplete high-school	5.2%	1.1%	3.3%	1.9%	2.3%	4.1%	3.7%	2.4%
	Incomplete primary school	19.8%	6.5%	16.7%	22.1%	6.0%	9.8%	8.1%	11.9%
	Incomplete secondary	9.4%	2.2%	11.7%	9.6%	15.8%	6.7%	7.4%	7.1%
	Post-graduate-level education (such as Master's or Ph.D.)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.0%
	Reads and writes (traditional education)	25.0%	3.2%	18.3%	5.8%	0.0%	2.6%	2.9%	4.8%
	Some university-level education, without degree	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	2.3%	1.6%	6.6%	0.0%
	University-level education, with degree	4.2%	2.2%	5.0%	9.6%	6.0%	4.7%	30.9%	9.5%
	Refuse to respond	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Count	96	93	60	104	133	193	136	84
RETURNEE	Complete high-school	11.3%	6.3%	11.5%	3.2%	3.1%	2.0%	30.9%	6.0%
	Complete primary school	33.8%	30.2%	30.8%	27.0%	61.5%	7.8%	4.4%	31.3%
	Complete secondary	15.5%	0.0%	11.5%	6.3%	6.2%	5.9%	4.4%	10.4%
	Illiterate (doesn't read and write)	9.9%	33.3%	5.8%	17.5%	3.1%	45.1%	1.5%	13.4%
	Incomplete high-school	2.8%	1.6%	0.0%	1.6%	1.5%	5.9%	10.3%	6.0%
	Incomplete primary school	9.9%	19.0%	5.8%	11.1%	10.8%	3.9%	0.0%	4.5%
	Incomplete secondary	4.2%	3.2%	5.8%	15.9%	7.7%	2.0%	1.5%	4.5%
	Post-graduate-level education (such as Master's or Ph.D.)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	1.5%
	Reads and writes (traditional education)	1.4%	3.2%	11.5%	6.3%	0.0%	27.5%	0.0%	3.0%
	Some university-level education, without degree	1.4%	0.0%	1.9%	3.2%	1.5%	0.0%	7.4%	0.0%
	University-level education, with degree	9.9%	3.2%	15.4%	7.9%	4.6%	0.0%	38.2%	17.9%
	Refuse to respond	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%
	Count	71	63	52	63	65	51	68	67

		Case Origin							
EMPLOYMENT STATUS		Jalawla	Khan Dari	Mansouriya	Multaqa	Sab'a Al Bour	Sinjar	Tikrit	Zummar
IDP	Employed full time	10.4%	3.2%	16.7%	11.5%	8.3%	16.6%	9.6%	20.2%
	Employed part-time at more than one job	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	3.8%	.8%	.5%	0.0%	0.0%
	Employed part-time at one job	3.1%	11.8%	6.7%	3.8%	3.8%	2.1%	4.4%	0.0%
	Housewife	12.5%	17.2%	13.3%	9.6%	18.8%	17.6%	10.3%	16.7%
	Retired	6.3%	9.7%	8.3%	14.4%	7.5%	2.6%	33.1%	3.6%
	Self-employed	47.9%	37.6%	43.3%	20.2%	54.9%	30.1%	16.2%	26.2%
	Student	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	.8%	1.0%	0.0%	1.2%
	Unemployed, looking for work	9.4%	17.2%	3.3%	19.2%	2.3%	18.7%	19.9%	22.6%
	Unemployed, not looking for work	10.4%	2.2%	6.7%	17.3%	3.0%	10.4%	6.6%	9.5%
	Refused/don't know	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Count		96	93	60	104	133	193	136	84
RETURNEE	Employed full time	15.5%	6.3%	11.5%	11.1%	7.7%	3.9%	42.6%	29.9%
	Employed part-time at more than one job	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%
	Employed part-time at one job	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	6.2%	3.9%	1.5%	1.5%
	Housewife	15.5%	22.2%	30.8%	9.5%	16.9%	23.5%	4.4%	14.9%
	Retired	14.1%	3.2%	1.9%	6.3%	7.7%	2.0%	27.9%	6.0%
	Self-employed	0.0%	61.9%	46.2%	49.2%	41.5%	17.6%	11.8%	22.4%
	Student	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%
	Unemployed, looking for work	45.1%	3.2%	5.8%	9.5%	6.2%	45.1%	8.8%	16.4%
	Unemployed, not looking for work	2.8%	3.2%	3.8%	9.5%	13.8%	3.9%	2.9%	1.5%
	Refused/don't know	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%
Count		71	63	52	63	65	51	68	67

		Case Origin							
HOUSEHOLD INCOME		Jalawla	Khan Dari	Mansouriya	Multaqa	Sab'a Al Bour	Sinjar	Tikrit	Zummar
IDP	We are able to buy only basic products	56.3%	32.3%	58.3%	66.3%	42.1%	75.1%	57.4%	75.0%
	We are able to buy some more expensive goods, but should save on other things	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%
	We are able to buy what is necessary, but we cannot afford more expensive goods	17.7%	3.2%	21.7%	8.7%	8.3%	1.6%	18.4%	7.1%
	We can afford almost whatever we want	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	.7%	0.0%
	We do not have enough money for the basic needs	26.0%	64.5%	20.0%	14.4%	49.6%	23.3%	17.6%	17.9%
	Refuse to respond	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Count	96	93	60	104	133	193	136	84
RETURNEE	We are able to buy only basic products	80.3%	36.5%	46.2%	61.9%	40.0%	27.5%	61.8%	32.8%
	We are able to buy some more expensive goods, but should save on other things	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.0%
	We are able to buy what is necessary, but we cannot afford more expensive goods	2.8%	6.3%	19.2%	30.2%	15.4%	5.9%	30.9%	23.9%
	We can afford almost whatever we want	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	1.5%	0.0%	1.5%	17.9%
	We do not have enough money for the basic needs	15.5%	57.1%	34.6%	3.2%	43.1%	66.7%	5.9%	16.4%
	Count	71	63	52	63	65	51	68	67

Survey – Returnees¹ (15)

QUESTIONNAIRE TRACKING	
Questionnaire number:	رقم استمارة الاستبيان
Interviewer name:	اسم الشخص الذي يقابل
Team:	الفريق
Interview date:	تأريخ المقابلة
District of origin: القضاء الأصلي	
Sub-district origin:	مركز الناحية
Rural / Urban:	
Interviewee Name:	اسم الشخص الذي يتم مقابله
Interviewee Telephone:	رقم الهاتف الشخص الذي يتم مقابله
Interviewee Address:	عنوان الشخص الذي يتم مقابله
Rating:	التقدير

RETURNEES			
1. When were you displaced?	متى نزحت؟	• MM / YY	الشهر / السنة
2. Where were you displaced?		Sub-district / camp	District Governorate

