

IOM IRAQ

PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE, SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN IRAQ



Center for
Global Legal Challenges
YALE LAW SCHOOL

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UN MIGRATION

ABOUT IOM

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

ABOUT IOM IRAQ'S COMMUNITY POLICING PROGRAMME

In 2012, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) began implementing a Community Policing Programme in partnership with Iraq's Ministry of Interior (MoI). The Programme aims to counter drivers of irregular migration, by contributing to create safer communities, strengthen security, as well as prevent and respond to crime by improving trust and cooperation between communities and law enforcement institutions. The MoI has created a special Directorate and Departments for Community Policing and is in the process of expanding and mainstreaming the methodology across all of Iraq's 19 governorates. The Community Policing Programme includes three main components: (1) the training of community police officers and community members, (2) the construction of community police offices and (3) the establishment of Community Policing Forums.

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ABOUT THE IOM IRAQ — YALE LAW SCHOOL CENTER FOR GLOBAL LEGAL CHALLENGES STUDY

IOM Iraq has partnered with Yale Law School's Center for Global Legal Challenges to assess IOM's Community Policing Programme, which aims to improve safety and security by building trust and cooperation between Iraqi civilians and law enforcement institutions. In order to support data-informed programming, IOM Iraq's research team collected data from two waves of door-to-door household surveys of random samples of Iraqi citizens, – before and after the implementation of the Community Policing Programme, – in three communities: Baradiyah, a Shia Arab-majority urban neighbourhood in the city of Basra located in the southern governorate of Basra; Hamdaniyah, a Christian-majority town in the northern governorate of Ninewa; and Jubeil, a Sunni Arab-majority urban neighbourhood in the city of Fallujah located in the central governorate of Anbar. As IOM works with Iraq's MoI to integrate community policing methods throughout state security forces, this study provides suggestive evidence of the Community Policing Programme's impact by comparing perceptions of police, security and governance at two different points in time, before and after the Programme's implementation.

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INTRODUCTION

In 2012, IOM Iraq began implementing a Community Policing Programme in partnership with Iraq's MoI as part of a broader effort to improve relations between Iraqi citizens and state security forces.

Community policing is a method of law enforcement defined by the United Nations as “a strategy for encouraging the public to act as partners with the police in preventing and managing crime as well as other aspects of security and order based on the needs of the community.”¹

Previous research suggests that community policing methods can promote mutual trust and cooperation between state security forces and civilians in post-authoritarian and post-conflict settings, thereby increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the government. Community policing differs from traditional policing approaches by “involv[ing] citizens in helping to solve law-and-order problems in their communities.”²

In Iraq, where the rule of law is weak and the risk of conflict recurrence is high, public distrust of state security forces is a major policy challenge and barrier to sustainable peace-building. Since 2003, the country has experienced cyclical episodes of intra-state violence – the most recent of which was the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) crisis between 2014 and 2017 – and continuous, collective calls for improved governance and adherence to the rule of law. Widespread distrust in the Iraqi police undermines public safety, effective governance and democracy because it discourages citizens from reporting crimes and other problems to state authorities and from exercising their civil and human rights including freedom of expression and movement. Grievances against state institutions including the police may also create enabling conditions for non-state actors – including violent non-state actors – to assert themselves as alternative providers of governance and security, therefore increasing the risk of inter-group conflict.

Community policing is a promising tool for security sector reform and trust-building between state and society. Common methods of community policing include walking through communities to build trust with citizens (rather than driving, which limits interpersonal contact); facilitating meetings open to all members of the community to encourage the reporting and discussion of local problems; and a separate line of command that enables community police to report misconduct by other state institutions and officials, including regular police officers or other security forces, to an independent government body with the authority to investigate and discipline offenders.³

This study presents evidence from an assessment of IOM's Community Policing Programme in Iraq based on data from two waves of surveys conducted in three communities where the programme was implemented in 2019. Surveys were conducted before the Community Policing Programme's implementation in July–August 2019 and again after six months of programming in December 2019. The data provide insights into public opinion toward police and concerns about governance, security and the economy at these two different points in time. A comparison of the two waves of data also provides some evidence that the Community Policing Programme may have had some positive effects on security and public opinion toward police, although the complexity of this real-world research setting – as opposed to a laboratory – and the presence of potentially confounding variables make it impossible to estimate the Programme's impact more precisely. This study is a first step toward evidence-based evaluation of community policing methods in Iraq.

1 United Nations, Human Rights. Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/>.

2 John Fuller, *Criminal Justice: Mainstream and Crosscurrents*. Pearson/Prentice Hall (2006).

3 Wesley Skogan, *Community Policing: Can It Work?* Wadsworth/Thomson Learning Belmont (2004).

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study was to collect data on perceptions of police, security and governance at two different points in time, before and after the implementation of the Community Policing Programme in three communities, to assess changes in communities where the programme was implemented. This report is based on a comparison of two waves of cross-sectional surveys conducted in July and August 2019 (baseline), before the implementation of the Community Policing Programme and in December 2019 (endline), after the implementation of the Community Policing Programme.⁴

A previous report covered the findings of the baseline surveys.⁵ A total of 2,220 respondents were surveyed in three communities where the Community Policing Programme was implemented as well as nearby comparison communities where the Programme was not implemented but are otherwise similar. The household surveys were conducted by IOM field researchers according to IOM's Data Protection Principles and approved by Yale University's Institutional Review Board.⁶ The three teams of Iraqi field researchers included equal numbers of men and women.