¹ Family is considered the sampling unit of the survey. Family is composed by those members who were living together before displacement

محافظة	منطقة	ناحية / مخيم	اين نزحت؟
3. Did all your family flee together?		• Yes / No	هل نرح جميع اعضاء اسرتك؟
3.1. If not, who did stay?		All that apply • Minor female (-15) • Minor male (-15) • Spouse • Elder male (+60) • Elder female (+60)	أذا كلا، من الذي بقي؟
4. When did you come back?		• MM/YY	متى رجعت؟
5. Did all your family return?		• Yes / No	هل عاد جميع أعضاء أسرتك؟
5.1. If yes, all at the same time?		• Yes • No, only the HoH first • No, men first • No, women and children first • Other: _____	أذا نعم، هل عادو في الوقت نفسه؟
5.2. If no, who did stay displaced?		All that apply: • Minor female (-15) • Minor male (-15) • Spouse • Elder male (+60)	أذا كلا، من الذي بقي نازحاً؟

¹⁵ Returnees' assessment of the militias' role is not applicable since returns have taken place to areas under the control of the local tribal mobilization force where no militia operates.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elder female (+60) <p>كل ما ينطبق</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> القاصرة القاصر الزوج/ الزوجة الرجال الأكبر عمرا النساء الأكبر عمرا
5.2.1. What was the reason? ماذا كان السبب؟	
6. The decision to return was a قرار العودة كان قراراً ...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Personal decision Spouse decision Family decision Tribal decision Community decision Other: ____ <p>قرار شخصي</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> قرار الزوج/ الزوجة قرار الأسرة قرار العشيرة قرار الجماعة اخر (حدد) _____
7. What was the main / second reason –rank - that attract you to come back? ما كان السبب الرئيسي/ السبب الثاني (ترتيب) الذي دفعك الى العودة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security in the area of origin Ongoing fight / Lack of security in displacement Availability of jobs in area of origin Lack of economic opportunities (jobs) in displacement Availability of services in area of origin Difficulty to pay rent in displacement Difficult to adapt to new environment (rural / urban) Harassment in displacement Fear of revenge acts in displacement Missing home

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Other <p>الحالة الامنية في المكان الاصلي</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> المعارك المستمرة, انعدام الامن في منطقة النزوح وجود فرص عمل في المكان الاصلي انعدام فرص العمل في منطقة النزوح وجود الخدمات في المكان الاصلي صعوبة دفع الايجار في منطقة النزوح صعوبة التكيف مع البيئة الجديدة (الريفية/ الحضرية) التحديات في منطقة النزوح الخوف من افعال الانتقام في منطقة النزوح افتقاد/ الاشتياق الى البيت اخر (حدد) _____
8. Was your return supported? هل كانت عملية عودتك مدعومة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes / No <p>نعم/ كلا</p>
8.1. If yes, by... اذا نعم, من قبل...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Family / relatives / friends Government of Iraq / Provincial council KRG ISF Peshmerga Asayish Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Which one? Tribal Leaders Local Authorities (Mukthar / Mayor / etc.) Religious leaders Local NGOs International NGOs / IOs Civil Society Activist Other _____ <p>الأسرة/ الاقرباء/ الاصدقاء</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> الحكومة العراقية حكومة اقليم كردستان القوات الامنية العراقية

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية • المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية/ المنظمات الدولية • اخر (حدد)
8.2. If yes, how?	أذا نعم, كيف؟	<p>ت</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitating the records check • Transportation offered to return • Households rebuilt • Job offered • Financial assistance offered • Moral support • Other
9. Was the return forced?	هل كانت عملية العودة باكراه؟	<p>نعم/ كلا</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • YES / NO
9.1. If yes, by...	اذا نعم, من قبل...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family / relatives / friends • Government of Iraq • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • Local NGOs • International NGOs / IOs • Community of origin
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community of displacement • Other _____ • الأسرة/ الاقرباء/ الاصدقاء • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كوردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية • المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية/ المنظمات الدولية • المجتمع الاصلي • مجتمع النازحين • اخر (حدد)
9.2. If yes, how?	أذا نعم, كيف؟	<p>((</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evicted by the government / provincial council from place of displacement • Prevented from receiving MoMD cards • Increased screen checking and finger print • Stopping assistance received in displacement • Discrimination by the Host Community • Other
10. Did anyone try to stop your return?	هل حاول احد ايقاف عملية عودتك؟	<p>نعم/ كلا</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • YES / NO
10.1. If yes, who?	اذا نعم, من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family / relatives / friends • Government of Iraq • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asayish • Militias • Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • ISIS • Community of origin • Community of displacement • Other _____ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الأسرة/ الاقرباء/ الاصدقاء • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا ▪ اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • داعش • المجتمع الاصلي • مجتمع النازحين • اخر (حدد) _____
10.2.	If yes, how?	اذا نعم, كيف؟ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delay in processing return by authorities • Stop in checkpoint • Name included in blacklist • Other _____ 	تأخير السلطات في معالجة عملية العودة الوقوف في نقاط التفتيش وجود الاسم في قائمة السوداء اخر (حدد) _____

11. Did your records get checked?	هل تم التحقق من سجلك؟	• Yes / No	نعم/ كلا
11.1. If yes, by who?	اذا نعم, من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Which one? • Local Authorities • Tribal leaders • Other 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الشرطة • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا • اي منهم؟ • السلطات المحلية • قادة العشائر • اخر (حدد) _____
12. Did anyone try to encourage your return by means of promises?	هل حاول احد تشجيعك على العودة بأي طريقة؟	• YES / NO	نعم/ كلا
12.1. If yes, of which kind?	اذا نعم, بأي طريقة؟	All that apply <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic compensation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ How much? • Security in the area • Provision of services • Return to previous job • Start a new job / employment opportunity • Agriculture grants • Cleaning of UXOs / IEDs / rubble • Other _____ 	كل ما ينطبق

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • التعويض المادي • ما هي الكمية؟ (بالدينار العراقي) • الأمان في المنطقة • توفير الخدمات • العودة إلى العمل السابق • المنح الزراعية • تنظيم المنطقة من الذخائر الغير منفجرة • اخر (حدد) _____
12.2.	If yes, who? إذا نعم, من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family / friends / relatives • Government of Iraq • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • Local NGOs • International NGOs / IOs • Civil Society Activist • Other _____ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الأسرة/ الاقرباء/ الاصدقاء • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا • اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية • المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية/ المنظمات الدولية • اخر (حدد) _____
12.3.	If yes, have these promises been met? إذا نعم, هل نفذت هذه الوعود؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No <p>نعم/ كلا</p>
12.3.1.	If not, do you think they will be met? إذا كلا, هل تعتقد بان هذه الوعود سوف تنفذ؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No <p>نعم/ كلا</p>
13.	From who did you get reassurance before coming back? من الذي اعطاكم الطمأنينة للعودة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family / relatives / friends • Government of Iraq • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • Local NGOs • International NGOs / IOs • Other returnees • Community of origin • Other _____ • No one <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الأسرة/ الاقرباء/ الاصدقاء • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا • اي منهم؟

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية • المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية/ المنظمات الدولية • المجتمع الاصلي • اخر (حدد) • لا احد
14. How comfortable did you feel here before the displacement? الى اي مدى كنت مرتاحاً قبل النزوح؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very comfortable • Somewhat comfortable • Not comfortable either uncomfortable • Somewhat uncomfortable • Very uncomfortable • مرتاح جداً • مرتاح الى حد ما • لست مرتاحاً و لست متضايقاً • الى حد ما, غير مرتاح • جداً, غير مرتاح
15. And in the place where you were displaced? وفي المكان الذي نزحت منه؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very comfortable • Somewhat comfortable • Not comfortable either uncomfortable • Somewhat uncomfortable • Very uncomfortable • مرتاح جداً • مرتاح الى حد ما • لست مرتاحاً و لست متضايقاً • الى حد ما, غير مرتاح • جداً, غير مرتاح
16. And here now? وهنا الان؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very comfortable • Somewhat comfortable • Not comfortable either uncomfortable • Somewhat uncomfortable

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very uncomfortable • مرتاح جداً • مرتاح الى حد ما • لست مرتاحاً و لست متضايقاً • الى حد ما, غير مرتاح • جداً, غير مرتاح
17. How satisfied are you with your decision to return? الى اي مدى انت راض من قرار عودتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Somewhat satisfied • Not satisfied either dissatisfied • Somewhat dissatisfied • Very dissatisfied • راض جداً • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما, غير راض • جداً غير راض
18. Before the displacement, did you face any harassment / discrimination in your place of origin? هل تعرضت الى المضايقة/ التمييز في المكان الاصلي؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No / I don't know • نعم/ كلا/ لا اعلم
18.1. Which sort? اي شكل؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to religion • Due to ethnicity • Due to tribal affiliation • Due to political affiliation • Gender-based • Mistreatment by the Host Community • Other
18.2. By who? من قبل من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Representative of the Local Authorities in displacement • Gol • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias

	<p>Which one?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • Other community groups • Own community group • Other _____ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ممثلي السلطات المحلية في منطقة النزوح • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا • اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • جماعات من مجتمعات اخرى • جماعة من المجتمع الاصلي • اخر (حدد)
19. And while in displacement, did you face any harassment / discrimination while in displacement? هل تعرضت الى المضايقة/ التمييز خلال النزوح؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No 	نعم/ كلا
19.1. Which sort? اي شكل؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to religion • Due to ethnicity • Due to tribal affiliation • Due to political affiliation • Gender-based • Mistreatment by the Host Community • Other 	
19.2. By who? من قبل من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Host community • Representative of the Local Authorities in displacement • Gol 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • Other _____ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • المجتمع المضيف • ممثلي السلطات المحلية في منطقة النزوح • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا • اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • اخر (حدد)
20. What about now, are you facing any sort of harassment / discrimination here in your location? هل تتعرض الان الى اي انواع المضايقات/ التمييز في مكانك الحالي؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No 	نعم/ كلا
20.1. Which sort? اي شكل؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to religion • Due to ethnicity • Due to tribal affiliation • Due to political affiliation • Gender-based • Mistreatment by the Host Community • Other 	

20.2. By who? من قبل من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Host community • Representative of the Local Authorities in displacement • Gol • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • Other _____
21. Are you or some member of your family planning to leave again? هل تخطت انت او اي من افراد اسرتك للسفر مرة اخرى؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No
21.1. If yes, what is the reason? اذا نعم, ما هو السبب؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of security • Lack of economic opportunities • Discrimination / harassment

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of services • Property destroyed • Lack of trust to the actors in control of the area • Fear of ISIS return • Other _____
22. Do you fear any sort of reprisal or act against you or any of your family members? هل تخاف اي نوع من الانتقام او افعال ضدك او ضد اي فرد من اسرتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • No • I don't know / refused to answer
22.1. If yes, by who? اذا نعم, من قبل من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stayees • Government of Iraq • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • ISIS • Other _____

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> اي منهم؟ قادة العشائر السلطات المحلية القيادات الدينية داعش اخر (حدد) _____
23. Have any of your properties been damaged / occupied since the last crisis? هل تضررت / احتلت اي من الممتلكاتك منذ الأزمة السابقة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes / No / I don't know <p>نعم / كلا / لا اعلم</p>
23.1. If yes, was it... اذا نعم، هل كانت؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Damaged due to conflict Demolished IEDs Arson Airstrike Illegally used Other _____ <p>تضررت بسبب النزاع</p> <p>هدم</p> <p>العبوات الناسفة</p> <p>الحرق</p> <p>استخدمت استخدام غير قانوني</p> <p>اخر (حدد) _____</p>
23.2. By who? من قبل من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stayees ISIS People from the community currently displaced Government of Iraq KRG ISF Peshmerga Asayish Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Which one? Tribal Leaders
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local Authorities Religious leaders ISIS Other _____ I don't know <p>الباقون</p> <p>داعش</p> <p>الناس من المجتمع الذين نزحوا حالياً</p> <p>الحكومة العراقية</p> <p>حكومة اقليم كردستان</p> <p>القوات الامنية العراقية</p> <p>قوات البشمركة</p> <p>قوات الميليشيا</p> <p>اي منهم؟</p> <p>قادة العشائر</p> <p>السلطات المحلية</p> <p>القيادات الدينية</p> <p>داعش</p> <p>اخر (حدد) _____</p> <p>لا اعلم</p>
24. How comfortable do you feel being around the people who stayed here during the crisis? الى اي مدى تشعر بالراحة لوجودك بين الناس الذين و لم ينزحوا خلال الازمة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very comfortable Somewhat comfortable Not comfortable either uncomfortable Somewhat uncomfortable Very uncomfortable Not applicable <p>مرتاح جداً</p> <p>مرتاح الى حد ما</p> <p>لست مرتاحاً و لست متضايقاً</p> <p>الى حد ما، غير مرتاح</p> <p>جداً، غير مرتاح</p>
25. And around the rest of returnees? و لوجودك بين الآخرين من العائدين؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very comfortable Somewhat comfortable

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not comfortable either uncomfortable • Somewhat uncomfortable • Very uncomfortable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • مرتاح جداً • مرتاح إلى حد ما • لست مرتاحاً و لست متضايقاً • إلى حد ما , غير مرتاح • جداً , غير مرتاح
26. And when the rest of families who are now displaced come back? و حين عودة باقي العوائل النازحة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very comfortable • Somewhat comfortable • Not comfortable either uncomfortable • Somewhat uncomfortable • Very uncomfortable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • مرتاح جداً • مرتاح إلى حد ما • لست مرتاحاً و لست متضايقاً • إلى حد ما , غير مرتاح • جداً , غير مرتاح

PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

27. How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with role the government is playing in your area of origin? الى اي مدى انت راض او غير راض عن دور الذي تقوم به الحكومة في منطقتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جداً • راض إلى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • إلى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
28. And the local authorities? و السلطات المحلية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جداً • راض إلى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • إلى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
29. KRG (when applicable)? حكومة اقليم كردستان (عند الاقتضاء)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جداً • راض إلى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • إلى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
30. ISF? القوات الامنية العراقية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جداً • راض إلى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • إلى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
31. And Peshmerga?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied راض جدا راض الى حد ما لست راض و لست غير راض الى حد ما , غير راض جداً غير راض
32. Asayish?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very satisfied Satisfied Not satisfied either unsatisfied Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied راض جدا راض الى حد ما لست راض و لست غير راض الى حد ما , غير راض جداً غير راض
33. Militia controlling your area now? قوات الميليشيا التي تسيطر على منطقتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very satisfied Satisfied Not satisfied either unsatisfied Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied راض جدا راض الى حد ما لست راض و لست غير راض الى حد ما , غير راض جداً غير راض
34. Tribal leaders in your area? قادة العشائر في منطقتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very satisfied Satisfied Not satisfied either unsatisfied Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied راض جدا

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> راض الى حد ما لست راض و لست غير راض الى حد ما , غير راض جداً غير راض
35. Religious authorities in your area? السلطات الدينية في منطقتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very satisfied Satisfied Not satisfied either unsatisfied Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied راض جدا راض الى حد ما لست راض و لست غير راض الى حد ما , غير راض جداً غير راض
36. IOs and INGOs? المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية/ المنظمات الدولية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very satisfied Satisfied Not satisfied either unsatisfied Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied راض جدا راض الى حد ما لست راض و لست غير راض الى حد ما , غير راض جداً غير راض
37. Local NGOs? المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very satisfied Satisfied Not satisfied either unsatisfied Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied راض جدا راض الى حد ما لست راض و لست غير راض الى حد ما , غير راض

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما, غير راض • جداً غير راض
35. Religious authorities in your area? السلطات الدينية في منطقتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما, غير راض • جداً غير راض
36. IOs and INGOs? المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية/ المنظمات الدولية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما, غير راض • جداً غير راض
37. Local NGOs? المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما, غير راض • جداً غير راض

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • جداً غير راض
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SOCIETY POLARIZATION الاستقطاب المجتمع		
38. In your opinion, in this sub-district until which extent would you say the community is getting dividing because of ethnic issues? برأيك, الى اي مدى تعتقد بان المجتمع ينقسم بسبب وجود مشاكل عرقية في مركز الناحية التي تعيش فيه؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely • Very • Moderately • Slightly • Not at all 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • للغاية • جداً • بشكل معتدل • قليلاً • على الاطلاق
39. And because of religious issues? ولاسباب دينية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely • Very • Moderately • Slightly • Not at all 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • للغاية • جداً • بشكل معتدل • قليلاً • على الاطلاق
40. And because of tribal issues? لاسباب متعلقة بالعشيرة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely • Very • Moderately • Slightly • Not at all 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • للغاية • جداً • بشكل معتدل

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> قليلًا على الإطلاق
41. Within the next 3 months, will tension in the area? هل سوف () التوتر في المنطقة في ثلاث أشهر القادمة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase a lot Increase slightly Not increase either decrease Decrease slightly Decrease a lot I don't know / refused to answer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> يزداد كثيراً يزداد قليلاً لا يزداد و لا ينخفض ينخفض قليلاً ينخفض كثيراً
42. And within the next 3 to 12 months? و في ثلاث الى اثنا عشر أشهر قادمة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase a lot Increase slightly Not increase either decrease Decrease slightly Decrease a lot I don't know / refused to answer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> يزداد كثيراً يزداد قليلاً لا يزداد و لا ينخفض ينخفض قليلاً ينخفض كثيراً
43. Do you think that returns will contribute to tension or will ease it? هل تعتقد بأن العائدون سوف يساهمون في زيادة التوتر او الحد منه؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contribute a lot contribute slightly Not contribute either ease Ease slightly Ease a lot I don't know / refused to answer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> يساهمون كثيراً يساهمون قليلاً لا يساهمون و لا يسهلون

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> يسهلون قليلاً يسهلون كثيراً
44. Which actor do you think is the most appropriate to foster cohesion among the communities living here? باعتقادك، أي من الجهات الفاعلة هي الانسب لتحقيق التماسك بين المجتمعات الذين يعيشون هنا؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local Authorities Tribal leaders Religious leaders Security actors KRG Gol Local NGOs IOs / INGOs International Security Actors Civil Society Activist Other <ul style="list-style-type: none"> السلطات المحلية قادة العشائر القيادات الدينية الجهات الامنية حكومة اقليم كوردستان الحكومة العراقية المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية / المنظمات الدولية اخر (حدد)

DEMOGRAPHICS	
التركيبة السكانية	
30 Sex of respondent (the HOH or any other adult members that can respond on behalf of the family) اسم المتحدث (رب الأسرة أو أي بالغ آخر يكون بإمكانه التحدث باسم العائلة كلها)؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Male Female <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ذكر انثى
31 Who is the respondent من هو المتحدث؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HOH Spouse Sons/daughters

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Other members <ul style="list-style-type: none"> رب الأسرة الزوج/ الزوجة الأولاد/ البنات اعضاء الآخرين
32 If not the HH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Age of the HoH in years Gender of HoH: Male / Female
33 How old are you? كم عمرك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Age in years العمر
34 How many people live in your household, including adults and children? كم عدد اعضاء أسرتك, من ضمنهم البالغين و الأطفال؟	
35 Number of children (less 15)? عدد الأطفال (اقل من 15 سنة)	
36 Number of elderly (above 60)? عدد كبار السن (أكبر من 60 سنة)	
37 Ethnoreligious background الخلفية العرقية و الدينية	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arab Sunni Muslim Arab Shia Muslim Turkmen Shia Muslim Kurd Yazidi Kurd Sunni Muslim Chaldean Christian Assyrian Christian Shabak Shia Muslim Shabak Sunni Muslim Turkmen Sunni Muslim Kurd Shia Muslim Kaka'i Other (specify) Unknown عربي مسلم سني عربي مسلم شيعي