Differences between the two waves of surveys, whether positive or negative, cannot be definitively attributed to the Community Policing Programme for the following reasons. First, on any survey, it is always possible that respondents do not answer questions truthfully due to social desirability bias.⁷ Second, it is possible that any changes between baseline and endline surveys might be due to trends and events unrelated to the Community Policing Programme. Major events that

occurred in Iraq over the course of the study include anti-government protests in central and southern Iraq, the resignation of Iraq's Prime Minister and rising regional tensions involving Iran, the United States of America and Turkey. Third, it is possible that changes could be explained by differences between the two cross-sectional survey samples, which are relatively small and therefore not perfectly representative of the larger communities from which they were drawn, despite being comparable across key demographic and socioeconomic variables.⁸ Despite the above identified limitations of the study to identify the programme's impact, the study does provide suggestive evidence of the Community Policing Programme's impact on public opinion as well as important insights into perceptions of police, security and governance before and after the programme's implementation.

4 Cross-sectional surveys collect data on a population at particular points in time rather than repeatedly surveying the same individuals over time as is the case in a panel survey.


5 The International Organization for Migration and Yale Law School's Center for Global Legal Challenges, "Perceptions of Security and Police in Iraq," March 2020. Available from: <https://iraq.iom.int/publications/perceptions-security-and-police-iraq-baseline-survey-findings>.

6 This research was approved by Yale University's Institutional Review Board on July 9, 2019 (Protocol #2000025209).

7 Social desirability bias is a phenomenon in which respondents provide answers that they believe will be viewed most favorably by the researcher. In this study, IOM's role as an inter-governmental organization may have led some respondents to answer questions in ways that they believed would increase the likelihood of assistance to their communities. We attempted to mitigate this potential bias by noting in the informed consent script, which was read to all potential respondents, that IOM could not provide any compensation or material benefits in exchange for participation in the survey. Furthermore, we informed respondents that their decision – whether to decline or agree to take the survey – "will not have any effect on your relationship with IOM."

8 Although Annex Tables 5 through 7 indicate that the baseline and endline survey samples were roughly comparable across key demographic and socioeconomic variables (gender ratio, age, ethno-religious composition and unemployment). It is possible that there were systematic attitudinal and behavioral differences since these two samples were cross-sectional (random sampling of communities at two different points in time) rather than follow-up (panel) surveys of the same participants. Throughout this report, we discuss the limitations of our findings and acknowledge that any evidence of the Community Policing Programme's effects, whether positive, negative, or null, is only suggestive.

Figure 1: Two Rounds of Data Collection



Communities Where the Community Policing Programme Was Implemented

The study was fielded in three communities where the Community Policing Programme was implemented: Jubeil, a Sunni Arab-majority urban neighbourhood in the city of Fallujah located in the central governorate of Anbar; Baradiyah, a Shia Arab-majority urban neighbourhood in Basra; and Hamdaniyah, a Christian-majority town in the northern governorate of Ninewa. These three communities vary significantly in their geographical locations, demographic compositions and exposure to the recent conflict with ISIL. The field researchers followed a random-walk procedure to select every third house. A Kish grid was used to randomly select a respondent from among the adults (18 years or older) living in each house. In the baseline survey, 94 per cent of potential respondents agreed to participate in the survey and a total of 911 respondents were surveyed in these three communities (around 300 respondents per community). In the endline survey, 93 per cent of potential respondents agreed to participate in the survey and a total of 903 respondents were surveyed in these three communities (again, around 300 respondents per community) with a margin of error of +/- 5 per cent.⁹ Annex Tables 5 through 7 indicate that the two samples were very similar across key demographic and socioeconomic variables.

Comparison Communities

The study also included surveys in comparison communities that were selected for geographical proximity and demographic similarity to the communities where the Community Policing Programme was implemented. Conducting baseline and endline surveys in these comparison communities provides some insight into whether other trends and events unrelated to the Community Policing Programme might have contributed to the changes observed over the course of the study. For two of the communities where the Community Policing Programme was implemented – Baradiyah located in Basra governorate and Jubeil located in Anbar governorate – we were able to identify nearby comparison communities that were demographically similar but still sufficiently distant from the communities with the Community Policing Programme to have a low likelihood of spillover effects.¹⁰ The comparison community for Baradiyah was Khor Zubair, another Shia-majority city located approximately 40 km south of Baradiyah in Basra Governorate. Field teams surveyed 103 respondents in Khor Zubair. The comparison community for Jubeil was Saqlawiyah, another Sunni-majority city located approximately 10 km northwest of Jubeil in Anbar Governorate. One hundred respondents were surveyed in Saqlawiyah.¹¹ The unique demographic characteristics of

⁹ The total number of adult respondents in each of the three communities was estimated to be less than 2,500, so while we expect that these samples are relatively representative of the small communities from which they were drawn, they are not necessarily representative of public opinion in the larger districts or governorates in which the communities are located.


¹⁰ "Spillover effects" occur when members of the comparison or "control group" are inadvertently exposed to the programme or intervention being studied (in this case, the Community Policing Programme). For ethical reasons, we could not ask survey respondents in the comparison communities whether or not they had been exposed to any Community Policing Programme activities because this question could have confused or upset respondents who are either unfamiliar with the programme or resent that the programme is not yet being implemented in their community.

¹¹ Door-to-door sampling was not possible in the comparison communities due to resource constraints and security challenges. Instead, IOM field researchers invited participants to take the survey inside IOM community resource centers, trying to ensure gender, age and socioeconomic diversity.

the third treatment community, Hamdaniyah, combined with access and security challenges, made it impossible for us to identify a suitable comparison community.¹² Although the comparison community survey samples were not randomly selected and therefore not necessarily

representative of the larger communities from which they were drawn, these samples nonetheless provide some insight into how perceptions of security and police have changed over time in communities where the Community Policing Programme was not implemented.

Map: Study Locations – IOM's Community Policing Programme and Comparison Communities



¹² Hamdaniyah is one of only a few Christian-majority communities in northern Iraq. Other Christian-majority communities that would have been candidates for comparison communities were either inaccessible to IOM's research teams or had significant demographic and institutional differences that would have made a balanced comparison impossible.

PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE, SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE: BEFORE AND AFTER IOM'S COMMUNITY POLICING PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

The three communities included in this study vary significantly in their geographical locations, demographic compositions and exposure to the recent conflict with ISIL. Before the implementation of the Community Policing Programme, these three communities also had different perceptions of security and police.

In general, respondents in Hamdaniyah had the most favorable perceptions of security and police, while respondents in Baradiyah had more negative perceptions. Jubeil was in the middle. This ranking remained the same in the endline surveys conducted in December 2019, after the implementation of the programme, but there were some noteworthy changes between the two rounds of surveys.

Perceptions of police improved for most indicators in one of the communities where the Community Policing Programme was implemented (Jubeil) and improved for some indicators in the other two communities (Baradiyah and Hamdaniyah). The comparison community for Jubeil (where the Community Policing Programme was not implemented) did not see as many improvements despite being demographically similar, suggesting that the improvements observed in Jubeil could be due to the Community Policing Programme, but these improvements could also be due to other factors discussed in the methodology section. Since both Baradiyah and its comparison community saw similarly mixed results, we cannot attribute the improvements in Baradiyah to the Community Policing Programme. In Hamdaniyah, the lack of significant changes between baseline and endline surveys (with the exception of a significant increase in the perceived fairness of police and in the percentage of respondents who perceived the police as having a positive impact on security) is likely due to the fact that public opinion toward the police was already very favorable at the time of the baseline survey, leaving little room for improvement.

The following sections discuss in more detail the findings in four areas: (1) perceptions of police, (2) perceptions of security, (3) community concerns and (4) gender dynamics of community-police relations. For each topic, we present the results for the three communities where the Community Policing Programme was implemented followed by relevant results for the nearby comparison communities that were selected for geographical proximity and demographic similarity to the three treatment communities. Table 1 summarizes key findings. Comparing baseline and endline surveys in communities with the Community Policing

Programme and comparison communities that are otherwise similar except for the implementation of the programme provides some insight into whether other trends and events unrelated to the programme might have contributed to the changes observed over the course of the study.



Table 1. Comparison of Baseline and Endline Surveys in Three Communities with the Community Policing Programme

COMMUNITY	HAMDANIYAH		BARADIYAH		JUBEIL	
Urban Neighbourhood or Town	Town		Urban Neighbourhood		Urban Neighbourhood	
Governorate	Ninewa		Basra		Anbar	
Demography	Christian Majority		Shia Arab Majority		Sunni Arab Majority	
Captured by ISIL	Yes		No		Yes	
RESULTS	Baseline N=307	Endline N=301	Baseline N=303	Endline N=300	Baseline N=301	Endline N=302
Perceive Community as Safe	98%	100% (+2%)	75%	86% (+15%)***	97%	97% (0%)
Trust the Police	89%	95% (+7%)**	19%	19% (0%)	82%	91% (+11%)**
Feel Respected by Police	95%	96% (+1%)	24%	30% (+25%)	75%	95% (+27%)***
Feel Listened to by Police	92%	95% (+3%)	35%	34% (-3%)	72%	86% (+19%)***
Perceive Police as Fair and Neutral	47%	74% (+57%)***	26%	19% (-27%)*	68%	74% (+9%)
Perceive Police as Effective at Fighting Crime	92%	92% (0%)	20%	30% (+50%)*	82%	94% (+15%)***
Police Respond Quickly to Calls for Help	84%	86% (+2%)	22%	17% (-23%)	74%	80% (+8%)
Likely to Report a Crime to Police	94%	94% (0%)	30%	40% (+30%)*	70%	87% (+24%)***
Likely to Provide Information About a Hypothetical Fugitive to Police	93%	94% (+1%)	31%	39% (+26%)	69%	72% (+4%)
Perceive the Police as Consistently Present in the Community	82%	99% (+21%)***	73%	86% (+18%)***	66%	78% (+18%)**
Perceive the Police as Having a Positive Impact on Security	73%	95% (+30%)***	52%	82% (+58%)***	83%	92% (+11%)*
Would Allow Female Relative to Report Problem to Police Directly	39%	43% (+10%)	8%	17% (+113%)**	14%	6% (-57%)**

Statistically significant differences are indicated as follows: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE

One of the objectives of the Community Policing Programme is to strengthen the “legitimacy” of the Iraqi police. When state institutions are legitimate, citizens respect and cooperate with them voluntarily without being forced to comply.¹³

The survey measured perceptions of police for eight indicators that are associated with legitimacy: fairness, trustworthiness and the extent to which police respect and listen to civilians; effectiveness of the police in their ability to fight crime and speed of replying to calls for help; and community members willingness to cooperate with police by reporting crimes and sharing information about hypothetical fugitives.¹⁴ All questions asked specifically about police at the community rather than at national level.