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> تركمني مسلم شيعي كوردي يزيدي كوردي مسلم سني مسيحي كلداني مسيحي سرياني شيك مسلم شيعي شيك مسلم سني تركمني مسلم سني كوردي مسلم شيعي كأكه بي اخر (حدد) غير معروف
38 Tribal affiliation الانتماء العشائري	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Al Jabour Al Ezza Al Ajwad Albu Nasr Tikharta Al Zawbaa Al Hamdany Al Ishaqi Other
39 Which group do you identify most strongly with? الى أي من المجموعات تنتمي أكثر؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Family Ethnic group Tribe Governorate as whole Iraq as whole None الأسرة جماعة عرقية عشيرة المحافظة بشكل عام عراق بشكل عام لا شيء

<p>40 What is the highest educational level that you have attained? ما هي أعلى درجة علمية حصلت عليها؟</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Illiterate (doesn't read and write) • Reads and writes (traditional education) • Incomplete primary school • Complete primary school • Incomplete secondary • Complete secondary • • Incomplete high-school • Complete high-school • Some university-level education, without degree • University-level education, with degree • Post-graduate-level education (such as Master's or Ph.D.) • Refused <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • أمي (لا يقرأون أو يكتبون) • يقرأ و يكتب (دراسة تقليدية) • لم يكمل الدراسة الابتدائية • أكمل الدراسة الابتدائية • الدبلوم بعد اكمال الدراسة الابتدائية • لم يكمل الدراسة المتوسطة • اكمل الدراسة الإعدادية • الدبلوم بعد اكمال الدراسة المتوسطة • قليل من الدراسة الجامعية, من غير الحصول على درجة علمية • الدراسة الجامعية, مع الحصول على درجة علمية • دراسة الدراسات العليا (مثل, الماجستير أو الدكتوراه) • رفض الإجابة
<p>41 What is your current employment status? ما هي حالتك الوظيفية الحالية؟</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-employed • Employed full time • Employed part-time at one job • Employed part-time at more than one job • Unemployed, looking for work • Unemployed, not looking for work • Retired
<p>42 N of working members of the family عدد الاعضاء الذين يعملون في الأسرة؟</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Student • Housewife • Refused / don't know <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • موظف بدوام كامل • موظف بدوام جزئي في عمل واحد • موظف بدوام جزئي في اكثر من عمل واحد • غير موظف, يبحث عن العمل • غير موظف, لا يبحث عن العمل • متقاعد • طالب • ربة منزل • رفض الإجابة
<p>43 Which of the following statements best describes your household income? أي من العبارات الآتية تصف جيداً مصدر الدخل لأسرتك؟</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We do not have enough money for the basic needs • We are able to buy only basic products • We are able to buy what is necessary, but we cannot afford more expensive goods • We are able to buy some more expensive goods, but should save on other things • We can afford almost whatever we want <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • لا نمتلك المال الكافي لاحتياجاتنا الأساسية • قادرون شراء الاحتياجات الأساسية فقط • قادرون على شراء ما هو مهم, لكننا غير قادرين على شراء أشياء غالية الثمن • قادرون على شراء أشياء غالية, و لكن علينا صرفها لشراء أشياء أخرى • قادرون على شراء كل الأشياء التي نريدها
<p>44 Occupation in place of origin (before displacement) العمل/ الوظيفة في المكال الأصلي. (قبل النزوح)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-employed • Paid job public • Paid job private • Profession category (doctors, nurses, teachers, professors, layers, etc.) • Agriculture / farming / herd animal raising

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Informal commerce or inconsistent daily labor • Pension • Unemployed • Other <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • وظيفة حكومية براتب • وظيفة في القطاع الخاص • الفئة المهنية (اطباء, ممرضين, معلمين, بروفيسور, محامين, الخ...) • الزراعة, الفلاحة, تربية المواشي • التجارة الغير الرسمية أو العمل اليومي الغير متسق • تقاعد • غير موظف • آخر (حدد) _____
45 Occupation level in place of origin (before displacement) المستوى الوظيفي في المكان الأصلي. (قبل النزوح)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Professional and managerial • Clerical and sales • Skilled blue-collar • Semi-skilled and unskilled <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الفنية و الإدارية • الكتابية و المبيعات • الماهرين (blue- collar) • شبه الماهرين و غير الماهرين
46 Occupation in place of displacement الوظيفة في مكان النزوح	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-employed • Paid job public • Paid job private • Profession category (doctors, nurses, teachers, professors, layers, etc.) • Agriculture / farming / herd animal raising • Informal commerce or inconsistent daily labor • Pension • Unemployed • Other <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • وظيفة حكومية براتب • وظيفة في القطاع الخاص

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الفئة المهنية (اطباء, ممرضين, معلمين, بروفيسور, محامين, الخ...) • الزراعة, الفلاحة, تربية المواشي • التجارة الغير الرسمية أو العمل اليومي الغير متسق • تقاعد • غير موظف • آخر (حدد) _____
47 Occupation level in place of displacement المستوى الوظيفي في مكان النزوح	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Professional and managerial • Clerical and sales • Skilled blue-collar • Semi-skilled and unskilled <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الفنية و الإدارية • الكتابية و المبيعات • الماهرين (blue- collar) • شبه الماهرين و غير الماهرين
48 Occupation in place of origin (after return) الوظيفة في مكان النزوح (بعد العودة)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paid job public • Paid job private • Profession category (doctors, nurses, teachers, professors, layers, etc.) • Agriculture / farming / herd animal raising • Informal commerce or inconsistent daily labor • Pension • Unemployed • Other <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • وظيفة حكومية براتب • وظيفة في القطاع الخاص • الفئة المهنية (اطباء, ممرضين, معلمين, بروفيسور, محامين, الخ...) • الزراعة, الفلاحة, تربية المواشي • التجارة الغير الرسمية أو العمل اليومي الغير متسق • تقاعد • غير موظف • آخر (حدد) _____

<p>49 Occupation level in place of origin (after return)</p> <p>المستوى الوظيفي في المكان الأصلي</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Professional and managerial • Clerical and sales • Skilled blue-collar • Semi-skilled and unskilled <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الفنية و الإدارية • الكتابية و المبيعات • الماهرين (blue-collar) • شبه الماهرين و غير الماهرين
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Survey – IDPs¹

QUESTIONNAIRE TRACKING	
تعقب استمارة الاستبيان	
Questionnaire number:	
رقم استمارة الاستبيان	
Interviewer name:	
اسم الشخص الذي يتم مقابلته	
Team:	
الفريق	
Interview date:	
تاريخ المقابلة	
District of origin:	
القضاء الأصلي	
Sub-district origin:	
مركز الناحية	
Rural / Urban	
Interviewee Name:	
اسم الشخص الذي يتم مقابلته	
Interviewee Telephone:	
رقم الهاتف الشخص الذي يتم مقابلته	
Interviewee Address:	
عنوان الشخص الذي يتم مقابلته	
Rating:	
التقدير	

IDPs			
1. When were you displaced? متى نزحت؟	الشهر/ السنة MM/YY		
2. Where are you displaced? اين نزحت؟	Sub-district / camp ناحية/ مخيم	District منطقة	Governorate محافظة
3. Did all your family flee together? هل نرح جميع اعضاء اسرتك؟	Yes / No نعم/ كلا		

¹ Family is considered the sampling unit of the survey. Family is composed by those members who were living together before displacement.