In Jubeil, endline survey respondents perceived the police as significantly more fair, trustworthy and respectful in comparison with the baseline survey. They also perceived the police as more effective at fighting crime and faster to respond to calls for help and they were more likely to cooperate with the police by reporting crimes. The only indicator of police legitimacy that did not see an improvement in Jubeil

was willingness to share information with the police about a hypothetical fugitive. In Baradiyah, endline respondents perceived the police as more effective at fighting crime than baseline respondents and they were also more likely to cooperate with the police by reporting crimes and sharing information about fugitives. There was also an increase in the percentage of respondents who said that they felt respected by the police. However, other indicators of police legitimacy – trust and feeling listened to – did not improve and two indicators (fairness and speed of response to calls for help) declined. In Hamdaniyah, there were improvements in trust in police and the perceived fairness of police but no significant changes for other indicators. This is likely due to the fact that public opinion toward the police was already very favorable at the time of the baseline survey, leaving little room for improvement.



¹³ Tom Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*. Princeton University Press (2006).

¹⁴ Survey questions measured each indicator on a five-point scale where 1 is the most negative response and 5 is the most positive. A score of 3 is the neutral midpoint. In this example question, the possible responses ranged from “I distrust the police a lot” (1) to “I trust the police a lot” (5).

JUBEIL AND SAQLAWIYAH (COMPARISON COMMUNITY), ANBAR GOVERNORATE


Of the three communities included in the study, Jubeil saw the most significant improvements in perceptions of police between the baseline and endline surveys.

- Respondents perceived the police as significantly more trustworthy, fairer, more respectful and more likely to listen to them in comparison with the baseline survey. The biggest increase was in feeling respected by the police (up 27%).

- They also perceived the police as more effective at fighting crime (up 15%) and faster to respond to calls for help (up 8%).


They were more likely to cooperate with the police by reporting crimes (up 24%). However, another measure of cooperation with police (willingness to share information with the police about a hypothetical fugitive) did not change significantly.

Figure 2. Jubeil, Changes in Perceptions of Police*



* Combined percentage of respondents who had somewhat or very favorable views of police on each round of the survey.

Figure 3. Saqlawiyah, Changes in Perceptions of Police*




* Combined percentage of respondents who had somewhat or very favorable views of police on each round of the survey.

In the comparison community of Saqlawiyah, located 10 km northwest of Jubeil in Anbar Governorate, perceptions of police at the time of the baseline survey in July and August 2019 were comparable to perceptions of police in Jubeil. However, unlike Jubeil, which saw significant improvements in seven of the eight indicators of police legitimacy (feeling respected, feeling listened to, fairness, trustworthiness, effectiveness at fighting crime, responsiveness to calls for help and likelihood of reporting crime to police), there was a statistically significant improvement in Saqlawiyah for only one indicator (trust in police, an increase of 9%) and two other indicators (feeling listened to by police and willingness to share information with police) declined by 12 per cent and 15 per cent respectively.

Respondents in Jubeil were generally likely to report crimes to the police in both the baseline and endline surveys. However, between the baseline and endline surveys, there were some significant changes in how respondents would choose to approach the police to report a problem. The percentage of respondents who would not report a problem to the police at all decreased by 13 percentage points and the percentage of respondents who would go to a police department in person or approach a police officer whom they personally know outside of a police department increased (by 8 percentage points and 13 percentage points respectively), suggesting a possible improvement in community relations with the police.¹⁵

15 Percentages add up to more than 100% because this was a multiple-selection question.

Figure 4. Jubeil, Preferred Ways of Approaching Police to Report a Problem




BARADIYAH AND KHOR AL ZUBEIR (COMPARISON COMMUNITY), BASRA GOVERNORATE

At the time of the baseline survey in July and August 2019, Baradiyah had the most negative perceptions of police and therefore the most room for improvement among the three communities.


- There was a significant increase in the percentage of respondents who reported that they felt respected by police (up 25%).
- Perceptions of the effectiveness of the police at fighting crime improved significantly by 30 per cent.
- Cooperation with the police also improved: respondents in the endline survey were more likely to report crimes (up 30%) and share information about hypothetical fugitives (up 26%).
- However, two indicators of police legitimacy (fairness and speed of response to calls for help) declined by 27 per cent and 23 per cent respectively. Two other indicators – trust in police and feeling listened to by police – did not change significantly.

Figure 5. Baradiyah, Changes in Perceptions of Police*



* Combined percentage of respondents who had somewhat or very favorable views of police on each round of the survey.

Figure 6. Khor al Zubair, Changes in Perceptions of Police*




* Combined percentage of respondents who had somewhat or very favorable views of police on each round of the survey.

In the comparison community of Khor al Zubair, located approximately 40 km south of Baradiyah in Basra Governorate, perceptions of police at the time of the baseline survey in July and August 2019 were comparable to perceptions of police in Baradiyah. Like Baradiyah, Khor al Zubair saw improvements in four of the eight police indicators between the baseline and endline surveys but for different indicators: perceived fairness of police (up 29%), feeling respected by the police (up 17%), perceived effectiveness of the police at fighting crime (up 35%) and likelihood of providing information about fugitives (up 7%). The magnitude of the improvements was somewhat lower in Khor al Zubair than in Baradiyah. The other indicators for Khor al Zubair had no statistically significant changes and two became more negative: trust in police (down 35%) and speed of police response to calls for help (down 30%).

Respondents in Baradiyah were not very likely to report crimes to the police in both the baseline and endline survey. However, between the baseline and endline surveys, there were some significant changes in *how* respondents would choose to approach the police to report a problem. The percentage of respondents who would not report a problem to the police at all decreased by 43 percentage points and the percentage of respondents who would go to a police department in person increased by 13 percentage points, suggesting a possible improvement in community relations with the police.¹⁶

Figure 7. Baradiyah, Preferred Ways of Approaching Police to Report a Problem



16 Percentages add up to more than 100% because this was a multiple-selection question.


HAMDANIYAH, NINEWA GOVERNORATE

In Hamdaniyah, the lack of significant changes between baseline and endline surveys (with the exception of a significant improvement in fairness of treatment by police and a slight improvement in trust in police) is likely due to the fact that public opinion toward the police was already very favorable at the time of the baseline survey, leaving little room for improvement.

- There were statistically significant improvements in the perceived fairness of police (up 57%) and trust in police (up 7%).
- There were no statistically significant changes in six of the eight indicators of police legitimacy.

In Hamdaniyah, respondents were very likely to report crimes to the police in both the baseline and endline surveys. However, between the baseline and endline surveys, there were some significant changes in *how* respondents would choose to approach the police to report a problem. The percentage of respondents who would go to a police department in person or approach a police officer whom they personally know outside of a police department increased by 7 percentage points and 15 percentage points respectively, suggesting a possible improvement in community relations with the police.¹⁷


Figure 8. Hamdaniyah, Changes in Perceptions of Police*



* Combined percentage of respondents who had somewhat or very favorable views of police on each round of the survey.

¹⁷ Percentages add up to more than 100% because this was a multiple-selection question.


Figure 9. Hamdaniyah, Preferred Ways of Approaching Police to Report a Problem



Both rounds of surveys included a free association question that attempted to gauge respondents' unfiltered impressions of police in their community by asking them to state the first words that come to mind when they think about the police.¹⁸ The most frequently cited themes in both rounds of surveys were security, protection of the people, protection of the state, corruption, discipline, justice and fear. The ranking of these themes remained very similar between the two rounds.

One noteworthy finding is that a majority of respondents in both rounds of the survey associated the police with protection, but generally had two different views on the beneficiaries of police protection. Around a quarter of respondents in both rounds of the survey associated the police with protection of the Iraqi state but a higher percentage (41% in the baseline and 43% in the endline) associated the police with protection of the people.

Figure 10. Free Association Words Used to Describe Local Police




Word clouds showing the frequency of words that respondents associated with police show that "safety," "protection" and "security" were the most common themes in both rounds of the survey. Some respondents had more negative associations including "bribery" and "corruption." Others associated police with positive associations "people," "help," "justice" and "enforcement".


¹⁸ To identify patterns in the sentiments and topics of responses, we coded the qualitative data into categories of related words.

Figure 11. Local Police: What Comes to Mind?

BASELINE



ENDLINE



PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY


COMMUNITY SECURITY

Perceptions of community safety improved or stayed the same in all three communities.

- In Jubeil and Hamdaniyah, there were no statistically significant changes in perceptions of community safety.
- Baradiyah, which was perceived as the least safe of the three communities at the time of the baseline survey, did see a statistically significant improvement of 15 per cent.

In the comparison community for Baradiyah (Khor al Zubeir), perceptions of security decreased by 15 per cent. There was no statistically significant change in Saqlawiyah, the comparison community for Jubeil.

Figure 12. Perceptions of Safety in Community*



* % "somewhat" or "very safe"




FAMILY SECURITY

In both the baseline and endline surveys, respondents were asked to assess how their family's security situation had changed over the past year.¹⁹ Respondents in Jubeil perceived the greatest improvements in security followed by Hamdaniyah in both rounds of the survey. In contrast, very few respondents in Baradiyah perceived any improvement: most reported that their families' security situation had not changed or had gotten worse.

- In Jubeil, 72 per cent of respondents said that their family situation had improved compared to last year in the baseline survey and this percentage increased slightly to 75 per cent in the endline survey.
- In Baradiyah, around three quarters of the respondents reported that their family situation remained the same as last year in both rounds. However, a slightly higher percentage of respondents said that their family's security situation had gotten worse in the endline survey (an 8-percentage-point increase from 20 to 28%), which could be related to anti-government demonstrations in Basra.
- In Hamdaniyah, which was perceived as the safest of the three communities at the time of the baseline survey, significantly fewer respondents reported that their security situation had improved in the endline survey (21%) compared to the baseline survey (35%). These results may reflect local security challenges that occurred between the baseline and endline surveys.²⁰
- It is also possible that fewer respondents reported an improvement in the endline survey because security improved dramatically after Hamdaniyah was recaptured from ISIL in 2017 and security is no longer improving as rapidly as it was at that time.

Figure 13. Perception of Change in Family's Security Situation Over the Last Year



19 This question was designed to assess perceptions of relative changes in family security over time as opposed to measuring perceptions of security at a single point in time.