4. Did any of your direct family members return to live in your area of origin? هل عاد اي احد من أعضاء أسرتك للعيش في المكان الأصلي؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MM/YY الشهر/ السنة not added yet
4.1. If yes, who? اذا نعم, من؟	All that apply: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minor female (-15) Minor male (-15) Spouse Elder male (+60) Elder female (+60)
5. Who took the decision not to return? من الذي قرر عدم العودة؟ ... من الذي اتخذ قرار عدم العودة؟ ...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Personal decision Spouse decision Family decision Tribal decision Community decision Other: ____
6. What is the main/second reason – rank- that makes staying here more attractive than returning? ما هو السبب الرئيسي/ الثاني (ترتيب) الذي يجعل البقاء هنا محبباً أكثر من العودة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing fight / lack of security in area of origin Security in area of displacement Lack of jobs back home Availability of jobs in place of displacement Lack of services back home Better services in place of displacement

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> House / property destroyed / damaged / demolished Children enrolled to school in place of displacement Fear of harassment / discrimination back home Fear of reprisal acts / violence back home Fear from ISIS returning to area of origin Fear from security actors in area of origin Other
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> المعارك المستمرة، انعدام الامن في المنطقة الأصلية الحالة الامنية في منطقة النزوح انعدام فرص عمل في المكان الاصلى وجود فرص العمل في منطقة النزوح انعدام الخدمات في المكان الاصلى وجود الخدمات في منطقة النزوح المنازل / الممتلكات دمرت / تضررت / هدمت الأطفال الملتحقين المدارس في منطقة النزوح الخوف من التهديد / التمييز في المكان الاصلى الخوف من افعال انتقامية / العنف في المكان الاصلى الخوف من عودة داعش الى المكان الاصلى الخوف من الجهات الأمنية في المكان الاصلى اخر (حدد) _____
7. Did you try to return at some point but you were not allowed? هل حاولت العودة في وقت ما ولم يسمح لك بالعودة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes / No نعم / كلا
7.1. If yes, by... إذا نعم، من قبل...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Family / relatives / friends Government of Iraq KRG ISF Peshmerga Asayish Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Which one? Tribal Leaders Local Authorities Religious leaders
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> الاسرة / الاقرباء / الاصدقاء الحكومة العراقية حكومة اقليم كردستان القوات الامنية العراقية قوات البشمركة قوات الميليشيا <ul style="list-style-type: none"> اي منهم؟ قادة العشائر السلطات المحلية القيادات الدينية داعش المجتمع الاصلى مجتمع النازحين اخر (حدد) _____
7.2. If yes, how? إذا نعم، كيف؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delay in processing return by authorities Stop in checkpoint Name included in blacklist Other _____
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> تأخير السلطات في معالجة عملية العودة الوقوف في نقاط التفتيش وجود الاسم في قائمة السوداء اخر (حدد) _____
8. Did anyone try to encourage your return by means of promises? هل حاول احد تشجيعك على العودة باي طريقة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> YES / NO نعم / كلا

8.1. If yes, of which kind? أذا نعم, بأي طريقة؟	<p>All that apply:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic compensation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How much? () Security in the area Provision of services Return to previous job Agriculture grants Cleaning of UXOs / IEDs / rubble Other _____ <p>كل ما ينطبق</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> التعويض المادي ما هي الكمية؟ (بالدينار العراقي) الامن في المنطقة توفير الخدمات العودة الى العمل السابق المنح الزراعية تنظيف المنطقة من الذخائر الغير منفجرة اخر (حدد) _____
8.2. If yes, who encouraged you? اذا نعم, من الذي شجعك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Family / Friends / relatives Government of Iraq KRG ISF Peshmerga Asayish Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Which one? Tribal Leaders Local Authorities Religious leaders Local NGOs International NGOs / IOs Civil Society Activist Others: _____

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> الأسرة/ الاقرباء/ الاصدقاء الحكومة العراقية حكومة اقليم كوردستان القوات الامنية العراقية قوات البشمركة قوات الميليشيا اي منهم؟ قادة العشائر السلطات المحلية القيادات الدينية المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية/ المنظمات الدولية اخر (حدد) _____
9. Did anyone try to discourage you about returning? هل حاول احدهم اقناعك بعدم العودة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes / No نعم/ كلا
9.1. If yes, who? اذا نعم, من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Family / Friends / relatives Government of Iraq KRG ISF Peshmerga Asayish Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Which one? Tribal Leaders Local Authorities Religious leaders Local NGOs International NGOs / IOs Community of origin Community of displacement Other returnees Other IDPs

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Others _____ /الاقرباء/ الاصدقاء الحكومة العراقية حكومة اقليم كردستان القوات الامنية العراقية قوات البشمركة قوات الميليشيا اي منهم؟ قادة العشائر السلطات المحلية القيادات الدينية المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية/ المنظمات الدولية المجتمع الاصلي مجتمع النازحين عائدون اخرون نازحون اخرون اخر (حدد)
9.2. If yes, how?	<p>اذا نعم, كيف؟</p> <p>Open ended</p>
10. How comfortable did you feel in your area of origin before fleeing?	<p>الى اي مدى كنت مرتاحا في منطقتك الأصلية قبل الهروب (التزوج)؟</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very comfortable Somewhat comfortable Not comfortable either uncomfortable Somewhat uncomfortable Very uncomfortable مرتاح جدا مرتاح الى حد ما لست مرتاحاً و لست متضايقا الى حد ما, غير مرتاح جدا, غير مرتاح
11. And here now, how do you feel?	<p>وهنا الان, كيف تشعر؟</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very comfortable Somewhat comfortable Not comfortable either uncomfortable
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Somewhat uncomfortable Very uncomfortable مرتاح جدا مرتاح الى حد ما لست مرتاحاً و لست متضايقا الى حد ما, غير مرتاح جدا, غير مرتاح
12. Have you faced any harassment / discrimination while in displacement?	<p>نعم/ كلا Yes / No</p> <p>هل تعرضت الى المضايقة/ التمييز في المكان التزوج؟</p>
12.1. Which sort?	<p>اي شكل؟</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Due to religion Due to ethnicity Due to tribal affiliation Due to political affiliation Gender-based Mistreatment by the Host Community Other
12.2. By who?	<p>من قبل من؟</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Host community Representative of the Local Authorities in displacement Gol KRG ISF Peshmerga Asayish Militias Which one? Tribal Leaders Local Authorities Religious leaders ISIS Other _____ المجتمع المضيف

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ممثلي السلطات المحلية في منطقة النزوح • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كوردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا • اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • داعش • اخر (حدد)
13. And previously in your place of origin? و من قبل في المنطقة الأصلية ؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No / I don't know نعم/ كلا / لا اعلم
13.1. Which sort? اي شكل؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to religion • Due to ethnicity • Due to tribal affiliation • Due to political affiliation • Gender-based • Mistreatment by the Host Community • Other
13.2. By who? من قبل من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Representative of the Local Authorities in displacement • Gol • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias • Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • Other community groups

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Own community group • Other _____ • ممثلي السلطات المحلية في منطقة النزوح • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كوردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا • اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • جماعات من مجتمعات اخرى • جماعة من المجتمع الاصلي • اخر (حدد)
14. How satisfied are you with your decision to stay in the area in which you are currently living? الى اي مدى انت راض عن قرارك بالبقاء في المنطقة التي انت فيها حالياً؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Somewhat satisfied • Not satisfied either dissatisfied • Somewhat dissatisfied • Very dissatisfied • راض جداً • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
15. Do you plan to return to your previous location at some point? هل تخطط للعودة الى مكانك السابق في المستقبل؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No نعم/ كلا
15.1. If yes, within... نعم, خلال....	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The next three months • Three to 12 months • Between 1 and 5 years • After 5 years • I don't know

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • خلال ثلاث أشهر القادمة • خلال ثلاث أو اثنا عشر شهراً • بين سنة و خمس سنوات القادمة • بعد خمس سنوات • لا اعلم
16. Do you fear any sort of reprisal against you if you go back? هل تخاف اي نوع من الانتقام ضدك في حالة رجوعك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No نعم/ كلا
16.1. If yes, by who? اذا نعم, من قبل من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stayees • People who have already returned • Government of Iraq • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • ISIS • Other _____ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الباقون • الناس الذين عادوا • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كوردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • داعش

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • اخر (حدد) _____
17. Have any of your properties been damaged / occupied since the last crisis? هل تضررت/ احتيلت اي من الممتلكاتك منذ الأزمة السابقة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes / No / I don't know نعم/ كلا / لا اعلم
17.1. If yes, was it... اذا نعم, هل كانت؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Damaged due to conflict • Demolished • IEDs • Arson • Airstrike • Illegally used / occupied • Other: _____ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • تضررت بسبب النزاع • هدم • العبوات الناسفة • الحرق • استخدمت استخدام غير قانوني • اخر (حدد) _____
17.2. By who? من قبل من؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stayees • People who have already returned • Government of Iraq • KRG • ISF • Peshmerga • Asayish • Militias <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Which one? • Tribal Leaders • Local Authorities • Religious leaders • ISIS • Other _____ • I don't know <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الباقون

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الناس الذين عادوا • الحكومة العراقية • حكومة اقليم كوردستان • القوات الامنية العراقية • قوات البشمركة • قوات الميليشيا • اي منهم؟ • قادة العشائر • السلطات المحلية • القيادات الدينية • داعش • اخر (حدد) _____ • لا اعلم
18. How comfortable do you feel with the host community? الى اي مدى تشعر بالراحة لوجودك بين المجتمع المستضيف؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very comfortable • Somewhat comfortable • Not comfortable either uncomfortable • Somewhat uncomfortable • Very uncomfortable <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
19. How comfortable would you feel being around the rest of returnee families if you go back to your place of origin? الى اي مدى تشعر بالراحة لوجودك بين اخرين من العوائل العائدة الى المنطقة الأصلية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very comfortable • Somewhat comfortable • Not comfortable either uncomfortable • Somewhat uncomfortable • Very uncomfortable <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض

20. And around the people who stayed in your place of origin during the crisis? و لوجودك بين الناس الذين بقوا في مناطقهم و لم ينزحوا خلال الازمة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very comfortable • Somewhat comfortable • Not comfortable either uncomfortable • Somewhat uncomfortable • Very uncomfortable <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
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PERCEPTION OF ACTORS

21. How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with role the government is playing in your area of origin? لى اي مدى انت راض او غير راض عن دور الذي تقوم به الحكومة في منطقتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
22. And the local authorities? و السلطات المحلية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض

23. KRG (when applicable)? حكومة اقليم كوردستان (عند الاقتضاء)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied
24. ISF? القوات الامنية العراقية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied
25. And Peshmerga	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied
26. Asayish	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied
27. Militia controlling your area now? قوات الميليشيا التي تسيطر على منطقتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied
28. Tribal leaders in your area? قادة العشائر في منطقتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied
29. Religious authorities in your area? السلطات الدينية في منطقتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
30. IOs and INGOs? المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية / المنظمات الدولية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض
31. Local NGOs? المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very satisfied • Satisfied • Not satisfied either unsatisfied • Unsatisfied • Very unsatisfied <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • راض جدا • راض الى حد ما • لست راض و لست غير راض • الى حد ما , غير راض • جداً غير راض

SOCIETY POLARIZATION	الاستقطاب المجتمع
32. In your opinion, in your sub-district of origin, until which extent would you say the community is getting dividing because of ethnic issues? RETranslate برأيك, الى اي مدى تعتقد بان المجتمع يتقسم لوجود مشاكل عرقية في هذه الناحية؟ برأيك, الى اي مدى تعتقد بان المجتمع ينقسم بسبب وجود مشاكل عرقية في مركز الناحية التي تعيش فيه؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely • Very • Moderately • Slightly • Not at all <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • للغاية

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • جداً • بشكل معتدل • قليلاً • على الاطلاق
33. And because of religious issues? و لاسباب دينية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely • Very • Moderately • Slightly • Not at all <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • للغاية • جداً • بشكل معتدل • قليلاً • على الاطلاق
30 And because of tribal issues? لاسباب متعلقة بالعشيرة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely • Very • Moderately • Slightly • Not at all <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • للغاية • جداً • بشكل معتدل • قليلاً • على الاطلاق
31 Within the next 3 months, will tension in your area of origin? هل سوف () التوتر في المنطقة في ثلاث اشهر القادمة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase a lot • Increase slightly • Not increase either decrease • Decrease slightly • Decrease a lot • I don't know / refused to answer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • يزداد كثيراً • يزداد قليلاً • لا يزداد و لا ينخفض