20 Local security challenges included protests by members of the PMF in charge of the area, resisting the central government's order to withdraw from checkpoints around Mosul in August 2019. (John Davidson and Ahmed Rasheed, "Baghdad's crackdown on Iran-allied militias faces resistance," Reuters (August 29, 2019). Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-militias-usa/baghdads-crackdown-on-iran-allied-militias-faces-resistance-idUSKCN1VJ0GS>.) The Christian population in Ninewa have accused both of these forces of engaging in harassment to discourage the return of displaced Christians. (United Kingdom Home Office, "Country Policy and Information Note, Iraq: Religious minorities," (October 2019). Available from: <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1215081/download>.) Another security issue that may have affected results was the occurrence of six attacks attributed to ISIL between December 5-25 in areas around Mosul, near Hamdaniyah, an uptick from zero attacks attributed to ISIL during the previous month. Iraq Humanitarian Fund, Weekly Explosive Incidents Reports for November 1-13, available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-immmap-ihf-humanitarian-access-response-weekly-explosive-incidents-flash-news-1-13>; November 14-20, available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-immmap-ihf-humanitarian-access-response-weekly-explosive-incidents-flash-news-14-0>, and November 21-27.


CONCERNS ABOUT FUTURE INSTABILITY AND VIOLENCE

In addition to asking about past changes in security, the survey also asked about respondents' expectations about the potential for future violence in their communities.

- In Jubeil and Hamdaniyah, most respondents said that they did not expect the level of violence in their community to increase in the next year and this finding is consistent across both rounds of the survey. Although the number of respondents who expected an increase in violence was relatively small in both communities, Jubeil saw a significant increase of eight percentage points from 6 per cent in the baseline to 14 per cent in the endline survey. The increase in concern about future violence in Jubeil could be related to destabilizing security developments in Anbar Governorate including the start of a new military operation in late August 2019 to destroy the remnants of ISIL in the Anbar desert.
- Only in Baradiyah did a majority of respondents expect an increase in violence in both the baseline and endline surveys. Fears of future violence in Baradiyah may be related to an increase in anti-government sentiment that translated into demonstrations starting in October 2019 and the subsequent response by riot police.



Figure 13. Perception of Change in Family's Security Situation Over the Last Year



LOCAL ACTORS' IMPACT ON SECURITY

Respondents were asked which actors have a “consistent presence” in the community and of the actors that are consistently present, which ones have a positive or negative impact on security.²¹

- The two actors with the most consistent presence across all three communities were mukhtars (local authorities) and the local police.
- Between the baseline and endline survey, there was a significant increase in the percentage of respondents who reported that the local police had a consistent presence in all three communities.
- Additionally, the percentage of respondents who perceived the local police as having a positive impact on security increased in all three communities. The greatest improvement was in Baradiyah, which witnessed a 30-percentage-point increase from 52 per cent to 82 per cent.
- In Baradiyah, significant minorities of respondents perceived tribal leaders and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as having a negative impact on security in both rounds of the survey.
- In Hamdaniyah, religious institutions (the Church) were perceived as having a very positive impact in both rounds of the survey.



Table 2. Comparison of Baseline and Endline Survey Results: Actors' Presence and Impact

JUBEIL, ANBAR				
Actor	Mukhtar/Local Authorities		Local Police	
Round	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
Consistent Presence	83%	84%	66%	78%
Positive Impact	84%	89%	89%	92%
Negative Impact	3%	4%	4%	3%

²¹ Analysis includes only actors perceived by at least 60% of respondents as having a consistent presence in the community.

Table 3. Comparison of Baseline and Endline Survey Results: Actors' Presence and Impact

BARADIYAH, BASRA								
Actor	Mukhtar/ Local Authorities		Local Police		Tribal Leaders		PMF	
Round	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
Consistent Presence	93%	77%	73%	86%	70%	66%	64%	58%
Positive Impact	40%	38%	52%	82%	67%	58%	40%	50%
Negative Impact	5%	9%	18%	9%	33%	23%	42%	15%

Table 4. Comparison of Baseline and Endline Survey Results: Actors' Presence and Impact

HAMDANIYAH, NINEWA								
Actor	Mukhtar/ Local Authorities		Local Police		PMF		Religious Institutions	
Round	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
Consistent Presence	93%	98%	82%	99%	62%	90%	71%	45%
Positive Impact	40%	42%	73%	95%	72%	93%	84%	79%
Negative Impact	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%

COMMUNITY CONCERNS


The survey asked respondents to indicate their level of concern, ranging from “not concerned” to “very concerned,” on a series of security, economic and political issues.

JUBEIL, ANBAR GOVERNORATE

In Jubeil, public health was the top concern in the endline survey (89% of respondents said they were “very concerned”), followed by unemployment (75%), basic services (66%) and corruption (63%). These same four issues were also the top concerns in the baseline survey although the order was slightly different. There were significant increases in concerns about public health (up 11 percentage points) and property disputes (up 9 percentage points) between the baseline and endline surveys and a slight increase in concerns about bribery by security forces (up 4 percentage points).



Figure 15. Jubeil, Issues of Greatest Concern*



* % “very concerned”


BARADIYAH, BASRA GOVERNORATE

In both the baseline and endline surveys, economic and governance issues (corruption (52% in the baseline, 70% in the endline), unemployment (47% baseline, 58% endline) and access to basic services (40% baseline, 54% endline) were the leading concerns in Baradiyah, followed by substance abuse and public health. Concerns about substance abuse in Baradiyah may be due to the fact that Basra is near Iraq's borders with Iran and Kuwait and border communities tend to be vulnerable to the negative security consequences of cross-border smuggling and trafficking.²² There has been a significant increase in abuse of crystal meth and other drugs that are reportedly smuggled into Basra from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.²³

Between the baseline and endline surveys, there were some noteworthy changes including an increase in concern about corruption (up 18 percentage points), unemployment (up 11 percentage points), basic services (up 14 percentage points) and public health (up 11 percentage points), which are among the grievances of anti-government protesters. Relatedly, the increases in concern about arbitrary arrests of civilians by security forces (up 14 percentage points) and violence against civilians by security forces (up 14 percentage points) may be related to the use of violence by riot police to disperse anti-government protests during the period of study.



Figure 16. Baradiyah, Issues of Greatest Concern*



* % "very concerned"

22 Gabriella Sanchez, *Human Smuggling and Border Crossings* (Routledge, 2014).


23 Alissa Rubin, "Iraq Faces a New Adversary: Crystal Meth," *New York Times* (Sept. 14, 2019). Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/iraq-drug-addiction-meth.html>.

HAMDANIYAH, NINEWA GOVERNORATE

In both the baseline and endline surveys, unemployment (87% were “very concerned” in the baseline survey, 77% in the endline survey) and corruption (59% baseline, 56% endline) were the leading concerns, followed by attacks by ISIL and the return of families perceived as affiliated with ISIL. One noteworthy change was a decrease in concern about documentation challenges (down 11 percentage points), which could indicate that efforts by the Iraqi government, as well as humanitarian and development organizations including the United Nations, international and local nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations to provide identification and personal status documents that were lost, destroyed, or never issued during the conflict with ISIL may be having some success. Another significant change was a sharp increase in concerns about property disputes (from 4% to 36%), which could be related to continued returns of internally displaced persons who displaced because of the conflict with ISIL and whose land or houses may have been occupied by other community members in their absence.



Figure 17. Hamdaniyah, Issues of Greatest Concern*



* % “very concerned”

GENDER DYNAMICS OF COMMUNITY-POLICE RELATIONS

The surveys included several questions about the gender dynamics of community-police relations. In general, most women are uncomfortable reporting problems to the police and are also uncomfortable allowing female family members to report problems to the police. However, a key finding is that women would be significantly more willing to report problems to police if they had the option of reporting to a female police officer rather than male police officer.

Willingness to Allow Female Family Members to Report a Problem to Police

Among all respondents in the baseline and endline surveys, both men and women, majorities said that they would not allow a female family member to report a problem to the police on her own. Jubeil and Baradiyah respondents were the least comfortable allowing women to interact with police, and Hamdaniyah respondents were somewhat more comfortable.

- In Hamdaniyah, respondents were the most comfortable allowing women to interact with police officers but still, a majority (57% of baseline respondents and 54% of endline respondents) would not allow a female family member to report a problem to the police. Examining the differences between male and female respondents, we find that female respondents were significantly less willing than men to allow female family members to report problems to police in both rounds of the survey (a difference of 18 percentage points in the baseline survey and 11 percentage points in the endline survey).
- In Baradiyah, 91 per cent of baseline and 83 per cent of endline respondents would not allow a female family member to report a problem to the police. Both male and female respondents were very uncomfortable allowing female family members to interact with police.
- In Jubeil, 81 per cent of baseline and 94 per cent of endline respondents would not allow a female family member to report a problem to the police. The decrease in willingness to allow female family members to interact

with police in the endline survey was driven more by female survey respondents than by male survey respondents. Between the baseline and endline surveys, the number of female respondents who would not allow such interaction increased by more than 20 percentage points (from 76% in the baseline to 97% in the endline), while the increase among male respondents was only eight percentage points (from 85% in the baseline survey to 93% in the endline survey).

Figure 18. Would Not Allow a Female Family Member to Report a Problem to Police





Figure 19. Treatment Communities, Would Not Allow a Female Family Member to Report a Problem to Police



How Women Report Problems to Police

Of the three communities, women in Hamdaniyah were the most comfortable reporting problems to the police directly and this pattern was consistent across baseline and endline surveys.

- In Hamdaniyah, 3 out of 10 women would report a problem directly to the police on their own.
- Women in Baradiyah were the least comfortable reporting problems to police. Eight out of 10 women would ask a male relative to report the problem on their behalf and only one out of ten would report the problem directly to police.

- In Jubeil, 5 out of 10 women in the baseline survey and 7 out of 10 in the endline survey would ask a male relative to report the problem on their behalf and only 2 out of 10 would report the problem directly to police.

Figure 20. Jubeil, How Women Report Problems to Police




Figure 21. Baradiyah, How Women Report Problems to Police





Figure 22. Hamdaniyah, How Women Report Problems to Police




Women's Willingness to Report Problems to Female Police Officers

In both waves of surveys, significant percentages of women who said that they would be uncomfortable reporting a problem to a male police officer said that they would report the problem if they had the option of reporting to a female police officer. Across all three communities, there were significant increases between the baseline and endline surveys in the number of female respondents who said that they would be willing to report a problem to a female police officer.

- In Jubeil, 24 per cent of baseline respondents and 56 per cent of endline respondents would report a problem to a female police officer (an increase of 32 percentage points).
- In Baradiyah, 65 per cent of baseline respondents and 72 per cent of endline respondents would report a problem to a female police officer (an increase of 7 percentage points). This result is particularly striking since women in Baradiyah are the least comfortable interacting with police in comparison with the other two communities.