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ينخفض قليلاً • ينخفض كثيراً
32 And within the next 3 to 12 months? وفي ثلاث الى اثنا عشر أشهر قادمة؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase a lot • Increase slightly • Not increase either decrease • Decrease slightly • Decrease a lot • I don't know / refused to answer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • يزداد كثيراً • يزداد قليلاً • لا يزداد ولا ينخفض • ينخفض قليلاً • ينخفض كثيراً
33 Do you think that returns will contribute to tension or will ease it? هل تعتقد بأن العائدون سوف يساهمون في زيادة التوتر او الحد منه؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribute a lot • contribute slightly • Not contribute either ease • Ease slightly • Ease a lot • I don't know / refused to answer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • يساهمون كثيراً • يساهمون قليلاً • لا يساهمون ولا يسهلون • يسهلون قليلاً • يسهلون كثيراً
34 Which actor do you think is the most appropriate to foster cohesion among the communities living here? باعتقادك، أي من الجهات الفاعلة هي الانسب لتحقيق التماسك بين المجتمعات الذين يعيشون هنا؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local Authorities • Tribal leaders • Religious leaders • Security actors • KRG • GoI • Local NGOs • IOs / INGOs • Other _____

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • السلطات المحلية • قادة العشائر • القيادات الدينية • الجهات الامنية • حكومة اقليم كردستان • الحكومة العراقية • المنظمات الغير الحكومية المحلية • المنظمات الغير الحكومية الدولية/ المنظمات الدولية • اخر (حدد) _____
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DEMOGRAPHICS

التركيبة السكانية

35 Sex of respondent (the HOH or any other adult members that can respond on behalf of the family) جنس المتحدث (رب الأسرة أو أي بالغ آخر يكون بإمكانه التحدث باسم العائلة كلها)؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Male • Female <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ذكر • انثى
36 Who is the respondent من هو المتحدث؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HoH • Spouse • Sons/daughters • Other members <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • رب الأسرة • الزوج • الأولاد/ البنات • اعضاء الآخرين
37 If not the HoH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Age of the HoH in years • Gender of HoH: Male / Female
38 How old are you? كم عمرك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Age in years • العمر
39 How many people live in your household, including adults and children? كم عدد اعضاء أسرتك، من ضمنهم البالغين و الأطفال؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • N of members of the HH • عدد اعضاء الأسرة _____
40 N of children (less 15)? عدد الأطفال (اقل من 15 سنة)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •

41 N of elderly (above 60)?	عدد كبار السن (أكبر من 60 سنة)	•
42 Ethnoreligious background	الخلفية العرقية و الدينية	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arab Sunni Muslim • Arab Shia Muslim • Turkmen Shia Muslim • Kurd Yazidi • Kurd Sunni Muslim • Chaldean Christian • Assyrian Christian • Shabak Shia Muslim • Shabak Sunni Muslim • Turkmen Sunni Muslim • Kurd Shia Muslim • Kaka'i • Other (specify) • Unknown
43 Tribal affiliation	الانتماء العشائري	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • عربي مسلم سني • عربي مسلم شيعي • تركماني مسلم شيعي • كوردي يزيدي • كوردي مسلم سني • مسيحي كلداني • مسيحي سرياني • شيك مسلم شيعي • شيك مسلم سني • تركماني مسلم سني • كوردي مسلم شيعي • كاكائي • اخر (حدد) • غير معروف
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Al Jabour • Al Ezza • Al Ajwad

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Albu Nasr • Tikharta • Al Zawbaa • Al Hamdany • Al Ishaqi
44 Which group do you identify most strongly with?	الى أي من المجموعات تنتمي أكثر؟	<p>Other</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family • Ethnic group • Tribe • Governorate as whole • Iraq as whole • None
45 What is the highest educational level that you have attained?	ما هي أعلى درجة علمية حصلت عليها؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الأسرة • جماعة عرقية • عشيرة • المحافظة بشكل عام • عراق بشكل عام • لا شيء
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Illiterate (doesn't read and write) • Reads and writes (traditional education) • Incomplete primary school • Complete primary school • Incomplete secondary • Complete secondary • Incomplete high-school • Complete high-school
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some university-level education, without degree • University-level education, with degree • Post-graduate-level education (such as Master's or Ph.D.) • Refused
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • أمي (لا يقرأون أو يكتبون) • يقرأ و يكتب (دراسة تقليدية)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> لم يكمل الدراسة الابتدائية أكمل الدراسة الابتدائية الدبلوم بعد اكمال الدراسة الابتدائية لم يكمل الدراسة المتوسطة اكمل الدراسة الاعدادية الدبلوم بعد اكمال الدراسة المتوسطة قليل من الدراسة الجامعية, من غير الحصول على درجة علمية مع عدم بعض من التعليم الجامعي بدون شهادة الدراسة الجامعية, مع الحصول على درجة علمية التعليم الجامعي مع الحصول على شهادة جامعية دبلومة الدراسات العليا (مثل, الماجستير أو الدكتوراه) رفض الاجابة
46 What is your current employment status? ما هي حالتك الوظيفية الحالية؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Self-employed Employed full time Employed part-time at one job Employed part-time at more than one job Unemployed, looking for work Unemployed, not looking for work Retired Student Housewife Refused / don't know موظف بدوام كامل موظف بدوام جزئي في عمل واحد موظف بدوام جزئي في اكثر من عمل واحد غير موظف, يبحث عن العمل غير موظف, لا يبحث عن العمل متقاعد طالب ربة منزل رفض الاجابة

47 N of working members of the family عدد الاعضاء الذين يعملون في الأسرة؟	
48 Which of the following statements best describes your household income? أي من العبارات الأتية تصف جيداً مصدر الدخل لأسرتك؟	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We do not have enough money for the basic needs We are able to buy only basic products We are able to buy what is necessary, but we cannot afford more expensive goods We are able to buy some more expensive goods, but should save on other things We can afford almost whatever we want لا نمتلك المال الكافي لاحتياجاتنا الأساسية قادرين شراء الاحتياجات الأساسية فقط قادرين على شراء ما هو مهم, لكننا غير قادرين على شراء اشياء غالية الثمن قادرين على شراء اشياء غالية, و لكن علينا صرفها لشراء اشياء أخرى قادرين على شراء كل الأشياء التي نريدها
49 Occupation in place of origin (before displacement) العمل/ الوظيفة في المكال الأصلي. (قبل النزوح)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Self-employed Paid job public Paid job private Profession category (doctors, nurses, teachers, professors, layers, etc.) Agriculture / farming / herd animal raising Informal commerce or inconsistent daily labor Pension Unemployed Other وظيفة حكومية براتب وظيفة في القطاع الخاص الفئة المهنية (اطباء, ممرضين, معلمين, بروفيسور, محامين, الخ...) الزراعة, الفلاحة, تربية المواشي التجارة الغير الرسمية أو العمل اليومي الغير متسق تقاعد غير موظف آخر (حدد)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الماهرين (blue-collar) • شبه الماهرين و غير الماهرين • العمال الماهرين / Skilled blue-collar • العمال الحرفيين
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OBSTACLES TO RETURN IN RETAKEN AREAS OF IRAQ

FINAL REPORT

MARCH 2017



International Organization for Migration (IOM)

The UN Migration Agency

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