- In Hamdaniyah, 37 per cent of baseline respondents and 50 per cent of endline respondents would report a problem to a female police officer (an increase of 13 percentage points).

Figure 23. Female Respondents' Willingness to Report a Problem to a Female Police Officer



DISCUSSION

Baradiyah, Jubeil and Hamdaniyah, the three communities where the Community Policing Programme is implemented and selected for this study, vary significantly in their geographical locations, demographic compositions and exposure to the recent conflict with ISIL, which enables to assess the impact of the programme in very different contexts.

Before the implementation of the Community Policing Programme, the three communities had varying perceptions of security and police. In general, respondents in Hamdaniyah had the most favorable perceptions of security and police, respondents in Baradiyah had more negative perceptions and Jubeil was in the middle. This ranking remained the same after the implementation of the Programme, but significant improvements in community members' perceptions of security and police occurred.

Across all three communities, the percentage of respondents who perceived the local police as having a positive impact on security significantly increased (58% in Baradiyah, 30% in Hamdaniyah and 11% in Jubeil). Trust in police also increased in two communities (11% in Jubeil and 7% in Hamdaniyah). Despite the tense context when the endline survey was

implemented, with widespread protests against the government, the perceived fairness of the police increased (57% in Hamdaniyah and 9% in Jubeil) and so did the willingness to report crimes to police (30% in Baradiyah and 24% in Jubeil).

The comparison community for Jubeil (Saqlawiyah) did not see as many improvements despite being demographically similar, suggesting that the improvements observed in Jubeil could be due to the Community Policing Programme. As to Baradiyah and its comparison community (Khor al Zubair), the two communities saw similarly mixed results and therefore it is not possible to directly attribute the improvements in Baradiyah to the Community Policing Programme. Possibly, positive effects of the programme spilled over into Khor al Zubair due to the proximity of these two communities.

The three communities, despite their significant demographic and geographical differences, share a negative perception when it comes to the governance provided by the central government. Respondents in all three communities were most concerned about unemployment, basic services, public health and corruption on both the baseline and endline surveys and were much less concerned about security issues and crimes such as attacks by ISIL, revenge killings, kidnapping and harassment.

Despite the encouraging results, there is still room for improvement. In Baradiyah, for instance, which had the most negative perceptions of police and security among the three communities, only 19 per cent of respondents said that they trust the police in both rounds of the survey. For all eight indicators of police legitimacy (trust, respect, feeling listened to, fairness, effectiveness at fighting crime, speed of police response to calls for help, reporting crimes, and sharing information), the percentage of respondents who had favorable views was below 40 per cent on both rounds of the survey. Low levels of trust and cooperation with Police in Baradiyah (compared to higher levels in Jubeil and the highest levels in Hamdaniyah) suggests the need for continuous long-term cooperation with the Government of Iraq to keep providing the relevant institutions – at the

local and central level – with the required technical support, through a tailored and evidence-based programming, aimed at building strong institutional capacity to contribute to good and inclusive security governance.

The results also highlight the need to improve women's access to and representation in security institutions. In general, most women are uncomfortable reporting problems to the police themselves and are also uncomfortable allowing female family members to report problems to the police. Most respondents, men and women, in both rounds of the survey, would not allow a female family member to report a problem to the police on her own.

To date, there has been very little publicly available research on efforts to improve relations between citizens and police in Iraq, perhaps due to the difficulty of conducting research in this immediate post-conflict setting. This study is a first step toward evidence-based evaluation of community policing methods in Iraq. Still, more evidence is needed to understand the impact of community policing methods and to design community policing programs that are well tailored to the diverse contexts in which they are implemented.

ANNEX 1: DEMOGRAPHICS OF SURVEY SAMPLES

Table 5. Treatment Communities, Baseline and Endline Demographics

	JUBEIL, ANBAR		BARADIYAH, BASRA		HAMDANIYAH, NINEWA	
Survey Round	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
Sample Size	N=301	N=302	N=303	N=300	N=307	N=301
Gender	45% Women 55% Men	32% Women 68% Men	32% Women 68% Men	29% Women 71% Men	59% Women 41% Men	57% Women 43% Men
Average Age	39	37	41	41	43	44
Religious Majority	99% Sunni Arab	100% Sunni Arab	97% Shia Arab	94% Shia Arab	92% Christian	91% Christian
Unemployment Rate	34%	26%	15%	11%	13%	11%

Table 6. Anbar, Treatment and Comparison Community Demographics

ANBAR				
	Community with Community Policing: Jubeil		Comparison Community: Saqlawiyah	
Survey Round	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
Sample Size	N=301	N=302	N=102	N=100
Gender	45% Women 55% Men	32% Women 68% Men	39% Women 61% Men	30% Women 70% Men
Average Age	39	37	42	41
Religious Majority	99% Sunni Arab	100% Sunni Arab	99% Sunni Arab	100% Sunni Arab
Unemployment Rate	34%	26%	16%	15%

Table 7. Basra, Treatment and Comparison Community Demographics

BASRA				
	Community with Community Policing: Baradiyah		Comparison Community: Khor al Zubair	
Survey Round	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
Sample Size	N=303	N=300	N=101	N=103
Gender	32% Women 68% Men	29% Women 71% Men	36% Women 64% Men	26% Women 74% Men
Average Age	41	41	43	38
Religious Majority	97% Shia Arab	94% Shia Arab	95% Shia Arab	88% Shia Arab
Unemployment Rate	15%	11%	9%	15%

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